




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Nicomachean Ethics By AristotleCommentary: Quite a few comments have been posted about Nicomachean Ethics. Download: The plain text version is available for download. Nicomachean Ethics By Aristotle Written 350 b.C.E Translated W. D. Ross Table of Contents III 1 Because virtue is concerned about passions and deeds, as well as voluntary passions and acts, praise and accusations are given to those who are unintentional amnesty and sometimes pity, the dismissal of volunteer and involuntary is presumably necessary for those who study the nature of virtue. and also useful to legislators in showing both tributes and punishments. However, these things are premeditated and take place under duress or ignorance; And it is mandatory, of which the moving principle is outside, because it is a principle in which nothing is promoted by a person who acts or feels passion, for example, if he was transported somewhere by the wind, or by the men who got him over. But when it comes to things that are done out of fear of greater evil or some noble object (e.g. if a tyrant ordered to do some foundation when his parents and children were under his control, and if someone did that activity, they would be saved, but otherwise executed), there might be a debate about whether such actions were unintentional or voluntary. Something like this also happens when goods are thrown overboard in a storm; For, in the abstract, no one throws things away voluntarily, but on condition that it protects his safety and that of his crew, any reasonable man will do so. However, such measures are confused, but they are more voluntary; because they are optional when they are made, and the termination of operations is proportional to the situation. Both terms voluntary and unintentional must therefore be used at the time of operation. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him, and the things that the moving principle is in the man are within his power to do or be to do. Such actions are therefore voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps unintentional; no one would choose anything like this in itself. For such acts, people are even praised when they endure something to form or painful in exchange for large and feet of objects; In the opposite case, they are accused, because to endure the greatest indignations about the noble end or insignificance is a sign of the inferior person. In some actions, praise has certainly not been given, but amnesty is when he does what he should not do under pressure that limits human nature too much and that no one can stand. But some acts may not be compelled to do, but rather we should face death after the most fearful suffering; Euripides Alcmaeon to kill his mother seems absurd. Sometimes it is difficult to determine what should be chosen at what price and what should be endured in exchange for the benefits, and it is even more difficult to comply with our decisions; For what is usually expected is painful, and we are forced to set up what is praised and blamed on those who have been coerced or who are not. What kind of acts should then be called mandatory? We reply that, without qualification, actions are so that the fault is in external circumstances and the agent does nothing. But the things that in themselves are unintentional, but now and in exchange for these victories are worthy of choice and whose moving principle is agent, are in themselves unintentional, but now and in exchange for these victories, volunteers. They are more of a voluntary act; the actions are of a special category, and in this case certain actions are voluntary. What kind of things need to be chosen, and in exchange for what is not easy to say;

because there are many differences in specific cases. But if someone said that pleasant and noble objects have compelling power, forcing us away without, any act would be mandatory for them; Because it's because of these things that all men do everything they do. And those who act under duress and act unwillingly under pain, but those who do deeds for pleasantness and nobleness, do so with pleasure; It is absurd to make external circumstances accountable, not to themselves, because they are easily accessible to such attractions, and to hold themselves accountable for the feet of deeds, but pleasant objects that are responsible for the basics. It therefore seems mandatory that a person whose moving principle is outside is not obliged to give anything. Not everything for ignorance is voluntary; Only what causes pain and healing is unintentional. For a man who has done something out of ignorance and does not feel the least temptation to do so has not acted voluntarily because he did not know what he was doing, nor yet unintentionally, because he is not in pain. People who act on ignorance, considered an unwitting agent, and a man who does not repent, can be called a non-volunteer agent because he is different; Because he's different, it's better if he has his own name. For ignorance, action also seems to differ from ignorance; for a man who is drunk or furious is believed not to act as a result of ignorance, but as a result of one of those reasons, but not consciously but ignorant. Now every bad person is ignorant of what he should and should refrain from, and it is this kind of mistake that is due to men become unjust and generally evil; but the term unintentional usually, if a man is unaware of what is his interests - for it is not an erroneous purpose that causes unintentional activity (it leads rather to evil), nor ignorance of the universal (that people are accused), but ignorance of these agglomerations, as opposed to the circumstances of the activity and the objects to which it applies. For it is precisely these things that both pity and amnesty depend on, because a person who is not unaware of any of these acts inadvertently. Perhaps that is why it is just as well to determine their nature and number. Thus, a man may be unaware of who he is, what he is doing, what or on whom he is acting, and sometimes also what (e.g. what instrument) he is doing