




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Cuban missile crisis map

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The following other wikis use this file: redirecting missile crisis here. For the missile crisis in Cyprus see cyprus crisis S-300. Confrontation between the Us and the Soviet Union for ballistic missiles in Cuba Cuba Missile CrisisPart of the basic photography of the Soviet ballistics on the Soviet ballistics on Red Square , MoscowDad 16 October - 20 November 1962 (Naval quarantine[1] from Cuba ended on November 20)LocationCubaResult Publicized Removal of Nuclear Missiles of the Soviet Union from Cuba Non-public removal of American nuclear missiles from Turkey and Italy Agreement with the Soviet Union, that the United States would never invade Cuba without direct provocation creating one of the countries of a nuclear hotline between the United States and the Soviet UnionStovyyh Soviet Union CubaSubstantiated by: Warsaw Treaty USA Italy TurkeySupported: NATOCommanders and leaders Nikita Khrushchev Anastas Mikosain Rodion Malinowski Psaldi Georgie Abashvili Fidel Castro U.S. Taylor Curtis Lemai George W. Anderson Robert F. Kennedy Amintore Fanfanfani Giulio Andreotti Cemal Gürsel İlhami SankarKaviti and lost not a single U-2 spy plane lost1 killed the Cuban missile crisis, also known as the October crisis of 1962 (in Spanish: Crisis of the Oct. Karibsky krizis, IPA: [ks(16 October - 20 November 1962] the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, which escalated into an international crisis when U.S. missile deployments in Italy and Turkey were met by a Soviet deployment of similar ballistic missiles in Cuba. Confrontation is often considered closest to the Cold War in a full-on nuclear war. [2] In response to the presence of U.S. Jupiter ballistic missiles in Italy and Turkey and the failed 1961 invasion of the Bay of Pigs, First Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev agreed to Cuba's request to place nuclear missiles on the island to deter future incursions. The agreement was reached during a secret meeting between Khrushchev and Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro in July 1962, and construction of a number of missile launch facilities began later in the summer. Meanwhile, america's 1962 election was underway, and the White House denied months of accusations that it ignored dangerous Soviet missiles 140 miles from Florida. Missile preparation was confirmed when an Air Force U-2 spy plane presented clear photographic evidence of mid-range R-12 (a CODE name of THE USS-4) and R-14 (A-5 code) ballistic equipment. When this was communicated to President John F. Kennedy, he convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisers in a group that became known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM). After consulting with them, Kennedy ordered the naval blockade on October 22 to keep it from reaching Cuba. The US has announced it will not allow offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba and has demanded that weapons already in Cuba be dismantled and returned to the Soviet Union. After a few days of tense negotiations, an agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev. The Russians would dismantle their offensive weapons in Cuba and return them to the Soviet Union, provided they were subject to a U.N. probe in exchange for the U.S. public declaration and an agreement not to invade Cuba again. Secretly, the United States agreed that it would dismantle all Jupiter's MRDs that had been deployed in Turkey against the Soviet Union. The agreement also discusses whether Italy has been included or not. When all offensive missiles and light bombers or illus-28s were withdrawn from Cuba, the blockade was officially lifted on November 20, 1962. As a result, the Moscow-Washington hotline was established. A series of agreements later reduced tensions between the United States and the Soviet Council for several years until the two sides eventually resumed expanding their nuclear arsenals. Background Cuba and the Berlin Wall Additional information: After the Cuban Revolution and the Berlin Crisis of 1961 with the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, the United States was worried about the expansion of communism. A Latin American country that openly allied itself with the Soviet Union was considered by the US to be This would be subject, for example, to the Monroe Doctrine, an American policy limiting US participation in European colonies and European affairs, but given that the Western Hemisphere is in the sphere of US influence. The Kennedy administration was publicly embarrassed by the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, which was launched under President John F. Kennedy by CIA-trained forces of Cuban exiles. Then former President Dwight D. Eisenhower told Kennedy that the failure of the Bay of Pigs would prompt the Russians to do something they otherwise would not have done. [3]:10 The invasion of the half-hearted place left soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and his advisers under the impression that Kennedy was indecisive and, as one Soviet adviser wrote, too young, intellectual, not well prepared for decision-making in crisis situations... too intelligent and too weak. [3] U.S. covert operations against Cuba continued in 1961 with the failed Operation Mongoose. [4] Khrushchev was also honored by Kennedy's weaknesses, which was confirmed by the president's response to the Berlin Crisis of 1961, especially the Berlin Wall building. Responding to Soviet officials in the wake of the crisis, Khrushchev said: I know for a fact that Kennedy has no strong experience, nor does he generally have the courage to face a serious challenge. He also told his son Sergei that cuba's Kennedy would make a fuss, make more noise, then agree. [5] A monument in the Miami neighborhood of Little Havana for the men who died in Playa Giron during cuba's failed Bay of Pigs invasion in January 1962, General Edward Lansdale described his plans to overthrow the Cuban government in a top-secret report (partially declassified in 1989) addressed to Kennedy and officials involved in Operation Monguse. [4] CIA agents or pathfinders from the Special Operations Department were infiltrated in Cuba to carry out sabotage and organization, including radio broadcasts. In February 1962, the United States began an embargo against Cuba[a][6] and Lansdale presented a 26-page, top-secret program to implement the overthrow of the Cuban government, ordering guerrilla operations to begin in August and September. An open rebellion and overthrow of the communist regime will take place in the first two weeks of October. [4] Rocket Gap Main article: Rocket chasm when Kennedy ran for president in 1960, one of his key choices was the supposed missile gap with the Russians leading. In fact, the U.S. at the time led advisers by a wide margin that would only increase. In 1961, the Russians had only four intercontinental ballistic missiles (P-7 Ssmörka). By October 1962, they may have had several dozen, with some intelligence estimates up to 75. [8] The United States, from have 170 ICDs and are quickly built more. In addition, it eight George Washington and Ethan Allen-class submarines with the ability to launch 16 Polaris missiles, each with a range of 2,500 nautical miles (4,600 km). Khrushchev increased the perception of a missile chasm when he strongly boasted to the world that soviets were building missiles like sausages, but the number and capabilities of Soviet missiles were nowhere near his claims. The Soviet Union has medium-range ballistic missiles, about 700 of them, but they are very unreliable and inaccurate. The US has a significant advantage in the total number of nuclear warheads (27,000 vs. 3,600) and in the technology needed to deliver them accurately. The US has also led in combat capabilities, naval and air forces; But the Soviets had a 2-1 advantage in conventional ground forces, more pronounced in field cannons and tanks, especially in European theater. Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev was persuaded by the idea of opposing the growing US leadership in developing and deploying strategic missiles, placing medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, despite the delusions of the Soviet ambassador to Havana, Alexandr Ivanovich Aleksandrov, who argued that Castro did not accept the missiles. Khrushchev faces a strategic situation in which the US is seen as a wonderful first strike capability that puts the Soviet Union at a huge disadvantage. In 1962, the Russians had only 20 ICDs capable of delivering nuclear warheads to the United States from inside the Soviet Union. [10] The poor accuracy and reliability of the missiles raises serious doubts about their effectiveness. Faster and more reliable generation of ICBMs will not be operational until after 1965. [10] Therefore, Soviet nuclear capability in 1962 placed less emphasis on ICBM than on medium- and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBs and IRBMs). The missiles could hit U.S. allies and most of Alaska from Soviet territory, but not neighboring United States. Graham Allison, director of Harvard University's Center for Science and International Relations, points out the Soviet Union cannot make a nuclear imbalance by deploying new ICBMs on its own soil. To deal with the threat she faced in 1962, 1963 and 1964, she had very few options. Moving to places from which they can reach American targets was one thing. [11] The second reason for the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba was because Khrushchev wanted to bring West Berlin, controlled by the American, British and French in communist East Germany, into Soviet orbit. Eastern Germans and Russians consider Western control over part of Berlin a serious threat to East Germany. Khrushchev made West Berlin the central battlefield of the Cold War Khrushchev believes that if the U.S. did nothing about deploying the missiles to Cuba, it could displace the West from Berlin by using those missiles as a deterrent to Western countermeasures in Berlin. If the U.S. tried to bargain with advisers after meeting the missiles, Khrushchev might require a missile trade for West Berlin. Because Berlin is strategically more important than Cuba, trade will be a victory for Khrushchev, as Kennedy admits: The advantage from Khrushchev's point of view is that there is a great chance, but there are a lot of rewards for that. Thirdly, from the point of view of the Soviet Union and Cuba, it seems that the United States wants to increase its presence in Cuba. With actions including an attempt to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States,[13] placing economic sanctions on the nation and conducting covert operations on the content of communism and Cuba, America is supposed to be trying to invade Cuba. As a result, to prevent this, the USSR will place missiles in Cuba and neutralize the threat. This will ultimately serve to protect Cuba from attack and keep the country in the socialist bloc. [14] In 1961, more than 100 missiles were deployed in Italy and Turkey, which had the ability to strike Moscow with nuclear warheads. Another important reason why Khrushchev plans to put Cuba's missiles undetected is to level the playing field with the apparent American nuclear threat. America had an advantage because they could launch from Turkey and destroy the USSR before they had a chance to react. After the transmission of nuclear missiles, Khrushchev finally established mutually assured annihilation, which means that if the US decides to launch a nuclear strike against the USSR, they will respond by launching retaliatory nuclear strikes against the US,[15] Further, placing nuclear missiles on Cuba is a way for the USSR to show its support for Cuba and to support the Cuban people, who see the US as a threat to the US. [16] the latter became their ally after the Cuban Revolution of 1959. According to Khrushchev, the Soviet Union's motives were aimed at allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop according to the wishes of its people. [16] In early 1962, a group of Soviet military and missile specialists accompanied a delegation from agriculture to Havana. They met with Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro. The Cuban leadership had a strong expectation that the U.S. would invade Cuba again and enthusiastically endorsed the idea of installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. According to another source, Castro objected to the missile launch, which would make him look like a Soviet puppet, but he is convinced that the missiles in Cuba will be annoying to the United States and help the interests of the entire socialist camp. [18] Also, the deployment of warships will include tactical weapons with a range of 40 km, which can only be used by naval ships) to provide a nuclear umbrella for attacks on the island. By May, Khrushchev and Castro had agreed to place strategic nuclear missiles in secret in Cuba. Like Castro, Khrushchev believes that our imminent invasion of Cuba, and that to lose Cuba, would harm the Communists, especially in Latin America. He said he wanted to face the Americans in more than words... the logical answer was missiles. [19]:29 Soviet advisers kept their secret by writing their longhara plans, which were approved by Soviet Marshal Rodion Malinowski on The Fourth of July and Khrushchev on July 7. From the outset, the Russians' operation suggested complex denials and delusions, known as maskirovka. All planning and preparation for the transport and deployment of the missiles is carried out in complete secrecy, with only a few telling about the exact nature of the mission. Even the troops described for the mission were given a delusion, saying they headed to the cold area and were equipped with ski boots, fleece-lined parks and other winter equipment. The Soviet code name is Operation Anadir. The Anadir River flows into the Bering Sea, and Anadyr is also the capital of Chukotsky County and a bomber base in the far region. All measures were designed to disguise the programme from both the internal and external audiences. [20] Rocket construction specialists arrived in July under the guise of machine operators, irrigation specialists and agricultural specialists. [20] A total of 43,000 foreign troops will eventually be brought in. [21] The head of the artillery artillery birtsov, head of the Soviet state roulette units, led a headquarters of the Cuban army. He told Khrushchev that the missiles would be hidden and masked by palm trees. [8] The Cuban leadership was further upset when, on September 20, the U.S. Senate approved joint resolution 230 expressing the United States is determined to prevent the creation or use of externally supported military capabilities that threaten the security of the United States. [22] [23] On the same day, the United States announced a major military exercise in the Caribbean, PHIBRIGLEX-62, which Cuba condemned as a deliberate provocation and proof that the United States was planning to invade Cuba. [23] [24] [unreliable source?] the Soviet leadership believed, based on its perception of Kennedy's lack of confidence during the bay invasion of pigs, that he would avoid confrontation and accept the missiles as a faithful successor. [3]:1 On 9/11, the Soviet Union publicly warned that a U.S. attack on Cuba or on Soviet ships carrying supplies to the island would mean war. [4] The Soviet Council continued the Disguise program to cover up its actions in Cuba. They have repeatedly denied that offensive in nature. On September 7, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dominin, assured the American ambassador to Adlai Stevenson that the Soviet Union was supplying only defensive weapons to Cuba. On September 11, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS: Telegraph Sovesko Soetz) declared that the Soviet Union did not need or intend to introduce offensive nuclear missiles to Cuba. On October 13, Dobrinin was questioned by former U.S. Secretary of State Chester Bowles about whether Soviet troops planned to place offensive weapons in Cuba. He denied any such plans. [13] On October 17, the representative of the Soviet Embassy, Georgi Bolshakov, sent a personal message from Khrushchev, in which he inhaled that under no circumstances should the missiles be sent superficially to Cuba. The United States suspects the Russians of building

