


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## In nims when do managers

Barbara Bean-Mellinger Management More articles for you Not all animals are created equal. If you have to work with animals, I would recommend working with sea lions, which are lovely and trainable creatures, says co-director Mark Levin. Spud and Friday, two Sea World Australia sea lions, shared the role of Selkie -- and arrived on set already able to kiss, greet and embrace. But because the marine couple had no previous film experience, they had to get used to the cameras, lights and crew and feel comfortable with Abigail Breslin. Coaches Katie Brock, who worked at Babe: Pig in the City, and John Medlin had breslin and fed them fish every day before filming began. She really trained them well. In fact, he became very involved in training, says producer Paula Mazur. Breslin, who has two dogs, two cats and a turtle and wants to be a vet if the performance doesn't work, joined the 400-pound sea lions. They approach you and kiss you, he says. Sea lions drove the schedule and making the film in a very substantial way, Levin notes. They were not allowed to be anywhere, but in the studio. They were not allowed to go to the beach for fear that they would break for freedom. This needed an animatronic stand-in for scenes on the beach. Using Friday as a model, animatronic supervisor John Cox carved out a facsimile covered in skin and oil, for a wet look. He also created animatronic sea turtles, making research trips to Sea World to observe, measure and photograph specimens. Similar stand-ins were required for a scene in which nim slingshots several lizards in the air, but the bearded dragon playing his companion, Fred, was real -- in multiples. Five different reptiles played the part. They are kept in a kind of igloo ice chest to stay cool, and as their body temperature warms up, then they become more ornery and become less fun to have around. The lizard would always perch on Abby's shoulder, but then, when it warmed up, it would crawl on top of her head, and we always had to pull it out and carry a cold lizard. Getting the lizards to react was an exercise in patience. If you keep the camera on the lizard long enough and put enough bugs in front of it, it will turn its head, Levin explains. Co-director Jennifer Flackett supplied sounds that gave Fred a voice. But make him dance? Forget it. We had asked the coaches what tricks sea lions could do, and we wrote these things in the film, like the dance scene, Levin says. But getting the lizards dancing was something we did with computers. Interacting with the bearded dragons spooked Breslin in the admits, but then I overcame it. One of the dragons, Goblet, laid a dozen eggs while shooting. The first was called Nim -- and the second, second, Product Manager. Ex-Farfetch, Skyscanner. Working on something new. One of the most important aspects of building large product organizations is to design a system where builders thrive. A group of well-organized, ambitious but humble, intelligent people is an unstoppable force. For managers, this means hiring and enhancing direct reports so that they fulfil their aspirations and channels their strengths in the direction of a better product, but also of construction teams that are able to discover this product that changes the course of the company, which probably still do not know it must exist. So what distinguishes great managers? Read on to find out. Empowerment vs InspirationGood managers empower their teams to achieve their goals. Great managers inspire their teams to go beyond their self-imposed restrictions. Listening vs EmpathizingG managers hear more than they talk. Great managers understand, resonate, empathize and are vulnerable to their own opportunities for improvement. Transparency vs CommunicationGood managers are transparent, sincere and clear. Great managers change people's careers by showing them what is possible through great communication. Construction systems that build productsGood managers structure processes and practices that do the job smoothly. Great manager structure systems that build products, where people feel empowered by boundaries and can use them to discover 10x improvements to the current product. Security and meaningGood managers make people feel safe and productive. Great managers make people feel sense, purpose and dynamization to come to work. Turning the impact into forceGood managers are concerned about their direct reports on a personal level. Great managers have a deep level of empathy for everyone around them and create lasting bonds from potential conflicts. Elaboration of strategic narrativeGood managers can talk comfortably about macro strategy and minute execution details. The great managers elaborate a compelling narrative, where direct reports are encouraged to participate actively. His entry restructures the talks decisively. The composite value of manager good relationships regularly check-in with their teams and direct reports and have a list of things that are obstacles and pains that are working through right now. The big managers ensure the value of these composite sessions over time maintaining a long-term record of what has worked, what has not and what continues to rise despite our best efforts. Specific managers and actionable InsightsGood help their people overcome and improve their jobs. Great managers are specific about how people can improve, and analyze the problem through the goal of personal challenges, stories and goals. Join Hacker Noon Create your free account to unlock your custom reading experience. In Brazil, where paternalism and the fiefdom of the family business are still I am president of a manufacturing company that treats its 800 employees as responsible adults. Most of them, including factory workers, set up their own working