it for and for what purpose (e.g. he can think of his actions as causing some safety) and how he does it (for example, gently or violently). Now none of these could be ignorant if he were not angry, and apparently he could not be unaware of the agent either; How could he not know himself? But from what he does, the man may be ignorant, for example, people say it slipped out of their mouths when they spoke, or they didn't know it was a secret, as Aeschylus said of the mystery, or the man could say he let it go when he just wanted to show that job like a man did with a catapult. You might think again that the boy was the enemy, as Meropie did, or that the sharp spear had a button or that the stone was a punctured stone; or could give a man a bet to save him and really kill him; Or someone might want to touch a man like people do in sparring and really wound him. Ignorance can therefore be related to any of these things, unlike the circumstances of the action, and a man who was unaware of any of these is believed to have acted unintentionally, and especially if he was unaware of the most important points; and these are thought to be the circumstances of the operation and its termination. Moreover, an act called inadvertent because of ignorance of this kind must be painful and must be accompanied by an improvement. Since what happens under duress or because of ignorance is unintentional, the volunteer appears to be the one in which the moving principle is the agent himself, he is aware of the specific circumstances of the action. Supposedly, acts committed out of anger or appetite are not rightly called intentional. Firstly, in the fact that no other animal works voluntarily, nor do children; and secondly, does that mean that we do not voluntarily do anything out of appetite or anger, or that we do noble things voluntarily and the foundation acts unintentionally? Isn't this absurd when it's one and the same thing? But it would certainly be strange to describe the unintended things that should be desired; And we should both be angry about certain things and have desires for certain things, health and learning. Also what is considered painful, but what is brushed with appetite is considered pleasant. What is also the difference between errors in calculation and inadvertent errors in anger? Both must be avoided, but irrational passions are thought to be as human as reason is, and therefore acts that progress from anger or appetite are also the work of a man. It would be strange to treat them as unintentional. 2 Next, we must discuss the choice after both voluntary and unintentional demaring, it is thought to be most closely linked to virtues and discriminates against characters better than deeds. The choice therefore seems voluntary, but not the same as the voluntary one; the latter extends more widely. For both children and inferior animals, a share of voluntary action, but not selection, and actions taken with the encouragement of the moment, which we describe as voluntary but not selected. Those who say it is appetite, anger or desire or some kind of opinion do not seem to be right. For choice is not common even for irrational creatures, but appetite and anger are. Once again, a retious man acts with appetite, but not with selection; whereas a person on the continent, on the contrary, acts with choice, but not with appetite. Again, appetite is anti-choice, but no appetite. Again, appetite is associated with a pleasant and painful choice, neither painful nor pleasant. Even less is anger; because of hatred, actions are thought to be less than any other choice. But it also does not hope, although it seems to be close to it; because the choice cannot be related to the impossible, and if someone said they had chosen them, they would be confused as foolish; But there may even be a wish for the impossible, for example immortality. And the wish may relate to things that under no circumstances can be achieved through their own efforts, for example, that a particular actor or athlete should win in a competition; But no one chooses such things, but only the things that he thinks could be achieved through his own efforts. Again, the wish is more related to the main course, the choice of means; For example, we want to be healthy, but we choose the actions that make us healthy, and we want to be happy and say so, but we cannot well say that we choose to be so; because, in general, the choice seems to be related to matters that are within our own power. For this reason too, it cannot be an opinion; opinion is thought to be related to all kinds of things, no less to eternal things and impossible things than to the affairs of our own power; And it stands out in its injustice or truth, not its evil or good, while choice stands out rather from these. Now that there's an opinion in general, maybe no one's even saying it's identical. But it's not even identical. With statements; because by choosing what is good or bad, we are a man of a certain nature who we are not holding Opinions. And we decide to get or avoid something good or bad, but we have opinions about what the thing is or who it is good for or how it is good for him; I don't think we can be said to get or avoid anything. And the choice is praised for being related to the right subject rather than being rightly related to it, the opinion that it is actually related to its goal. And we choose what we know best to be good, but we think of what we do not quite know; And it is not the same people who think about making the best choices and getting the best opinions, but some are thought to have pretty good opinions, but for vice to choose what they should not. If an opinion precedes or follows a choice, it is irrelevant; It is not a question of considering, but of whether it is identical to some kind of opinion. What, then, or what is it like, because it is one of the things we mentioned? It seems voluntary, but it's not voluntary to be a choice. So is it a question of what has been decided in the previous deliberations? In any case, the choice involves a rational principle and an idea. Even the name seems to suggest that it will be chosen before other things. 