




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John mearsheimer the tragedy of great power politics pdf

Author: Charles A. Kupchan, Senior Fellow September 2003 International History Review The Tragedy of Great Energy Policy John J. Mearsheimer New York: W. W. Norton, 2001Pp. xvi, 555. \$27.95 (U.S.) In this important and impressive book, John Mearsheimer elegantly defines his theoretical approach to studying international politics - offensive realism - and then tries to show that this approach manages to explain the key causes of war and peace. The book is a major contribution to the realist canon and, given the accessible style, will most likely become a must-read for students of international relations. In addition, Mearsheimer is admirably thoughtful and original in formulating test suggestions from his theory and looking at them against historical data. Offensive realism is based on the assumption that great powers are always looking for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as the ultimate goal (p. 29). This perspective contrasts with defensive realism, which it places in search of security rather than power, making the international system less predatory and less prone to conflict. According to Mearsheimer, the propensity for aggression is not inherent in states, but is the product of the constant search for survival in a world of insecurity, offensive military might and a changing distribution of power. In order to test the validity of offensive realism, Mearsheimer argues that we almost always need to find leaders who think it is imperative to gain more power to increase the survival prospects of their country (p. 169). He then continued to examine this allegation against the behaviour of the great powers in the past, looking at several issues. Do countries systematically engage in aggression and expansion when their relative strength increases? What determines whether it is a great balance of power, calms down or flowing when confronted with a menacing aggressor? Are bipolar or multipolar systems more likely to cause war? As Mearsheimer navigates the historical records of the past two centuries, he marshals impressive evidence to support his assertion that he unconditionally takes advantage of opportunities to increase their power and that this dynamic explains many of the behavior of the great powers. In doing so, it is also advancing with several new ideas, arguing, for example, that stopping water power gives strategic advantage to terrestrial forces and means that leading nations seek only regional rather than global hegemony. Mearsheimer also introduces the useful concept of unbalanced multipolarity, which shows that multipolar systems with a clear imbalance of power are more prone to war than those with rough equilibrium. Although Mearsheimer was able to demonstrate the benefit of offensive realism, he did not that his theory has so many explanations as it claims. In defense of its part of realism, Mearsheimer ends with historical interpretations that border on ins defensible. Consider his treatment of Wilhelmian Germany in the leadership of The First World War Mearsheimer characterized German behavior as rational and over-reimach, based on the lack of importance of nationalism or the internal rivalries of the period, and rejecting the notion that Germany had invited its own encirclement. But especially in light of his views on water treatment and the comparative advantages of terrestrial armies, internal pressure is essential to explain why Germany has built a world-class combat fleet, alienating Britain, alienating the Triple Ant and distracting resources from the ground forces it needs to deal with France and Russia. Mearsheimer's explanation of the lack of balance against Nazi Germany in the 1930s is also inconclusive. He argues that barrels-goers in the 1930s were due to the fact that Germany did not have a formidable army until 1939, and therefore until then there was no reason to draw Hitler's enemies together (p. 331). But since 1933, Adolf Hitler has given Germany's neighbors every reason to clap against him. He is not at all interested in German power, precisely because British leaders had no choice over Germany's military superiority. Mearsheimer also fails to address how offensive realism explains peaceful change. The hard-working ties between Britain and the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century and the success of the European Union in transforming Europe's geopolitical landscape cast doubt on the fact that balancing and destructive rivalry are inevitable features of international life. These objections do not diminish the importance of Mearsheimer's book. Rather, they highlight the dangers inherent in seeking to explain the conditional course of history through a single analytical framework. If Mearsheimer had shed light on episodes of enduring peace that deviated from predictions of the balance of power theory, he would probably have been less convinced of the catchy logic of offensive realism and more open to eclecticism in explaining politics among great powers. 2001 John Mearsheimer's book The Tragedy of Great Energy Policy Author John MearsheimerCountriesVstates Audiences (Hardback) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics[1] is a book by the American scientist John Mearsheimer on the theme of international relations theory, published by W.W. Norton & in 2001. Mearsheimer explains and argues about his theory of offensive realism, stating his basic assumptions, evolution from early realistic theory and its predictive ability. He readily acknowledges the inherent pessimism of offensive realists and his predictions his world is one in which the conflict between the great powers will never see the end. An article adapted from the book was previously published by Foreign Affairs. [2] The main arguments of the power of the land Power State in international politics, Mearsheimer, stems from the strength of its military for two reasons: because earth power is the dominant military force in the modern era, and because large water bodies limit the projection capabilities of land armies. Mearsheimer's water-stopping power argues that the presence of oceans in the world prevents every country from reaching global hegemony. He says large bodies of water limit the capabilities of the military and thus naturally divide power in the world. He used the example of the isolation provided to Britain by the English Channel, allowing him to act as an offshore balancer in continental Europe. The British union, he argues, has never had ambitions to control or dominate continental Europe. Instead, it aims only to maintain the balance of power and ensure that no country can become powerful enough to achieve regional hegemony on the continent. For most of the 19th century, Britain had an industrial capacity that would have allowed it to easily invade and dominate much of Europe. Britain, however, chose not to try to dominate the continent, in part because it calculated that its security goals could be cheaper if European powers were taken against each other. In doing so, it will be occupied on the European continent and cannot challenge Britain across the English Channel or interfere with Britain's economic interests in Asia and Africa. Therefore, the main purpose of American foreign policy is to be hegemon only in the Western Hemisphere and to prevent the rise of such hegemon in the Eastern Hemisphere. For its part, the appropriate role of the United States is as an offshore balancing order against the rise of the Eurasian hegemon and goes to war only as a last chance to thwart it. State survival strategies Objective 1 – Regional hegemony In addition to their main goal, which is survival, large forces strive to achieve three main goals. Their highest objective is to achieve regional hegemony. Mearsheimer argues that achieving global hegemony would provide maximum security for a country, not possible because the world has too many oceans that hinder the projection of military power. Thus, the difficulty of projecting military might into large bodies of water makes it impossible for great powers to dominate the world. Regional hegemonies are trying to prevent other countries from achieving regional hegemony. Instead, they are trying to maintain an even balance of power in the regions and to act to ensure that multiple powers exist to preserve the these numerous powers between them. Their. be able to challenge the interests of regional hegemon, which they would be free to do if they were not occupied by their neighbouring competitors. Mearsheimer used the example of the United States, which achieved regional hegemony in the late 1800s and then sought to intervene wherever it seemed that another country could achieve hegemony in a region: Imperial Germany during World War I Nazi Germany during World War II Imperial Japan during Cold War 2 - Maximum wealth Great Powers sought to increase its share of world wealth because economic strength is the basis of military power. Great powers seek to prevent the world's dominant regions producing wealth, competing forces. The United States, for example, sought to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Western Europe and the Middle East. If the Russians had control