missiles in Cuba. This month, intelligence services gathered information on the surveillance of ground observers of Russian MiG-21 fighter jets and IL-28 light bombers. U-2 spy planes found the S-75 Dvina (USS SA-2 designation) in 8 different locations. Cia Director John McConn was suspicious. Sending anti-aircraft missiles to Cuba, he explained, only makes sense if Moscow intends to use them to shield a base for ballistic missiles aimed at the United States. On August 10, he wrote a note to Kennedy in which he suggested that the Russians were preparing to launch ballistic missiles into Cuba. [8] With important congressional elections scheduled for November, the crisis is becoming the higher politics of the United States. On August 31, Senator Kenneth Keating (R-New York) warned on the Senate floor that the Soviet Union was in all likelihood building a missile base in Cuba. He accused the Kennedy administration of covering up a major threat to the United States, thus beginning the crisis. [26] He may have received this initial extremely accurate information from his friend, former congressman and ambassador Claire Booth Luce, who in turn received it from the Cuban exiles. Later, confirming Keating's information, it was likely that the West German ambassador to Cuba, who received information from dissidents in Cuba that Soviet troops had arrived in Cuba in early August and was seen working in all likelihood on or near a missile base, and who passed that information on to Keating on a trip to Washington in early October. Air Force General Curtis LeMay unveiled a bombing plan before Kennedy's invasion in September, and spy flights and minor military harassment by U.S. forces at the Guantanamo naval base have been the subject of constant Cuban diplomatic complaints to the U.S. government. [4] A map created by U.S. intelligence showing the activity of Surface-to-Air missiles Cuba, September 5, 1962, the first shipment of R-12 missiles arrived on the night of September 8, followed by a second on September 16. The P-12 was a medium-range ballistic missile capable of carrying a thermonuclear warhead. [29] It is a single-stage, road-transportable, surface-launched projectile that can deliver a megaton-class nuclear weapon. [30] The Russians built nine sites, six for medium-range (TOA) missiles with an effective range of 2,000 km (1,2,000 mi) 3 for R-14 (TOA designation SS-5 Skeanar) ballistic missile with a maximum range of 4,500 kilometers (2,800 miles). On October 7, Cuban President Osvaldo Dortikors Torrado spoke at the Un General Assembly; if... we are under attack, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient resources to defend ourselves; we do have our inevitable weapons, weapons that we would prefer not to acquire and which we do not wish to use.1 [32] On October 10, in another Senate speech, Mr Keating reaffirmed his previous warning of August 31 and stated that The Building had begun at least half a dozen launch sites for medium-range tactical missiles. [33] Missiles in Cuba reported that missiles in Cuba allowed the Russians to target most continental States. The planned arsenal was 40 missiles. Cuban populations noticed the arrival and launch of the missiles, and hundreds of reports reached Miami. U.S. intelligence has received countless reports, very questionable quality or even ridiculous, most of which can be dismissed as describing defensive missiles. [34] [35] [36] Only five reports bothered analysts. They describe large trucks passing through cities at night, carrying very long cylindrical objects covered with canvases, which cannot rotate through cities without swiveling and manoeuvring. Defensive missiles can turn around. The reports cannot be satisfactorily rejected. [37] An reconnaissance photo of Cuba showing nuclear missiles from the Soviet Union, their transports and tents for refueling and maintenance. Since 2000, the U.S. has sent U-2 surveillance over Cuba after the failed invasion of the Bay of Pigs. The first question leading to a pause in reconnaissance flights took place on August 30, when the U-2, operated by the U.S. Air Force, mistakenly flew over Saklin Island in the Far East from the Soviet Union. The Russians stood in protest and the US apologized. Nine days later, a Taiwanese-controlled U-2[39] was lost over western China by an SA-to-air missile. U.S. authorities worry that one of cuba's Cuban or Soviet SAMs could shoot down the CIA U-2, initiating another international incident. At a meeting with members of the Overhead Intelligence Committee (COMOR) on 10 September 2014, the State's Dean Rusk and national security adviser McGeorge Bundy severely restricted more U-2 flights over Cuban airspace. As a result of the lack of coverage over the island over the next five weeks became known to historians as Photo Gap. No significant U-2 coverage has been achieved in relation to the inland of the island. U.S. officials tried to use corona's photo reconnaissance satellite to gain coverage from Soviet military missions, but images acquired in western Cuba by the Corona KH-4 mission on October 1 were heavily covered in clouds and fog and failed to provide usable information. [42] At the end of September, a naval reconnaissance aircraft captured the Soviet ship Kasimov, with large crates on the deck the size and shape of IL-28 aircraft carriers. In September 1962, defense agency (DIA) analysts noticed that Cuban surface-to-air missiles were arranged in a pattern similar to that used by the Soviet Union to protect ICBM bases, leading the DIA to lobby for the resumption of U-2 flights over the island. Although the flights have been conducted by the CIA in the past, pressure from the Ministry of Defence led to the transfer of this body to the Air Force. After the loss of the CIA U-2 in May 1960, it was thought that if another U-2 was shot down, an Air Force plane was likely to be used for legitimate military purposes, it would be easier to explain than a CIA flight. When reconnaissance missions were authorized on October 9, bad weather kept planes from flying. The United States first received U-2 photographic evidence of the missiles on October 14, when a U-2 flight piloted by Major Richard Heizer captured 928 images on the way chosen by DIA analysts, capturing images of what turned out to be an SS-4 construction site in San Cristobal, Pinar del Rio (a province now in Artemis) in western Cuba. [44] One of the first U-2 reconnaissance images of missile bases under construction displayed to President Kennedy on the morning of October 16, 1962, communicated to the President of the CIA on October 15, the CIA National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) reviewed the photographs and identified objects they interpreted as medium-range ballistic missiles. This identification was made partly on the reporting power provided by Oleg Penkowski, a dual agent in the GRU working for the CIA and M6I. Although it did not give any direct reports on the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba, the technical and doctrinal data on Soviet missiles provided by Penkowski in the months and years before the crisis helped NPIC analysts correctly identify the missiles on the U-2 images. [45] Tonight, the CIA notifies the State Department, and