3 Are we thinking about everything, and is everything possible a matter of reflection, or is it impossible to deal with some issues? We should not call what a fool or a madman would talk about, but what a reasonable man would consider, a matter of reflection. Now for eternal things that no one thinks about, for example, the material universe or the unsuitability of the diagonal and square side. However, we no longer talk about things that involve movement, but which always happen in the same way, whether it is necessity, nature or any other reason, such as the daytime stopstices and the rise of the stars; and not things that are happening now in one way, now in another, such as drought and rain; And no coincidences like finding treasure. However, we are not even talking about all human issues; For example, no Spartan is talking about the best Constitution for Scythians. Because none of these things can be achieved through our own actions. We are talking about things that are within our power and that can be done; And these are actually what's left. For nature, necessity and chance are considered causes and also reason and everything that depends on the man. Now every class of men is thinking about things you can do with your own efforts. And in the case of accurate and independent sciences, there is no reflection on, for example, the letters of the alphabet (for we have no doubt about how they should be written); But the things that are achieved through our own actions, but not always in the same way, are things that we talk about, for example, medical treatment or And we will do so more if: navigational art than gymnastics art, as it has been less precisely clear, and again about other things in the same proportions and also in terms of art and sciences; We have more doubts about the old one. Reflection is about things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but where the event is unclear, and things where it is undefined. We call on others to help us consider important issues and to trust that we are not equal in decision-making. We're not thinking about goals, we're thinking about means. For the doctor does not think about whether he will heal, nor the speaker, whether he will agree, nor the statesman, whether he will produce law and order, nor anyone else who will consider deciding him. They will take the end and consider how and how to achieve it; and if it appears to have been produced by several means, they will consider how it is easiest and best produced, while if it is achieved by only one, they will consider how to achieve it with this and how to achieve this until they come to the first cause, which in the order of discovery is the last. For the person considering seems to study and analyze as described as if he is analyzing the geometric structure (not all studies seem to be reflection - mathematical studies, for example - but all consideration is research), and what is the last in the order of analysis seems to be the first in the order that it becomes. And if we are impossible, we will give up the search, for example, if we need money and it cannot be obtained; But if anything seems possible, we'll try to do it. By what is possible, I am referring to things that could be achieved through our own actions; And these, in a way, contain things that can be achieved through the efforts of our friends, because the moving principle is in ourselves. The research sometimes concerns instruments, sometimes their use; and also in other cases - sometimes means, sometimes the way it is used, or the means of bringing it. It therefore seems, as has been said, that man is a moving principle of action; Now the deliberations are about the things that the agent himself has to do, and the actions are for the sake of anyone but himself. For decision-made cannot be a matter of consideration, but only means; Nor can it be a question of specific facts, because whether it is bread or whether it is baked as it should; Because these are observationals. If we're always going to have a conversation, we have to go to infinity. The same thing has been considered and chosen, except that the subject of the selection is already decisive, since the choice has decided what has been decided as a result of consideration. Every single person stops inquiring about what to do when he has brought in the principle back to itself and to the dominant part of itself; This is what you choose. This is also clear from the ancient Constitution that Homer represented; After the kings' choices. The aim of the choice is to be one of the things in our own power that is desired after reflection, the choice is the deliberate desire for things within our own power; because once we have decided as a result of the proceedings, we want to be at our discretion. We can therefore take the view that we have described the choice and established the nature of its sites and the fact that this is a matter of means. 4 This hope is that the end has already been implemented; Some think it's good, others for the apparent good. Now those who say that good is the object of hope must admit that what a man who does not choose directly is not the object of the wish (for if that is the case, it must also be good, but it was, if it did, bad); While those who say obviously good is the object of hope must admit that there is no natural object of desire, but only what feels good for every man. Now different things seem good to different people, and if that happens, even the opposite. If these consequences are unwe dear, do we have to say that absolutely and in reality good is the object of hope, but obviously good for everyone; that what is actually the object of hope is the object of a good man's wish, while any possibility can be such a bad man, as in the case of bodies, things that are actually healthy are healthy for bodies in good health, while for those who are sick, other things are healthy or bitter or sweet or hot or heavy. and so on; Because a good man judges every class right, and in every one, the truth appears to him? For each state