hours. All have access to the company's books. The vast majority vote on many important corporate decisions. Everyone gets paid for the month, regardless of job description, and more than 150 of our managers set their own salaries and bonuses. This may seem like an unconventional way to run a business, but it seems to work. Nearing the financial meltst In 1980, Semco is now one of Brazil's fastest growing companies, with a profit margin in 1988 of 10% on sales of \$37 million. Our five factories produce a range of sophisticated products, including marine pumps, digital scanners, commercial dishwashers, truck filters and mixing equipment for everything from bubble gum to rocket fuel. Our customers include Alcoa, Saab and General Motors. We have built several biscuit factories for Nabisco, Nestlé and United Biscuits. Our multinational competitors include AMF, Worthington Industries, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Carrier. Management associations, trade unions and the press have repeatedly appointed us the best company in Brazil to work with. In fact, we no longer advertise jobs. Word of mouth generates up to 300 applications for each available position. Among the top five managers —we call them directors—are a former human resources director at Ford Brazil, a 15-year veteran Chrysler executive, and a man who quit his job as chairman of a larger company to come to Semco. When I joined the company in 1980, 27 years after my father founded it, Semco had about 100 employees, manufactured hydraulic pumps for ships, generated about \$4 million in revenue, and teetered on the brink of catastrophe. Throughout 1981 and 1982, we ran from bank to bank in search of loans, and fought persistent and well-founded rumors that the company was in danger of going under. We often stay through the nightly reading archives and search for the desk drawers of veteran executives to get clues about long-time contracts indeed privately and privately forgotten. Most external managers and directors agreed on two immediate needs: professionalize and diversify. In fact, both measures had been discussed for years, but had never progressed beyond wishful thinking. For two years, holding out on our fingers, we sought licenses to manufacture products from other companies in Brazil. We traveled constantly. I remember one day being in Oslo for breakfast, New York for lunch, Cincinnati for dinner, and San Francisco at night. The obstacles were great. Our company did not have an international reputation, and so did our country. Brazil's political eccentricities and draconian business regulations spooked many companies. However, good luck and a relentless programme of beating the corporate bushes in continents finally paid off. By 1982, we had signed seven licensing agreements. Our marine division —once the whole company- fell to 60% of total sales. In addition, managers and managers were all professionals uns connected to the family. With Semco back on his feet, we entered an acquisitions phase that cost millions of dollars in expenses and millions more in losses over the next two or three years. All this growth was financed by banks at interest rates, usually 30% above the rate of inflation, which ranged from 40% to 900% annually. There was no long-term money in Brazil at the time, so all these loans had maximum conditions of 90 days. We didn't get a penny from the government or incentive agencies either, and we never paid a penny in graft or bribes. How did we do it and survive? Hard work, of course. And good luck, fundamental to all business success. But the most important thing, I think, were the drastic changes we made in our management concept. Without these changes, not even hard work and good luck could have pulled us through. Semco has three fundamental values on which we base about 30 management programs. These values —democracy, distribution of profits and information- work in a complicated circle, with each dependent on the other two. If we removed one, the others wouldn't make sense. Our corporate structure, employee freedoms, union relations, factory size limitations, all are products of our commitment to these principles. It is never easy to transplant management programs from one company to another. In South America, it is axiomatic that our structure and style cannot be duplicated. Semco is too small, too old, too far away, too young, too old, or too hateful. We can also be too specialized. We manufacture cellular manufacturing of technologically sophisticated products, and we work at the high end in quality and price. So our critics may be right. Perhaps nothing we've done can be a plan for anyone else. However, in an industrial world whose methods show obvious signs of exhaustion, the merit of sharing the experience is to encourage experimentation and plant the seeds of conceptual change. So what. Participatory hot air The first of Semco's three values is democracy, or employee involvement. Clearly, workers who control their working conditions will be happier than workers who do not. Just as clearly, there is no contest between the company that buys the chilling fulfillment of its workforce and the company that enjoys the entrepreneurial participation of its employees. But about 90% of the time, participatory management is hot air. Not that intentions aren't good. It's just that implementing employee engagement is so complex, so difficult, and, no wonder, so frustrating that it's easier to talk than to do. We have found four major obstacles to management: size, hierarchy, lack of motivation and ignorance. In an immense production unit, people feel tiny, nameless, and unable to exert influence over the way work is done or on the ultimate benefit done. This feeling of helplessness is underlined by managers who, jealous of their power and prerogatives, refuse to