at 8:30 p.m. EDT, Bundy chose to wait until the next morning to tell the president. McNamara has been informed of the The next morning, Bundy met with Kennedy and showed him the U-2 photos and informed him of the cia's analysis of the photos. [46] At 6:30 p.m., EDT Kennedy convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisers[47] in a group that formally named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM), following the fact that the 196 National Security Memorandum of Action met on October 22. Without informing EXCOMM members, President Kennedy recorded all of his works, and Sheldon M. Stern, head of the Kennedy Library, recorded some of them. [49] On October 16, President Kennedy informed Robert Kennedy that he was convinced that the Russians had planted missiles in Cuba and this was a legitimate threat. This has officially turned the threat of nuclear annihilation from two world superpowers. Robert Kennedy responded by contacting Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobnin. Robert F. Kennedy expressed his concern about what was happening, and Dobnin was instructed by Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev to assure President Kennedy that there would be no unenviable or offensive weapons placed in Cuba. Khrushchev still assures Kennedy that the Soviet Union has no intention of breaking the relationship between our two countries, despite the photo evidence presented to President Kennedy. [51] The answers are that President Kennedy met in the Oval Office with General Curtis Lemay and the intelligence pilots who found the missiles in Cuba. The U.S. has no plan because its intelligence was convinced that the Russians would never install nuclear missiles in Cuba. At 7 p.m., Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, a member, quickly discussed several possible ways of action: The American vulnerability to Soviet missiles was not new. Diplomacy: Use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviet Union to remove the missiles. Secret approach: Suggested Castro choose to split with the Russians or be attacked. Invasion: The full force invading Cuba and overthrowing Castro. Air Strike: Use the U.S. Air Force to attack all known missile sites. Blockade: Use the U.S. Navy to block the missiles from arriving in Cuba. As described in the article, both the US and the Soviet Union have considered many possible outcomes of their actions and threats during the crisis (Allison, Graham T.; Zelikowski, Philip D.). This game tree models how both actors would consider their decisions. It is divided into a simple form of basic understanding. The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed that the only solution was a complete assault and invasion. They believed the Russians would not try to stop the U.S. from taking over Cuba. Kennedy was skeptical: They, no more than us, can't let these things go without doing something. They can't, after all their statements, let us. And then they don't do anything. If they don't take action in Cuba, they're sure to spin in Berlin. [53] Kennedy concluded that the invasion of Cuba by air would signal to the Russians to suggest a clear line to conquer Berlin. Kennedy also believes U.S. allies will think of the country as descending happy cowboys who lost Berlin because they can't safely solve the situation in Cuba. [54] President Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara in excomm meeting Excomm then discussed the effect on the strategic balance of power, both political and military. Headquarters officials believed the missiles would seriously change the military balance, but McNamara disagreed. Another 40, he said, would make no difference in the overall strategic balance sheet. The United States already has about 5,000 strategic warheads,[55];261, but the Soviet Union had only 300. McNamara concluded that the Russians have 340 would not significantly change the strategic balance. In 1990, he repeated that it didn't change anything. The military balance has not changed. I didn't believe it at the time, and Now I don't believe it. [56] EXCOMM agrees that the missiles will affect the political balance. Kennedy explicitly promised the American people less than a month before the crisis that if Cuba had the capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States... u.s. will act. [57];674–681 Also, trust among allies and people in the United States would be violated if the Soviet Union appeared to offset the strategic balance by placing missiles in Cuba. Kennedy explained after the crisis that it would change the political balance of power. It would also appear to contribute to reality.1 [58] President Kennedy met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the Oval Office (October 18, 1962) On October 18, Kennedy met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who claimed that the weapons were for defensive purposes only. He is unwilling to reveal what he already knows and avoid panic in the American public.[59] Kennedy did not reveal that he was already aware of the missile. [19] As of October 19, frequent U-2 spy flights show four operational sites. [61] Operational plans examined two operational plans (OPLAN). OPLAN 316 envisages a full invasion of Cuba by military and marine units, supported by the Navy after naval and naval aviation replicas. U.S. military forces would have problems with combat and logistical assets, and the Navy could not deliver enough amphibies to transport even a modest armored contingent from the army. OPLAN 312, mainly an aircraft carrier of the Air Force and Navy, is designed with sufficient flexibility to do everything from engaging individual missile sites to providing air support for OPLAN 316 Forces. [62] The Blockade A US Navy P-2H Neptune on vp-18 flew over a Soviet cargo ship with shredded IL-28 on deck during the Cuban crisis. [63] Kennedy met with excomm members and other advisers on October 21, given two other options: an airstrike primarily against the Cuban missile base or cuba's naval blockade. [6] The full-scale invasion is not the administration's first opportunity. McNamara supported the naval blockade as a strong but limited military activity that left the U.S. under control. The term blockade was problematic. Under international law, the blockade is an act of war, but the Kennedy administration does not believe that the Russians will be provoked to attack by a simple blockade. [64] Furthermore, legal experts at the State Department and the Ministry of Justice conclude that a declaration of war can be avoided if another legal justification based on the Rio Treaty on the Defence of the Western Hemisphere is obtained by a decision of two-thirds of the votes of the members of the Organization of American States (OAS). [65] Admiral Anderson, head of naval operations, wrote a position document that helped Kennedy distinguish what they called quarantine of offensive weapons and blockade from all materials, arguing that a classic blockade was not the original intention. As it will take place in international waters, Kennedy received OAS approval for military action under the hemisphere protection provisions of the Rio Treaty: latin American countries' participation in quarantine already includes two Argentine destroyers, which must report to the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. South Atlantic [COMSOLANT] in Trinidad on November 9. An Argentine submarine and a sea battalion with an elevator were on hand if necessary. In addition, two Venezuelan destroyers (Destroyers ARV D-11 Nueva Esparta and ARV D-21 Zulia) and one submarine (Caribe) have been reported to COMSOLANT, ready for sea by November 2. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago proposed the use of Chaguaramas Naval Base for warships on each side of the OAS for the duration of quarantine. The Dominican Republic has provided one escort. Colombia has been declared ready to provide troops and has sent military officers to the Us to discuss this assistance. The Argentine Air Force has informally offered three SA-16 aircraft in addition to forces already engaged in the quarantine operation. [67] Initially, this was to include a naval blockade against offensive weapons within the Organization of American States and the Treaty of Rio. Such a blockade may be extended to all types of goods and air transport. The action had to be supported by Cuba's surveillance. The CNO scenario was followed by a later application of the quarantine. On 19 October, EXCOMM set up separate working groups to the options for since 2013, the largest support in EXCOMM has moved to the blocking option. Reservations about the plan continue to be expressed until the end of October 21, with the main concern being that once the blockade comes into force, the Russians will rush to complete some of the missiles. As a consequence, the US could find itself bombing operational missiles if the blockade fails to force Khrushchev to remove missiles already on the island. In his speech to the nation, Kennedy signed the proclamation of intercepting offensive weapons in Cuba in the Oval Office on October 23, 1962.[69] At 3 p.m. EDT on October 22, President Kennedy formally established the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) with a Memorandum of Action on National Security (NSAM) 196. At 5 p.m., he meets with congressional leaders who are controversially opposed to the blockade and want a stronger response. In Moscow, Ambassador Foy D. Kohler briefed Khrushchev on the impending blockade and Kennedy's speech to the nation. Ambassadors around the world have informed the leaders of the bloc, who are not from Eastern Europe. Before the speech, U.S. delegations met with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, U.S. Chancellor Conrad Adenauer, French President Charles de Gaulle and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Jose Antonio Mora, to brief them on U.S. intelligence and the proposed response. Everyone supported the U.S. position. During the crisis, Kennedy had daily phone calls with McMillan, who publicly supported U.S. action. [70] Shortly before his speech, Kennedy called former President Dwight D. Eisenhower. [71] Kennedy's conversation with the former president also revealed that the two were consulted during the Cuban missile crisis. [7] The two also expect Khrushchev to respond to the Western world in a similar way to his response during the Suez Crisis and is likely to move away from Berlin. [72] Address to the nation on October 22, 1962, about cuba's problems with Cuba's problems? Look at the media's help. Wikisource has original text related to this article: Cuban Missile Crisis on October 22 at 19:00 EDT, Kennedy delivered a national television address to all major networks announcing the discovery of the missiles. He notes: It would be this nation's policy to view any nuclear missile fired by Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union against the United States, demanding a full response from the Soviet Union. [73] Kennedy described the administration's plan: To stop the offensive buildup, all offensive military facilities that were shipped to Cuba were quarantined. All ships of any kind on the move to Cuba from any nation or port shall be the loads of assault weapons found, return. This quarantine will be extended, if necessary, to other types of cargo and carriers. However, we do not at this time deny the need for life, as the Soviets tried to do in their 1948 Berlin blockade. [73] During the speech, a directive went out to all American forces around the world, placing them on DEFCON 3. The heavy cruiser USS Newport News has been designated a flagship for the blockade.[66] with the USS Leary as a Newport News escort destroyer. [67] The crisis deepened the Soviet First Secretary Khrushchev, October 24, 1962, a letter to Kennedy stating that the blockade of Cuba constituted an act of aggression... [74] [75] On October 23 at 11:24 am EDT, a cable made by George Wildman Ball to the U.S. ambassador to Turkey and NATO informed them that they were considering making an offer to withdraw what the United States knew were almost obsolete missiles from Italy and Turkey - in exchange for the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. Turkish authorities have said they will not open up any trade that includes the U.S. presence of the missiles in their country. [77] Two days later, on the morning of October 25th, the American journalist Walter Lippman offered the same in his synthesized column. Castro reaffirmed Cuba's right to self-defense and said all its weapons were defensive and Cuba would not allow verification. [4] An international response Three days after Kennedy's speech, the Chinese People's Daily reported that 650,000,000 Chinese men and women stood by the people of Cuba. [77] In West Germany, newspapers supported the US response, opposing weak US action in the region in previous months. They also expressed fear that the Russians might retaliate. In France on October 23, the crisis made the front page of all daily newspapers. The next day, an editorial in Le Monde expressed doubt about the authenticity of the CIA's photographic evidence. Two days later, after a visit by high-ranking CIA agents, the newspaper accepted the validity of the photos. Also in France, in the October 29 issue of Le Figaro, Raymond Aaron went in support of the American response. On October 24, Pope John XXIII sent a message to the Soviet Embassy in Rome to be sent to the Kremlin expressing his concern for peace. In this message, he declared: We implore all governments not to be deaf to this call of mankind. They do everything in their power to save the peace. [79] Soviet broadcasting and communications The crisis continued irresponsibly, and on the evening of October 24, the Soviet news agency TASS broadcast a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy, in which Khrushchev warned that purely us piracy would lead to war. [20] This was followed by a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy, which was received at 22:52 EDT. said: if you weigh the current situation with a cold head without giving in to passion, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot afford not to give up on the despotic demands of the United States and that the Soviet Union regards the blockade as an act of aggression and their ships will be instructed to ignore it. Since October 23, Soviet communications with the US have increasingly shown signs of rushing. Undoubtedly a product of pressure, it is not uncommon for Khrushchev to repeat himself and send messages without simple editing. [81] With President Kennedy making his aggressive intentions for a possible airstrike followed by an invasion of Cuba, Khrushchev quickly sought to reach a diplomatic compromise. Communications between the two superpowers have become a unique and revolutionary period; with the newly developed threat of mutual destruction through the deployment of nuclear weapons, diplomacy has shown how power and coercion can dominate negotiations. [82] The U.S. alert level, which was raised, Adlai Stevenson shows aerial photographs of Cuban missiles to the United Nations, October 25, 1962. The United States requested an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council on October 25. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adele Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin at an emergency Security Council meeting, pressuring him to acknowledge the existence of the missiles. Ambassador Zorin declined to answer. The next day at 22:00 EDT, the US raised the level of readiness of the SAC forces to defcon 2. For the only confirmed time in U.S. history, B-52 bombers were on continuous airborne alert, and B-47 medium-sized bombers were scattered to various military and civilian airports and ready to take off, fully equipped, at 15 minutes' notice. [83] One-eighth of the 1,436 bombers are at the air level, and about 145 intercontinental ballistic missiles are ready, some of which are aimed at Cuba,[84] and 15-minute signal status. [62] Twenty-three B-52 nuclear chalcies were sent into orbit at points within striking distance of the Soviet Union, so that the US was considered serious. [85] Jack Caitton later estimated that about 80% of the SAC aircraft were ready for launch during the crisis; David Burchinal remembers that, by contrast: [86] the Russians were so diligently standing up, and we knew it. They didn't move. They have not increased their readiness; they have not increased any flights or their air defences. They didn't do anything, they froze on the spot. We've never been far from nuclear war than in Cuba's time, never further. By October 22, tactical air command (TAC) had 511 fighter jets plus support tankers and reconnaissance aircraft deployed to face Cuba on of the signal. TASS and the air transport service had problems. The concentration of aircraft in Florida has strained the command and support of echelons, who face critical underperforming in the areas of security, armaments, and communications; the absence of an initial authorisation for stockpiles of military reserves of conventional ammunition forcing the TAC to intersect; and the lack of funds for air transport to support a major air downturn required the call for 24 squadrons of reserve. On October 25, at 1:45 a.m., Kennedy responded to Khrushchev's telegram by stating that the U.S. was forced to take action after receiving repeated assurances that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba, and when the guarantees proved false, the deployment required the answers I reported... I hope that your government will take the necessary action to allow the recovery of the earlier situation. A declassified map used by the U.S. Atlantic Fleet showing the position of U.S. and Soviet ships at the height of the crisis. The blockade sparked at 7:15am EDT on October 25, the USS Essex and USS Gearing tried to intercept Bucharest but failed to do so. Pretty sure the tanker doesn't contain any military material, the U.S. cleared it through the blockade. Later that day, at 5:43 p.m., the commander of the blockade ordered the destroyer USS Joseph Kennedy Jr. to get in and board the Lebanese cargo ship Markla. This happened the next day, and Maroukila was cleared through the blockade after checking the cargo. [87] At 5pm EDT on October 25, William Clements announced that missiles in Cuba were still actively being developed. That report was later confirmed by a CIA report that suggested there had been no delay at all. In response, Kennedy issued a Security Memorandum 199 authorizing the loading of nuclear weapons on SACEUR-commanded aircraft that were required to carry out the first airstrikes against the Soviet Union. Kennedy argued that the blockade was successful when the Soviet Union returned fourteen ships, possibly carrying offensive weapons. [88] The first indicator of this came from a report by British Communications sent to the White House Situation Room containing intercepted messages from Soviet ships reporting their positions. On October 24, the Soviet ship Kislovodsk reported a position to the northeast from where 24 hours earlier it had stopped its journey and returned to the Baltic Sea. The next day, reports showed that more ships originally connected to Cuba had changed course. [89] Raising the stakes the next morning, October 26, Kennedy informed EXCOMM that he believed that only one invasion would remove the missiles from Cuba. He was persuaded to give time to the question and continue with military and diplomatic pressure. He agreed and ordered the flights of level above the island to be from twice daily to once every two hours. He also ordered the establishing of a new civilian power in Cuba if he whispered. At that point, the crisis was seemingly at a standstill. The Russians have not shown that they will go backwards and have made public media and private intergovernmental statements to that effect. The United States had no reason to believe otherwise and was in the early stages of preparing for an invasion, along with a nuclear strike by the Soviet Union, if they responded militarily, which was supposed to be the same. [90] Kennedy has no intention of keeping these plans secret; with numerous Cuban and Soviet spies forever present, Khrushchev is quickly aware of this imminent danger. The implied threat of airstrikes on Cuba, followed by an invasion, has allowed the United States to exert pressure in future negotiations. This was the possibility of military action, which played an influential role in accelerating Khrushchev's proposal for compromise. [19] During the closing stages of October, Soviet communications to the United States showed increasing defensiveness. Khrushchev's growing tendency to use poorly spoken and ambiguous communications during compromise negotiations, conversely, increases confidence and clarity in US communications. Leading Soviet figures consistently did not mention that only the Cuban government could agree to inspect the territory and permanently conclude agreements related to Cuba without the knowledge of Fidel Castro himself. According to Dean Rusk, Khrushchev blinked, he began to panic about the consequences of his own plan, and this was reflected in the tone of the Soviet messages. That allowed the U.S. to largely dominate the talks at the end of October. [92] At 13:00 EDT on October 26, ABC News' John A. Scali had lunch with Alexander Fomin, the cover name of Alexander Feklikov, head of the KGB station in Washington, at Fomin's request. Following the instructions of the Politburo of the PPP,[93] Fomin noted, the War looks set to break out. He asked Lucy to use her contacts to talk to her high-level friends at the State Department to see if the U.S. would be interested in a diplomatic solution. He suggested in the language of the deal that the Soviet Union should remove weapons under the United Nations and that Castro would publicly announce that he would not accept such weapons again in exchange for a public statement from the United States that he would not invade Cuba. [94] The U.S. responded by asking the Brazilian government to deliver a message to Castro that the U.S. would be unlikely to invade if the missiles were removed. [76] Mr. President, we and you should not pull the ends of the rope in which you tied the knot of war, because if more of us pull, the tighter it will be tied. And there may come a time when this knot be tied so tightly that even the one who tied it will not have the power to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut this knot, and what it means that I do not explain to you, for you yourself understand what terrible powers that our countries have. Therefore, if there is no intention to tighten this knot and thus bind the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, let us not only relax the forces that pull the ends of the rope, but take measures to untie this knot. We're ready for this. — Letter from President Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962[95] On October 26 at 18:00 EDT, the State Department began receiving a message that appeared to have been written personally by Khrushchev. It was Saturday at 2:00 a.m. in Moscow. The long letter took several minutes to arrive, and it took extra time for translators to translate and transcribe it. [76] Robert Kennedy described the letter very long and emotional. Khrushchev reiterated the basic plan that was announced to Slachi earlier in the day: I propose: we, on our part, will announce that our ships, which are for Cuba, do not carry any weapons. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces that could invade Cuba. Then the need for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear. At 18:45 EDT, news of Fomin's proposal to Scalise was finally heard and interpreted as having been created for the arrival of a khrushchev letter. The letter was then considered official and accurate, although it later learned that Fomin almost certainly acted of his own free will without formal renewal. Further investigation of the letter has been commissioned and continues into the night. [76] The crisis continues direct aggression against Cuba, it will mean nuclear war. Americans talk about such aggression as if they don't know or don't want to accept that fact. I have no doubt that they will lose such a war. - That Guevara, October 1962[96] C-75 Dvina with a V-750V 1D missile (USS Sa-2 guidance) on a launcher. An installation similar to the one that shot down Major Anderson's U-2 over Cuba. Castro, on the other hand, is convinced that it was soon invading Cuba, and on October 26 he sent a telegram to Khrushchev, who appeared to call for a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States in the event of an attack. In a 2010 interview, Castro expressed regret for his earlier position on first use: After seeing what I saw and knowing what I know now, it wasn't worth it at all. [97] Castro also ordered all weapons in Cuba to fire on every U.S. aircraft: [98] the orders were to fire only in groups of two or more. At 06:00 EDT on October 27, the CIA announced that three of the four missile sites in San Cristobal and the two sites in Sagua Grande seems to be fully operational. He also noted that the Cuban military continues to organize actions, but has been ordered not to take action unless attacked. [reference required] At 09:00 EDT on October 27, Radio Moscow began broadcasting a message from Khrushchev. Contrary to the letter of the night, the message suggests a new trade: the missiles on Cuba will be removed in exchange for the removal of Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey. At 10:00 am EDT, the executive committee met again to discuss the situation and concluded that the change in message was because of the internal debate between Khrushchev and other party officials in the Kremlin. [100];300 Kennedy realizes that he will be in an unachievable position if this becomes a khrushchev proposal, because the missiles in Turkey were not militarily useful and were removed anyway , That will be – for every person in the United Nations or any other rational person, it will look like a very fair trade. Bundy explained why he can't consider public tolerance: The current threat to peace is not in Turkey, but in Cuba. McNamara noted that another tanker, Grozny, is about 500 miles away and needs to be intercepted. He also noted that advisers were not aware of the blockade and suggested that this information be passed on to them through U Thant at the United Nations. [101] Lockheed U-2F, the high altitude lowered over Cuba, refueled by a Boeing KC-135Q. The plane in 1962 was painted generally gray and carried usaf military markings and national signs. As the meeting progressed, at 11:03 am EDT, a new message from Khrushchev began to arrive. The message is partly stated: You are concerned about Cuba. You're saying it worries you because it's 60 miles by sea off the coast of the United States of America. But... You have planted destructive weapons, which you call offensive in Italy and Turkey, literally next to us... That's why I'm making this suggestion: We're ready to remove from Cuba the means you find offensive... Your representatives will make a declaration that the United States... remove its similar funds from Turkey... and then the persons entrusted by the UN Security Council may verify on the spot the fulfillment of the commitments made. The Executive Committee continued to meet during the day. During the crisis, Turkey has repeatedly said it would be upset if jupiter rockets were removed. Italy's Prime Minister Amintora Fanfani, who was also interim foreign minister, has proposed allowing the withdrawal of the missiles stationed in Puglia as a swap chip. He passed the message to one of his most trusted friends, Ettore Bernabei, general manager of RAI-TV, to pass on to Arthur M. Junior Bernabei is in New York to attend an international conference on satellite TELEVISION. Unknown to the Russians, the U.S. considered the Jupiter rockets obsolete and already displaced by Polaris' nuclear ballistics. [8] Lockheed U-2's engine shoots down over Cuba on display at the Museum of the Revolution in Havana. On the morning of October 27, the U-2F (the third CIA U-2A modified for air-to-air refueling) piloted by US Major Rudolf Anderson,[102] departed for its location on its McCoy AFB operating system, Florida. At approximately 12:00 EDT, the plane was hit by an SA-2 saxophone fired from Cuba. The plane was shot down and Anderson was killed. Tensions in negotiations between the Russians and the US have intensified; it was only later believed that the decision to launch the missile was taken locally by an unspecified Soviet commander acting of his own free will. Later that day, at about 15:41 EDT, several naval forces were fired on the US warship RF-8A, at a low level of photo reconnaissance missions. On October 28, 1962, Khrushchev told his son, Sergei, that Anderson's downing of the U-2 was by the Cuban military under Raul Castro's leadership. [103] [104] [106] At 4:00 p.m., Kennedy recalled excomm members at the White House and ordered that a message be sent immediately to U Thant to ask the Russians to stop working on the missiles while negotiations were ongoing. During the meeting, General Maxwell Taylor announced that the U-2 had been shot down. Kennedy said he would order an attack on such sites if he fired at, but he decided not to do anything unless a new attack took place. Forty years later, McNamara said, we need to send a U-2 to get information on whether the Soviet missiles were launched. We believed that if the U-2 was shot down, that - the Cubans had no ability to shoot down, the Russians did - we believed that if it was shot down, it would be shot down by a Soviet missile team, and that it would represent a decision by the Russians to escalate the conflict. So, before we sent the U-2, we agreed that if it was shot down, we wouldn't meet, we'd just attack. He was shot down on Friday... Luckily, we changed our minds, we thought, maybe it was an accident, we're not going to attack. We later learned that Khrushchev had grounds just as we did: we sent a U-2, if it was shot down, he thought it was a deliberate escalation. And that's why he issued orders to the Soviet commander in Cuba, Plev, to instruct all his batteries not to shoot down the U-2. [Note 1] [107] Ellsberg said that Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) told him in 1964 that after the U-2 was shot down and the pilot died, he (RFK) told Soviet Ambassador Dobninin: You pulled out first. The president has decided not to give advice ... not to react militarily to this attack, but he [Dobnynin] should know that if another plane was shot down, ... we will take out all SAMs and anti-recovery apparatus And this will almost certainly be followed by an invasion. [108] Preparing an answer This section needs additional quotes for verification. Please help to improve this article by adding quotes to trusted sources. Non-material can be challenged and removed. Find sources: Cuban missile crisis - news - newspapers - books - scientist - JSTOR (October 2017) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) sent by Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed to meet at The Yenching Palace Chinese Restaurant in the Cleveland Park neighborhood of Washington, Saturday night, October 27. [109] Kennedy proposed taking Khrushchev's offer to trade missiles. Unknown to most members of the EXCOM, but with the support of his brother's president, Robert Kennedy met with Soviet Ambassador Dobninin in Washington to find out if the intentions