of character has its own ideas about noble and pleasant, and perhaps a good person differs most from others by looking at the truth in every category of things, because that was their norm and measure. In most things, the error seems to be due to pleasure; Because it looks good when it's not. That's why we choose pleasantly good and avoid pain as evil. 5. Therefore, because we hope for what means we will think and choose, the measures must be choice-based and voluntary. Now the practice of virtue is about means. That is why virtue is also in our own power, and so is vice. For where we have the power to act is also within our power not to deliver and vice versa; So that if we act, where this is noble, we are in power, that we do not act, which is the basis, is also in our power, and if we do not act, where it is noble, there will be us, action that is the basis, will also be in our power. If it is within our power to make noble or basics, and so is not in our power. Do so, and this is what good or evil meant, then it is in our power to be virt or vicious. The saying no one is voluntarily evil and unintentionally happy seems partly wrong and partly true; No one is inadvertently happy, but evil is voluntary. Otherwise, we will have to argue about what has just been said and deny that man is a moving principle or his children. But if these facts are obvious and we cannot refer to principles other than the moving principles of ourselves, actions whose moving principles are in us must also be in our power and voluntary. Both individuals and legislators themselves seem to bear witness testimony on this; for they punish and retaliate against those who commit evil acts (unless they have acted under duress or as a result of ignorance for which they themselves are not responsible), while respecting those who commit noble acts, as if they had intended to encourage the latter and intimidate the latter. But no one is encouraged to do things that are neither within our power nor voluntary; let us assume that there is no point in persuading people not to be hot or in pain, or hungry or like that, because we experience these feelings anyway. We therefore punish a man for ignorance if he is thought to be responsible for ignorance, as when penalties are doubled in the case of drunken ingestion; Because the moving principle is in the man himself, because he had the power not to be and his drinking was the reason for his ignorance. We also punish those who feel nothing in the laws they should know, and that is not difficult, and so is everything else they are believed to be ignorant of through negligence; we assume that it is within their power to be undesert ignorant because they have the power to care. But maybe he's the kind of man who doesn't take care of him. Yet they themselves are responsible for their limp lives for become such men, and men are responsible for injustice or self-centeredness, on the one hand by cheating and, on the other, by spending their time drinking and the like; because it is actions that are performed on specific objects that make a corresponding character. This is clear when people train for any competition or activity; they carry out activities all the time. Now it is not necessary to know that the pursuit of the activity of certain objects produces character traits is a sign of a completely irrational person. Again, it is absurd to assume that a man who acts unfairly does not want to be unfair or a man who behaves in a self-centered manner to be self-centered. But if without ignorance, a man does things that make him he's unjust voluntarily. However, it does not follow that if he wants to, he to be unjust and just be. Because a sick man isn't well on those terms either. We can assume he's sick voluntarily, living with restraint and disobeying his doctors. In that case, it was open to him not to get sick then, but not now that he has thrown away his chances, just as when you have let go of the stone, it is too late to return it; But it was your power to throw it because you had the moving principle. So it was open to unjust and self-centered men at the beginning not to fire such men, so they are unjust and selfish voluntarily; But now that they've become so, there's no way they're not. But the vices of the soul are not only voluntary, but also for some of the men we blame; Although no one blames those who are ugly in nature, we blame those who are so exercise and care. This is also the case in terms of weakness and weakness; No one would reproach a blind man for being born, aceries or a blow, but rather would feel sorry for him, while everyone would blame a man who was blind to drunkenness or other self-centeredness. The vices of the body are blamed on those who are not in our power. And if so, in other cases the guilty vices must also be within our power. Now someone can say that all people want obviously good, but can't control the appearance, but the rest shows every man in a form that responds to his character. We answer that if every man is somehow responsible for his state of mind, he is also somehow responsible for the appearance; But if not, no one is responsible for his own evil, but everyone does bad things through ignorance about the end, thinking that with these he gets what is best, and in the end the aim is not self-chosen, but must be born as it has been born with an eye to judge correctly and choose what is really good... and he is well equipped with a character that is well equipped with this. For it is largest and noble, and what we cannot get or learn from another, but it must be exactly as it was when we were given at birth, and to be well and nobly equipped this is a perfect and real excellence of natural equipment. If this is true, how is virtue more voluntary than vice? For both men, good and bad, the ending appears and is in character or however it is, and referring to everything else this men do what they do. Is it not, then, a condition of his character that the end should show every man, as it seems, but something also depends on him, or the rest is natural, but since a good man uses means voluntarily