let subordinates make decisions for themselves — sometimes even going to the bathroom. But even if size and hierarchy can be exceeded, why should workers care about the company's productivity and profits? On the other hand, even if you can get them to worry, how can they tell you when they are doing the right thing? As Antony Jay pointed out in the 1950s at Corporation Man, humans were not designed to work in large groups. Until recently, our ancestors were hunters and gatherers. For more than five million years, they refined their ability to work in groups of no more than a dozen people. Then comes the industrial revolution, and suddenly workers are trying to function efficiently in factories that employ hundreds and even thousands. Organizing these hundreds into teams of about ten members each can help some, but there is still a limit to how many small teams can work well together. At Semco, we found the most effective production unit made up of about 150 people. The exact number is open to argument, but it is clear that several thousand people in a facility make individual participation an illusion. When we made the decision to keep our units small, we immediately focused on a facility that had more than 300 people. The unit manufactured commercial food service equipment - cutters, scales, meat grinders, mixers - and used an MRP II system connected to an IBM mainframe with dozens of terminals throughout the plant. Paperwork often took two days to make its way from one end of the factory to the other. Excess inventories, late delivery and quality problems were common. We had tested several worker participation programs, quality circles, Kanban systems and motivational schemes, all of which got off to great starts, but lost their momentum in a matter of months. Everything was too damn big and complex; there were too many managers in too many layers holding too many meetings. So we decided to break the facility into three separate floors. To begin with, we kept all three in the same building, but we separated everything we could: entrances, dock reception, inventories, phones, as well as certain auxiliary functions such as personnel, management information systems and internal controls. We also scrapped the mainframe in favour of three pc-based independents. The first effect of the breakup was rising costs due to the doubling of effort and the loss of economies of scale. Unfortunately, the balance sheets have been consolidated into items such as these as liabilities, all with figures for dollars attached, and there is nothing to list on the asset side, but aerial things like augmented involvement and a sense of belonging. However, long-term results exceeded our expectations. Within a year, sales doubled; inventories fell from 136 days to 46; we unveiled eight new products that had stopped in R&D for two years; and overall quality improved to the point where a rejection rate of one-third of federally inspected scales dropped to less than 1%. Increasing productivity allows us to reduce the workforce by 32% through incentives for retirement and attrition. I don't claim that size reduction only achieved all this, only that size reduction is essential to putting employees in touch with each other so they can coordinate their work. The kind of distance we want to remove comes from having too many people in one place, but it also comes from having a pyramid hierarchy. Pyramids and Circles The organizational pyramid is the cause of much corporate evil because the tip is too far from the base. Pyramids emphasize power, promote insecurity, distort communications, hobble interaction, and make it very difficult for people planning and people running to move in the same direction. So Semco designed an organizational circle. Its biggest advantage is to reduce management levels to three - a corporate level and two operational levels in manufacturing units. It consists of three concentric circles. A small central circle contains the five people who make up the company's movements. These are the counselors I mentioned earlier. I'm one of them, and except for a couple of legal documents that call me president, counselor is the only title I use. A second, larger circle contains the heads of the eight divisions— we call them partners. Finally, a huge third circle has all the other employees. Most of them are the people we call associates; they do research, design, sales and job manufacturing and have no one to report them on a regular basis. But some of them are the permanent and temporary team and task leaders we call coordinators. We have counselors, partners, coordinators and associates. These are four titles and three layers of management. The linchpins of the system are the coordinators, a group that includes all the previous so-called foreanch, supervisor, manager, chief or chief. The only people who report to the coordinators are associates. No coordinator informs another coordinator— this characteristic of the system is what guarantees the reduction of the layers of management. Like anyone else, we value leadership, but it's not the only thing we value. In marine pumps, for example, we have an application engineer who can look at the design of a ship and then in a particular bomb and say: This bomb will fail if you take this thing north of the Arctic Circle. He makes a lot more money than the person who manages his unit. We can change manager, but this guy knows what kind of bomb will work in the Arctic, and that's worth more. Associates typically make higher salaries than coordinators and partners, and can increase their condition and compensation without entering the management line. The managers and the status and money they enjoy —in a word, hierarchy- are the single biggest obstacle to participatory management. We had to get managers out of the way of democratic