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Heuristic route to persuasion

The heuristic-systematic model is a theory of persuasion that suggests that attitudes can change in two fundamentally different ways. One way is through systematic processing, by which people carefully think about any information available when forming an opinion to determine whether the information is correct or valid. Attitudes are then based on the conclusions of this careful analysis of the facts. However, this kind of thinking requires a lot of effort, and given that people usually have only limited time and the ability to think carefully, the heuristic-systematic model suggests that attitudes are often formed in a more simplified way. This simplified form of attitude judgment is called heuristic processing, and involves the use of the rules of the thumb known as heuristics to decide what one's attitudes should be. This model of persuasion received much of the empirical support in the social psychology research literature and had a major impact on applied areas of research, such as health behaviour and consumer behavior. Common heuristics A number of different heuristics of persuasion can be used to form opinions. For example, when using the heuristic consensus, attitudes are simply based on the opinions that most other people have. In this case, people infer that if everyone believes something, then all those people must be right. For example, a political speech might be more convincing when a lot of people in the audience clap than when fewer people applaud, and a consumer product might seem better when it's last left on the shelf. The heuristic expert is another simple basis for determining attitudes. In this case, attitudes are based on the opinions or recommendations of trusted and informed experts. The bottom line here is that experts are usually right. For example, if a dentist recommends a certain type of toothpaste to combat cavities, then it must work, or if astronauts drink Tang for breakfast, then it must be good or nutritious. Finally, the length of the message itself can be used as a rule of thumb for persuasion, even without thinking carefully about the information the message contains. The length of the heuristic message suggests that longer messages, which seem to contain a lot of arguments, are more convincing because people infer that the length of the message implies that it is strong or correct (for example, length involves power). For example, the same essay might be more compelling when presented in double-spaced format than when it is in single-space format, even if the essay content is exactly the same in both. Importantly, the model suggests that the heuristic rules of the thumb are used only to the extent that the rule seems valid and reliable. Not everyone thinks that experts are always right, and in such cases, people are obviously less likely to follow the advice of experts. Also, the consensus consensus can be called into question when a political survey is based on a very small number of respondents, in which case people tend to stop using this heuristic. Bias in Persuasion The heuristic-systematic model suggests that opinions can be biased in a number of different ways. For example, heuristic rules can harm people's thoughts when they think carefully about a problem (for example, heuristics can harm systematic processing). This is the case, for example, when an argument seems more likely to be correct or convincing, as it comes from an expert compared to when the same argument comes from a less impressive source of information. For example, arguments suggesting that the Acme brand is the best on the market seem more likely to be true when these arguments come from a source of experts like Consumer Reports magazine than when the same arguments come from a less credible source like Wal-Mart. The heuristic-systematic model also suggests that certain reasons or objectives may prejudice attitudes. People are usually assumed to be motivated to form correct or correct opinions, known as precision motivation. However, in some cases, defensive motives or reasons for impression may also have an impact on attitudes. Defensive motives can prejudice attitudes by making people more likely to agree with information that matches their own self-interests or desired perceptions. People tend to agree more with government policies that provide economic benefits for themselves over policies that offer the same benefits to someone else. Also, most people have a more positive attitude towards themselves than other people have of themselves. The reasons for the impression provide another important source of motivation that can lead to biased attitudes. In this case, individuals tend to change their opinions so as to match the attitudes of others important to fit or get along with those other people. For example, students may exaggerate the extent to which they like the Beatles because they think their friend likes this group, and they want to maintain this friendship. Or students can exaggerate their taste for a particular class when talking to the instructor, to promote positive interactions with the instructor in the future. While heuristic rules certainly lead people to the wrong conclusion at times, the use of such heuristics is an essential aspect of everyday life. The eratura of persuasion provides a relatively easy way to make the many assessments with which people are burdened in their daily lives, and the use of these heuristics often leads people to adopt opinions perfectly. For example, many inexperienced consumers find it difficult to buy their first car or computer because there are a lot of brands, models, and features to consider, and beginner consumers tend to lack the background knowledge needed to evaluate all this technical information. In situations such as Simple thumb rules can help a lot in conducting assessments (i.e. the recommended machine of Consumer Reports is probably good). Reference: Chen, S., & Chaiken, S. (1999). The heuristic-systematic model in its broader context. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), *Dual-process toroms in social psychology* (pp. 73-96). New York: Guilford Press. Two Routes to Persuasion Petty and Cacioppo (1986a, 1986b) state that there are two ways of persuasion: central and peripheral. The central path to persuasion is to take careful consideration of the arguments (ideas, content) of the message. When a receiver is doing central processing, he or she is an active participant in the persuasion process. Central processing has two premises: It can only occur when the receiver has both motivation and the ability to think about the message and its subject. If the listener doesn't care about the subject of the convincing message, he or she will almost certainly lack the motivation to do central processing. On the other hand, if the listener is distracted or has trouble understanding the message, he or she will lack the ability to do central processing. The peripheral path to persuasion occurs when the listener decides whether to agree with the message based on clues other than the power of arguments or ideas in the message. For example, a listener may decide to agree to a message because the source appears to be an expert or is attractive. The peripheral path also occurs when a listener is convinced because they notice that a message has many arguments -- but it lacks the ability or motivation to think about them individually. In other words, peripheral clues, would be source expertise (credibility) or many arguments in a single message, are a short-cut. I don't want or can't think carefully about the ideas in this convincing message, but it's a fair gamble to go ahead with agreeing with the message if the source seems to be knowledgeable or if there are many arguments in support of the message. This path occurs when the auditor is unable or unwilling to engage in much thought on the message. The receivers involved in peripheral processing are more passive than those that make the central processing. Why does it matter what route an audience member takes when they hear or watch or read a compelling message? A key prediction of the ELM is that attitudes that are changed on the central path to persuasion will have different effects on attitudes changed through the peripheral pathway. Petty and Cacioppo explain that the changes in attitude that result largely from the processing of the relevant arguments for the problems (central route) will show greater temporal persistence, greater prediction of and greater resistance to persuasion than changes in attitude resulting largely from peripheral cues (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, p. 21). It should be either that these are important results: Surely, in most cases, persuasions would very much like to know to make the change of attitude last longer, have a greater influence on behavior, and be more resistant to change. However, even if central processing has advantages, receivers do not always oblige us through motivation and the ability to think about the message. We need to understand both persuasion processes because both appear in the receivers. Page 2 Involvement and cognitive responses Several factors influence the type of thoughts that receivers are likely to have. Given the ELM's assumption that thoughts create conviction, these factors must therefore influence the change in attitude. First, involvement and ability influence the amount of thoughts produced. The more a listener is involved in the subject -- the more important this topic is, relevant or important to the listener -- the more motivation they will have to think about the message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). This makes perfect sense: if a message is about a topic that matters to us, we have a reason (motivation) to pay attention to it and reflect on the ideas in this message. Of course, less involvement in this topic, less motivation to think about a message. However, the motivation is not sufficient to ensure that central processing takes place. Receivers must also have the ability to think about the message. If they are distracted, or too tired, or under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or sick, they will not be able to think carefully about a message. In addition, if a message is difficult to understand (full of unknown terms, confusing, spoken too quickly or with a thick accent), central processing is unlikely. However, having thoughts is not enough for persuasion to occur. Thinking unfavorable thoughts, disagreeing with the message, will not cause the change of attitude. One way to encourage favorable thoughts is to agree with the public. If an audience likes a particular presidential candidate (or some kind of car, or toothpaste), messages that support that candidate (or that car or that brand of toothpaste) are more likely to create favorable thoughts. Messages for another candidate (or machine or toothpaste) are more likely to create unfavorable thoughts. However, persuasions can't usually switch their subject to suit the audience's likes. You are hired to convince people to vote for a candidate (or buy a car or toothpaste). Page 3 Arguing Quality Another factor that influences the type of receiving thoughts they have is the quality argument or strength. strong ones have been consistently found to create more favorable thoughts, and fewer unfavorable thoughts, than weak arguments (Benoit, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). Strong arguments, thus, proved to be more convincing than weak ones (Benoit, 1987; Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983; Petty, Cacioppo, & Morris, 1981). In addition, the influence of the quality of arguments is greater on subjects involving than non-involvement (Andrews & Shimp, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). So persuasions can increase the likelihood that an audience will have