virtue is voluntary, the vice is equally voluntary; for in the case of an evil man there is just as much present the one that depends on the even if not at the end of the day. If virtues are voluntary, as has been said (for we are somehow partly responsible for our character traits, and by being certain types of people we assume that the end is so and so), the vices are also voluntary; the same goes for them. As far as virtues in general are concerned, we have said, by their family, that they are means and that they are of their nature and that, by their nature and nature, they tend to do the acts by which they were produced, that they are under our control and voluntary and operate according to the right rule. However, the actions and nature are not voluntary in the same way; for we control our activities from start to finish, if we know certain facts, but although we control the beginning of our character traits, gradual progress is no more evident than in disease; However, since we had the power to act in this way or not in this way, the states are voluntary. However, let us take up the many virtues and say what they are and what they are and how they are linked to them; At the same time, it becomes clear how many there are. Let us first talk about courage. 6 The fact that it is mean in terms of feelings of fear and trust has already become clear, and clearly the things we fear are terrible things, and these are, speak without competence, evil; That's why people even define fear as an expectation of evil. Now we fear all evil, such as shame, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death, but a brave man is not believed to be worried about everyone; fearing some things is even right and noble, and there is a basis for not being afraid of them, for example shame; Anyone who fears this is good and modest, and anyone who is not is, is shameless. However, some people who are called courageous say that the word will be transferred to a new meaning; Because there's something about him that's like a brave man, because a brave man is also a fearless person. Perhaps we should not be afraid of poverty and disease, nor in general things that do not progress from vices and are not on the man himself. But even a fearless man is not brave. Yet we also use the word on him for similarity; For some who are cowards at risk of war, they are liberal and rely on the loss of money. Nor is a man a coward if he fears insulting his wife and children, or envy or anything like that; And not brave if he's confident when he's whipped. What kind of terrible things is a brave man worried about? Certainly the greatest; No one is more likely than him to stand up to what is awe-inspiring. Now death is the most terrible; for it is over, and nothing is anymore Or bad for the dead. But a brave man does not seem to be worried even about death in all circumstances, for example at sea or in diseases. Under what circumstances, then? Probably the noblest. Now such deaths are in battle; Because they are most at risk and in danger of the most noble danger. And these are respected accordingly in city states and monarchs' courts. Then he is duly called the brave, fearless in noble death and in all emergencies involving death; And the emergencies of war are, to the highest possible extent, like this. However, even at sea and in diseases, a brave man is fearless, but not in the same way as a sailor; For he has given up hope for safety and loathes thinking about death in this form, while they are hopeful for their experience. At the same time, we show courage in situations where there is an opportunity to demonstrate capabilities or where death is noble; but in these forms of death neither of these conditions is met. 7 What is terrible is not the same for all men; But we say there are things that are terrible even outside of human power. These are then terrible for everyone - at least every reasonable man; but terrible things that are not beyond human strength differ in scope and scope, and so do those things that inspire confidence. Now a brave man is as scary as a man can be. Thus, though he fears even those things that are not beyond the reach of human power, he encounters them as he should and, as a rule, directs, for the sake of honor; This is the end of virtue. But it is possible to fear these more or less and again fear things that are not terrible as if they were. One of the faults made is to be afraid of what should not be, the other is afraid as we should not, the other is afraid when we should not, and so on; and so do those things that inspire confidence. A man who confronts and fears the right things and the right motive, in the right way and at the right time, and who feels confidence in similar circumstances, is courageous; because a brave man knows and acts on the merits of the case and how the rule guides. Now the end of each activity is the conformity of a similar character. So this applies to both a brave man and others. But courage is noble. Therefore, the end is also noble; each matter shall be determined by the end therein. That's why a brave man endures and acts as a courage-driven noble end. Of those who go too far, he who transcends fearlessness has no name (we have previously said that many character traits have no names), but he would be a kind of maniac or unflinching person if he was not afraid of anything, no earthquakes and no waves, as they say, do not; Whereas a man who confidentially transcends what really is terrible is hasty. A hasty man. Man. he is also thought to be bragging and just pretending to be courage; in any case, as a brave man is about what is terrible, such a hasty man wants to appear; And so he imitates her in situations where she can. Therefore, most of them are a mixture of rash and cowardice; for, although in these situations they are confident, they do not hold their ground against what is truly terrible. A man who crosses in fear is a coward; for he fears both what he should not and should not, and all the same characterizations that relate to him. He also lacks trust; But he shines more from his excessive fear in painful