decision-making, and our circular system does pretty well. But let's go further. We do not contract or promote people until they have been interviewed and accepted by all their future subordinates. Twice a year, subordinates evaluate managers. Also twice a year, all members of the company anonymously fill out a questionnaire about the credibility of the company and senior management competence. Among other things, we asked our employees what it would take to make them quit or go on strike. We insist on making important decisions in a collegiate way, and certain decisions are made by voting throughout the company. Several years ago, for example, we needed a larger plant for our marine division, which makes bombs, compressors and ship propellers. Real estate agents searched for months and found nothing. So we asked employees for help, and during the first weekend they found three factories for sale, all of them nearby. We closed the store for a day, amassed everyone on buses, and went out to inspect the three buildings. Then the workers voted—and chose a plant that counselors really didn't want. It was an interesting situation, which tested our commitment to participatory management. The building is opposite a Caterpillar plant that is one of brazil's most hit factories. With two tough unions, we weren't expecting front row seats for every labor dispute that came. But we accepted the employees' decision because we believe that in the long term, letting people participate in decisions that affect their lives will have a positive effect on employee motivation and morale. We bought the building and moved in. The workers designed the design of a flexible manufacturing system, and hired one of Brazil's 100 most important artists to paint all of this, inside and outside, including machinery. This plant really belongs to its employees. I feel like a guest every time I get in. I don't care. The division's productivity, in dollars per year per employee, has gone from \$14,200 in 1984 —the year we moved— to \$37,500 in 1988, and by 1989 the target is \$50,000. During the same period, market share went from 54% to 62%. Employees also called me the option on acquiring a I'm still sure we should have bought it. But they felt we weren't ready to digest it, and I lost the vote. In a case like this, the credibility of our management system is in The involvement of employees must be real even when it makes management uncomfortable. Anyway, what is the future of an acquisition if the people who have to operate it do not think it is feasible? Hiring adults We also have other ways to combat hierarchy. Most of our programs are based on the notion of giving employees control over their own lives. In one word, we lem adults, and then treat them as adults. Think about it. Outside the factory, workers are men and women who elect governments, serve in the military, lead community projects, raise and educate families, and make decisions every day about the future. Friends ask for his advice. The vendors court them. Children and grandchildren seek them out for their wisdom and experience. But by the time they enter the factory, the company transforms them into teenagers. They must wear badges and name tags, arrive at a certain time, be in line to hit the clock or eat their lunch, get permission to go to the bathroom, give long explanations whenever they arrive five minutes late, and follow the instructions without asking many questions. One of my first moves when I took control of Semco was to abolish the rules, manuals, rules and regulations. Everyone knows that you can't run a big organization without regulations, but everyone also knows that most regulations are poppycock. They rarely solve problems. On the contrary, there is usually some dark corner of the rule book that justifies the worst silhouette people may think of. Common sense is a riskier tactic because it requires personal responsibility. It is also true that common sense requires only a hint of civil disobedience whenever someone draws attention to something that doesn't work. We had to release the Thoreaus and Tom Sorrows into the factory and recognize that civil disobedience was not an early sign of revolution, but a clear hint of common sense at work. So we replaced all nitpicking rules with common sense rule and put our employees in the demanding position of using their own judgment. We don't have a dress code, for example. The idea that personal appearance is important in a job —any job- is baloney. We've all heard that marketers, receptionists and service representatives are the company's calling cards, but in fact how completely silly it is. A company that needs business suits to prove its seriousness probably has no more meaningful evidence. And which customer has ever cancelled an order because the receptionist was wearing jeans instead of a dress? Women and men look better when they feel good. IBM is not a big company because its vendors dress to the special standard that Thomas established. It is a great company that also happens to have this peculiarity. We also dismissed the company's complex rules on travel expenses: what kind of accommodation people were entitled to, whether we would pay for one entry, either a free call home meant five minutes or ten. I used to spend a lot of time discussing things like that. Now we base everything on common sense. Some people are staying in four-star hotels and some live as Spartans. Some people spend \$200 a day, while others go through \$125. Or so I guess. Nobody checks the expenses, so there's no way to know. The point is, we don't care. If we can't trust people with our money and their judgment, we're confident that as hell we shouldn't send them abroad to do business on our behalf. We're done with security searches, storage padlocks and audits of veteran employees' small money