favorable thoughts working hard to include strong, high-quality arguments in compelling messages. Page 4 Argument Quantity Subjects exposed to a greater number of arguments should produce more favorable cognitive responses than subjects exposed to fewer arguments. Calder, Insko, & Yandell (1974) found that the number of arguments influenced cognitive responses. Moreover, numerous studies have reported that messages with more arguments create more changes in attitude than those with fewer arguments (Calder, Insko, & Yandell, 1974; Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). The quantity argument, unlike the quality argument or strength, is considered to be a peripheral cue. When receivers notice that a message has a large number of arguments, they have a certain tendency to accept the message. Page 5 Source Factors An important factor in persuasion is the nature of the source of a message. I will discuss three source factors: expertise, trust, and attractiveness. In general, we are naturally more likely to accept an expert's statements than a non-expert. The cognitive response model posits that when auditors believe that the source of a message is an expert, they have less motivation to examine (develop counter arguments for) messages attributed to that source. Fewer unfavorable thoughts, in turn, should lead to more changes in attitude (with counter-attitudinal messages). On the other hand, receivers should be more motivated to think critically of messages from seemingly non-expert sources and therefore produce more counter arguments, reducing persuasion from such sources (see Benoit, 1991; Gillig & Greenwald, 1974; Hass, 1981; Perloff & Brock, 1980). Thus, expert sources can reduce the number of unfavorable thoughts as we submit to the knowledge that we assume an expert possesses. Research also shows that expertise only influences belief if the source is identified before the message, which suggests that credibility influences belief by modifying the processing or elaboration of messages (O'Keefe, 1987; Ward & McGinnies, 1974). Research has found that when an audience was told the source was an expert after listening to the message, that the information did not increase the conviction. Only if a source of experts is identified before a message does expertise help persuasion. Similarly, some receivers were told that the source was not an expert after the message. That didn't reduce persuasion. However, when were said that the source was a non-expert before the message, it reduced the belief. This strongly suggests that knowing that the source is an expert (or a non-expert) influences how we listen to a message. Source Source Expertise by influencing our cognitive responses to the message. Once the message is over, we already had our cognitive responses, and knowledge about the source of expertise, or lack of expertise, it's too late to make a difference. In other words, knowing that the source is an expert decreases our motivation to engage in central processing. Expertise reassures us and we don't think we should be critical listeners. However, knowing that the source is a non-expert increases our motivation to engage in central processing. We are suspicious and more likely to carefully examine the messages of non-experts. Not surprisingly, research finds that calls for credibility, which are often peripheral rather than central cues, are more likely to influence attitude change on unimplicated than involving subjects (Chaiken, 1980; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981; Petty, Cacioppo & Schumann, 1983). Very involved listeners really care about the subject. The subject of the message is very important to them. Therefore, very involved receivers are likely to think carefully about the message, regardless of who it is from. Knowing that the source is an expert is unlikely to decrease the motivation of a very involved listener. Thus, like other peripheral indices, source expertise is likely to have more influence on uninvolved receivers than involved. Another aspect of the sources is their reliability. Some sources appear to be biased while others are objective. An NRA spokesman is likely to appear biased on the issue of gun control. This does not mean that he or she is sure to lie or distort the facts. However, we naturally expect most people will put their best foot forward, focusing on the ideas that help them rather than on the ideas that hurt them. There is also a third type of source called reluctant testimony, in which a source gives evidence against his interest. A study told some subjects that a prosecutor is in favor of stricter convictions for offenders. Other subjects were told that a prosecutor is in favor of a more lenient sentence. We would expect most prosecutors to be strict, so the first case (prosecutor for a stricter conviction) is an example of biased testimony, while the second case (prosecutor for lighter conviction) is an example of reluctant testimony. Benoit and Kennedy (1999) ensured that the subjects perceived the expertise of these sources as equal, then varied whether they were considered biased, objective or reluctant. Biased sources were seen as less reliable and produced more unfavorable thoughts and fewer They were also less convincing. Both objective and reluctant sources were seen as more reliable (than biased), produced fewer unfavorable and favorable thoughts, and were more convincing. There was no difference between the objective and They were just as effective in this study. Here, reliability does not seem to influence motivation, as there was no difference in the total number of thoughts between these three types of sources. Rather, reliability seems to influence the type of thoughts. The reliable sources of the listeners (objective and reliable) produced more favorable and less unfavorable thoughts; the source in which the receivers did not trust (biased) produced fewer favorable and unfavorable thoughts. So persuaders would be well advised