situations. So the coward is a desperate person; Because he's afraid of everything. A brave man, on the other hand, has the opposite attitude; trust is a sign of a hopeful attitude. The coward, the hasty man and the brave man then worry about the same objects, but disagree with them; the first two crossings and fall short, while the third holds the middle one, which is correct, the position; and hasty men prey and they hope for dangers in advance, but retreat when they are in them, while brave men are eager at the moment of action, but quiet in advance. So, as we have said, courage is a nasty thing in matters that inspire confidence or fear once the circumstances have been established. and it chooses or endures things because it is noble or because it is the basis for not delivering it. But death from poverty, love or anything painful is not a sign of a brave man, but rather a coward; it has the softness to fly from what is troublesome, and such a man endures death, not because it is noble, but flies from evil. 8 Courage is therefore something like this, but the name also applies to the other five. First comes the courage of a citizen soldier; It's like real courage. Civil soldiers appear to be at risk from the punishments imposed by the laws and the repressings they otherwise inflict and the tributes they receive through such action. And that is why those peoples seem to be the bravest, among whom cowards are held in honorable and courageous men. This is the kind of courage Homer describes, for example, in Diomedea and Hector: First Polydamas must then reproach me; And for Hector one day, the Trojans will recite his vault harangue: Afraid of tydeids and fleeing my face. Such courage is most than when we described earlier, because it is due to virtue; for it is due to shame and noble object (i.e. glory) and avoidance of shame, which is shameful. For those forced by their rulers could be placed in the same category; but they are inferior because they do what they do not out of shame but out of fear, and do not avoid what is shameful, but For their hosts force them, as Hector does; But if I spy on any glare that cowers far from the battle, Vainly hopes to escape the dogs. And those who give them their office and defeat them if they withdraw do the same, and so do those who draft them in the trenches or something like that behind them; All of these are compulsive. But you should be brave, not under duress, but because it's noble to be so. (2) Experience with certain facts is also regarded as courage. That is why Mr Socrates saw courage as information. Other people show this quality in other dangers, and professional soldiers demonstrate this in the dangers of war; it seems that there are a lot of empty alarms in the war, of which they have had the most comprehensive experience; That's why they seem brave, because others don't know the nature of the facts. Once again, their experience makes them the most capable of attacking and defending, because they can use their weapons and be the ones that are probably best for both attack and defense; therefore, they fight like armed men against unarmed or trained athletes against amateurs; for also in such competitions the bravest men do not fight best, but those who are strongest and whose body is in the best condition. However, professional soldiers become cowards when they are over-burdened by danger and are inferior in number and equipment; for they are the first to fly, while the citizens die in their positions, as actually happened in the Temple of Hermes. Because it is shameful for the latter flight and death is better than safety under these conditions; whereas the first from the beginning faced danger, waiting for them to be stronger, and when they know the facts, they fly fearing death more than danger; But a brave man is not that kind of person. (3) Passion is sometimes seen as courage; those who act out of passion, such as wild beasts rushing over those who wounded them, are considered brave, because brave men are also passionate; passion above all is eager to rush into danger, and that's why Homerin puts strength into his passion and aroused their spirit and passion and hard he breathed panting and his blood boiled. All such expressions seem to indicate the confusion and beginning of passion. Now brave men act for glory, but passion helps them; whereas wild beasts act under the influence of pain; for they attack because they are wounded or because they are afraid, because if they are in the forest, they will not come anywhere near one. Thus, they are not brave, because driven by pain and passion, they rush into danger without anticipating any of the dangers, because at this rate even donkeys would be brave when they are hungry; impacts do not drive away from their food; and lust also causes adulterers to do many daring things. (Those who then are not brave, who are driven to danger by pain or passion.) The courage of passion seems natural and courageous if you add choice and motive to it. Then people and beasts suffer pain when they are angry, and are satisfied when they retaliate; however, those who fight for these reasons are cranky, but not courageous; for they do not act for glory or rule, but for the power of feeling; But they have some courage. (4) Nor is the Sanguine people courageous; for they are confident in danger only because they have won often and against many enemies. Yet they closely resemble brave men, because both are confident; But brave men are confident for the reasons mentioned above, while these are so because they think they are the strongest and can suffer nothing. (Drunk men also behave in this way; they become sanguine). However, when their adventures fail, they flee; But it was a sign of a brave man to face things that are and look terrible to a man because it is noble to do so and shameful not to assume so. Therefore, a braver man is also seen as being fearless and undisturbed in sudden alarms than foreseeable. for it must have progressed more from character to character, because less from preparation; the anticipated actions may be selected by calculation and rule, but the sudden actions shall be of a nature. (5) People who are not unaware of danger also seem courageous, and they are not far from sanguine temperament, but are inferior because they have no self-confidence when they are. Consequently, sanguine will also hold its own for some time; But those who have been deceived by the facts fly if they know or suspect that these are different from what they assumed, as happened to the Argives when they fell out with the Spartans and took them on behalf of the Scyons. We have therefore described the nature of both the brave and those who thought they were brave. 9 Although courage is about feelings of trust and fear, it is not about both, but more about things that inspire fear; For anyone who is undisturbed in front of these and carries himself as he should towards them is truly braver than the man who does so as trust-building things. As has been said, men are called brave because they face what is painful. That is why courage also involves pain, and it is rightly praised; it is more difficult to face what is painful than to refrain from what is pleasant. However, the ending that courage sets before then seems pleasing, but the conditions involved mask it, as it does in sporting competitions; For the ending that boxers aim for is pleasing - the crown and - but their blows are distressing to meat and blood, blood, painful, and so is their entire exertion; And since the blows and strains are many, the ending, which is only small, does not seem to be anything pleasant. And so, if courage is the same, death and wounds are painful for a brave man and against his will, but he faces them because it is noble or because it is the basis for not doing so. And the more virtue he has in his entirety and the happier he is, the more he agonized over the thought of death; Because life is best lived for such a man, and he consciously loses the greatest things, and this is painful. But he is just as brave, and perhaps all the more so because he chooses noble night of war at that price. It is therefore not the case that with all virtues their use is pleasant, except in case it reaches its end. But it is quite possible that the best soldiers may not be such men, but those who are less courageous but have no other good; Because these are willing to face danger, and they're selling their lives for a petty crime. So much for courage; It is not difficult to understand its nature according to the contours, at least not according to what has been said. 10 Let us speak of temperament after courage; Because these seem to be the virtues of irrational parts. We have said that temperament is mean in terms of pleasure (for it is less and not in the same way that concerns pain); self-centeredness is also manifested in the same field. So let us decide what kind of pleasures they are concerned about. We can assume that there is a difference between physical pleasures and soul pleasures, such as love of honor and love of learning; for the lover of every joy in which he is a lover, the body has in no way influenced, but rather the mind; but men who are concerned about such pleasures are not called temperate or self-centered. Neither are those who are concerned about other pleasures that are not bodily; For those who want to hear and tell stories and who spend their days anywhere that appears are called gossip, but not self-centered, nor those who are in pain from losing money or friends. Temperance must be concerned about bodily pleasures, but not even these; those who rejoice in visual objects such as colours and shapes and painting are not called temperate or self-centered; Nevertheless, it seems possible to delight in these too, either as it should, or too much or in deficient numbers. And so it is with hearing aids; No one invites those who rejoice lavishly in music or behave self-centredly, nor those who do as they should be temperately. Nor do we use these names for those who enjoy the smell, unless otherwise it is; we do not invite those self-centered who enjoy the smell of roses or incense, but those who enjoy or fines for containers; for self-centered people, joy from these, because they remind them of the objects of their appetite. And you can even see other people when they are hungry, rejoice in the smell of food; but rejoicing in such a thing is the mark of a self-centered person; Because these are objects of appetite for him. Animals other than humans also have no pleasure associated with these senses, except otherwise. For dogs are not delighted with the smell of a hare, but for eating them, but the smell told them that the hare was there; the lion also rejoices not in the scales of the bull, but in eating it; but he noticed that it was close, and therefore he seems to rejoice in the shallows; And similarly, he is not happy because he sees a stag or a wild goat, but because he is going to make it a meal. Temperament and self-centeredness, however, are concerned about the pleasures that other animals share, which seems slavish and brutal; These are touch and taste. But even from taste they seem to be of little or no use; there is a discrimination against tastes in the taste business, carried out by wine knights and people who flavour dishes; But they hardly enjoy the fact that these discrimination, or at least self-centered people, do not do so, but real pleasure, which in all cases occurs through contact, both in the case of food, drink and intercourse. That's why one gourmand prayed that his throat would get longer than that of a crane, suggesting that he enjoyed the touch. Thus, the feeling that self-centeredness is most interrelated is most widely shared from the senses; and self-centeredness seems to be quite reprehensible, because it does not attach itself to us men, but as animals. So it is brutal to rejoice in such things and love them above all else. Even the most liberal pleasures of touch have been eliminated, for example, those produced in the gymnasium by rubbing and the heat that follows; the touch feature of a self-centered person does not affect the whole body, but only certain parts. Among appetites, some