to try to avoid seeming biased and untrustworthy. Another feature of the sources is their attractiveness. Research has shown that physically attractive sources are compelling (Berscheid & Walster, 1974; Eagly & Chaiken, 1975; Shavitt, Swan, Lowrey, & Wanke, 1994). Attractiveness should generally function as a peripheral cue. For example, Mills and Harvey (1972) report that, unlike expert sources, attractive sources are just as compelling when identified after as before the message. In addition, Benoit (1987) found that attractive sources did not produce significant changes in attitude on a subject involving . Thus, the effects of attractiveness, would be the expertise and quantitative effects of the argument, should be more prominent on unimplicated than involving subjects. Page 6 ELM elm evaluation is a very powerful theory of persuasion. Recognize that audiences are sometimes active, thinking about messages and arguments in those messages. However, ELM also realizes that, at other times, the receivers are passive, being convinced of the peripheral pathway. ELM identifies two easy-to-understand conditions that determine whether the listener is doing central or peripheral processing: central processing requires that receivers have the ability and motivation to think about a message. ELM identifies several factors that influence the type of listening thoughts are likely to have: involvement, quality argument, argument quantity, credibility. Thus, conceptually this is a very good theory of persuasion. The main weakness of this theory is the metaphor he chose. Petty and Cacioppo state that there are two ways of persuasion, central and peripheral. However, if anyone says, there are two routes that you can take from Los Angeles to San Diego: I-5 or I-15, you would take one or the other -- but not both on the same trip. However, central and peripheral are not really two options, but the final points of a continuum. A listener can think more thoughts (and be closer to the central end of the continuum) or fewer thoughts (and be closer to the peripheral end). It is not a choice either / or after suggests the second metaphor. In fact, even peripheral processing requires some thoughts. The receiver must observe, for example, this persuasion seems to be an expert and then think if an expert so it is probably true for peripheral processing to occur. So Petty and Cacioppo mistakenly created the impression that listeners are doing central or peripheral processing, but not both, through the metaphor they chose to explain their theory. Experimental research has produced great experimental support for ELM. I quoted some of this research above. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) provide a more global summary of ELM-related research: The assumption that systematic or central route processing requires motivation and capacity has been documented in many studies, using a variety of motivational and capacity variables: convincing argumentation is a more important determinant of persuasion when recipients are motivated and able to process information relevant to attitude than when they are not. There is also substantial empirical support for the hypothesis of these models that heuristic or peripheral indices have a considerable convincing impact when motivation or the processing capacity of arguments is low, but a reduced impact when motivation and capacity are high (p. 333). Thus, there is a great deal of research that supports ELM's approach to persuasion and attitude change. Page 7: arguments that are strong, compelling, strong, powerful, compelling quantity argument: the number of arguments in a biased testimony message: a message from a source that speaks in favor of its own self-interest central path of persuasion: it occurs when the receiver thinks about the content or arguments of a message; requires both the ability and motivation to think about cognitive message, cognition: thoughts or ideas elaborating: favorable thoughts: ideas that agree with the point of a convincing message involving the subject: the message refers to a topic that is important to objective receiving sources: sources that have no proper interest in the subject of the message the peripheral path of persuasion to persuasion : occurs when the receiver agrees to a message because of a shortcut or cue (credible source; large number of arguments; occurs when the receiver does not have the ability or motivation to think about the message (or both) reluctant testimonies: a message from a source that speaks against his own unfavorable thoughts: ideas that do not agree with the point of an uninvolved message subject : a message that does not involve : the message refers to a topic that is not important to the receiverPage 8ReferencesAndrews, J.C., & Shimp, T. 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Page 9 Nature of Attitudes and Persuasion Approach Yale Approaching Congruity Theory Cognitive Dissonance Theory Social Judgment / Involvement theory of information Integration Theory of reasoned action Elaboration of Probability Model HomePage 10 Nature of Attitudes and Persuasion Yale Approach to Congruity Theory Cognitive Dissonance Theory / Involvement theory Information Integration Theory of Reasoned Action Development Probability Model HomePage 11 Nature attitudes and conviction Yale Approach to Congruity Theory Cognitive Disson Theory of Information Integration Theory of Reasoned Action Development Probability Model HomePage 12 Nature of Attitudes and Persuasion Approach Yale Congruity Cognitive Theory Dissonance Social Theory Judgment / Involvement Theory of Information Integration Theory of Reasoned Action Development Probability Model HomePage 13 Nature of Attitudes and Persuasion Yale Approach to Congruity Cognitive Theory Dissonance Social Theory Judgment / Involvement Theory of Information Integration Theory of Reasoned Action Development Probability Model HomePage 14

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