appear to be common, others are characteristic of individuals and acquired; for example, food craving is natural, because anyone who is without it craves food or drink and sometimes both and love too (as Homer says) if he is young and horny; But not everyone misses this or that kind of nourishment or love, nor the same things. That's why this lust seems to be ours. However, there is, of course, something natural about it; different things are pleasant for different people, and some things are more pleasant for everyone than objects of chance. Now, in natural desires, few go wrong, and only in one direction, to excesses; eat or drink what provides itself until is surfed is to exceed the natural amount, since natural appetite is replenishment of the deficiency. Therefore, these people are called the belly god, which means that they fill their stomachs with what is right. A people of a completely slave nature comes like this. But when it comes to pleasures specific to individuals, many people go wrong and in many ways. For while people who like it and so are called so because they rejoice either in the wrong things or more than most people do, or in the wrong way, the self-centered transcend in all three ways; they both rejoice in some of the things they shouldn't enjoy (because they're hostile), and if they should rejoice in some of the things they enjoy, they do so more than one should and than most men do. So it is clear that the excesses of pleasure are self-centered and guilty; in terms of pain, as in the case of courage, there is no temperate encounter with them or self-centered, because he does not do so, but a self-centered man is so-called because he is more painful than he should get pleasant things (even his pain due to pleasure), and temperate man is called so because he is not in pain that there is no pleasantness and that he abstains from it. So a self-centered person covets all pleasant things or those that are most pleasant, and is led by his desire to choose all these at the price of everything else; therefore, he is in pain both when he does not receive them, and when he only craves them (there is pain associated with appetite); But it seems absurd to be pained for pleasure. People who do not like pleasures and rejoice in them less than they should are hardly found; Because this kind of insensitiveness is not human. Even other animals distinguish different foods and enjoy some and not others; And if someone finds nothing pleasant and nothing more attractive than anything else, they must be something quite different from man; Such a person has not been named because he is unlikely to appear. The temperate man is the middle man when it comes to these things. For he does not enjoy the things that a self-centered person enjoys the most, but rather does not like them - and usually not things he shouldn't, nor anything like this excessive, nor does he feel pain or lust when they are away, or does so only to a reasonable extent, and no more than he should, and not when he shouldn't, and so on; but things that please, make for health or good condition, he wants in moderation and as he should, and also other pleasant things if they do not stand in the way of these endings or against the noble or beyond his means. For anyone who neglects these conditions loves such pleasures more they are worth, but a temperate man is not such a person, but such a person. Person. that the correct rule provides. 12 Self-centeredness is more of a voluntary state than cowardice. Since the first works with pleasure, the latter with pain, one of which must be chosen and the second must be avoided; and pain shocks and destroys the character of the person who knows it, while pleasure does nothing like that. That's why self-centeredness is voluntary. That is why it is also more a question of repro't. it is easier to get used to its objects, since there are many such things in life, and their process of getting used to is harmless, while with terrible objects the opposite. But cowardice seems to be voluntary to a different degree from its specific manifestations; for it itself is painless, but in these we are shocked by the pain so that even we throw our hands down and shame ourselves in other ways; That's why our actions are even thought to be compulsive. On behalf of a self-centered person, certain acts are voluntary on the one hand (for he does them with lust and desire), but the whole state is less; No one needs self-centeredness. The name self-centeredness also applies to childish defects; Because they are, to a certain extent, parallel to what we have considered. What is called after that is of no relevance to the current main purpose; However, it is clear that the later one will be called after the previous one. Moving the name does not look bad; for whoever wants what is the basis and which develops rapidly should be kept under control, and these qualities belong above all to appetite and child, because children actually live by the call and invitation of appetite, and it is in them that the desire for what is pleasant is strongest. Therefore, if it is not obedient and under the principle of decision, it goes a long way; for in the senseless creature the desire for pleasure is insatiable, even if it tries all the forces of satisfaction, and the practice of appetite increases its innate power, and if appetites are intense and violent, they even expel the computing power. They should therefore be moderate and few, and under no circumstances should they oppose the rational principle - and this is what we call an obedient and chastened state - and since the child should

live by the guidance of his teacher, then the appetitive element should live up to the rational principle. Therefore, the appeasing element of temperate man should align with the rational principle; for the nobleman is the mark that both aim for, and the temperate man craving things as he should, as he should; and when he should; and this is driven by rational principle. This is where we decide on the temperament of our check. Contents

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