were genuine. [110] EXCOMM is generally opposed to the proposal because it would undermine the power of THE EU, and the Turkish government has repeatedly stated that it is against any such trade. As the meeting progressed, a new plan emerged, and Kennedy slowly persuaded himself. The new plan urged him to ignore the latest message and instead return to the khrushchev earlier. Kennedy initially hesitated, feeling khrushchev would not accept the deal because a new one had been offered, but Leveleine Thompson said it was still possible. White House special counsel Ted Sorensen and Robert Kennedy left the meeting and returned 45 minutes later, with a draft description of it. The president made a few changes, wrote and sent. After excomm meeting a smaller meeting continued in the Oval Office. The group argued that the letter should be underlined with a verbal message to Doblin, who said that if the missiles were not withdrawn, military action would be used to remove them. Rusk added one condition that no part of the language of the deal mention Turkey, but there will be an understanding that the missiles will be removed voluntarily in the immediate vicinity of it. The president agreed and the message was sent. October 29, 1962 - An excomm meeting is held at the White House office. President Kennedy, Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk. At Rusk's request, Fomin and Scali met again. Slaney asked why the two Khrushchev letters were so different, and Fomin claimed it was because of poor communication. Slasi replied that the claim was not credible and shouted that he thought it was a stinking double cross. He went on to claim that the invasion was only a few hours away, and Fomin said that the American message was expected of Khrushchev soon and called Lucy to tell the State Department that the betrayal was not intended. Slami said he didn't think anyone would believe him, but agreed to deliver the message. The two went their separate ways, and Scalise immediately printed a note for EXCOMM. It is well understood that ignoring the second offer and returning to the former puts Khrushchev in a terrible position. Robert Kennedy later recalled the mood: We had not given up all hope, but the hope that he was now rested when Khrushchev revised his course in the next few hours. It was hope, not expectation. The military confrontation was expected on Tuesday (October 30) and probably tomorrow (October 29) ... [112] At 20:05 EDT, the letter, prepared earlier in the day, was delivered. The message reads: As I read your letter, the main elements of your proposals – which seem publicly available as I understand them – are as follows: 1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate supervision and supervision of the United Nations; and undertake, with the appropriate security guards, to stop the further introduction of such weapons systems in Cuba. 2) We, for our part, will agree on the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations, to ensure that these commitments are fulfilled and continued (a) to swiftly eliminate the quarantine measures currently in force and (b) to provide guarantees against the invasion of Cuba. The letter was also released directly to the press to ensure it could not be delayed. [113] With the letter to be delivered, the table is agreed. As Robert Kennedy noted, there is little expectation that it will be accepted. At 21:00 EDT EXCOMM met again to review the actions for the next day. Plans have been drawn up for airstrikes on missile sites as well as other economic targets, in particular oil storage. McNamara said they should have two things ready: a government for Cuba, because we're going to need one; and we're going to need one, and secondly, they plan how to respond to the Soviet Union in Europe, because they will certainly do something there. [114] At 12:12 EDT, on October 27, the United States informed its NATO allies that the situation was shortening.... The United States may find it necessary in its interest and its western hemisphere satellites to take the necessary military action in a very short time. To add to the concern, at 6:00 a.m., the CIA announced that all missiles in Cuba are ready for action. An HSS-1 U.S. Marine Helicopter rises above the Soviet B-59 submarine, forced to be launched by the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean near Cuba (October 28-29, 1962) 27, Khrushchev also received a letter from Castro, now known as Armageddon letter (from the day before), which was interpreted as inciting the use of nuclear power in the event of an attack on Cuba:[115] I believe that the aggression of the imperialists is extremely dangerous and if they actually carry out the brutal act of invading Cuba in violation of international law and morality, this would be the time to eliminate such danger forever through an act of clear legal defense. As harsh and terrible as the decision may be, Castro wrote. [116] The nuclear launch was diverted later that day, What the White House later called Black Sabbath, the U.S. Navy dropped a series of flares (a practice of depth bombs the size of hand grenades) on a Soviet submarine (B-59) on the blockade line, unaware that it was armed with a nuclear-maritime torpedo, with orders that allowed it to be used if the submarine was damaged by deep charges or surface fire. The captain of the B-59, Valentin Grigorievskii, decided that a war had already begun and she wanted to launch a nuclear torpedo. [121] The decision to launch these necessary agreements by the three officers on board, but one of them, Vasily Archipov, objected and therefore the nuclear launch was narrowly deflected. On the same day, a U-2 spy plane made a random, unauthorized 90-minute flyby of the East Coast of the Soviet Union. [122] Soviet troops responded to the shaking of MiG fighters from the island of Vangel. The Americans are launching F-102 jets armed with nuclear air-to-air missiles over the Bering Sea. [123] The crisis ended on Saturday, October 27, after much discussion between the Soviet Union and Kennedy's cabinet, Kennedy secretly agreed to remove missiles stationed in Turkey and possibly southern Italy, the first on the border of the Soviet Union, in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in Cuba. [124] There is a dispute over whether the removal of missiles from Italy is part of the collusion. Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that it was, and when the crisis was over, McNamara ordered them to dismantle the missiles in Italy and Turkey. [125] At that point, Khrushchev knew things that the United States was not: First, that the downing of the U-2 by a Soviet missile violated direct orders from Moscow, and the Cuban anti-inflammatory fire against other U.S. reconnaissance aircraft also violated direct orders from Khrushchev to Castro. [126] Secondly, Soviet warheads already had 162 nuclear warheads on Cuba that the United States did not believe were there. [12] Thirdly, the Russians and Cubans on the island would almost certainly respond to an invasion using these nuclear weapons, although Castro believes that every person in Cuba is likely to die as a result. [128] Khrushchev also knew, but they didn't think he had submarines armed with nuclear weapons that the U.S. Navy might not have known about. Khrushchev knew he was losing control. In early 1961, President Kennedy said that a nuclear war was likely to kill a third of humanity, with most or all of these deaths concentrated in the United States, the USSR, Europe and China; Khrushchev may have received similar reports from his army. With this story, when Khrushchev heard Kennedy's threats passed from Robert F. Kennedy to Soviet Ambassador Dobninin, he immediately chose to accept Kennedy's final terms from his date without including the Politburo, as before, and made them broadcast immediately on the radio, which he thought the United States would hear. In this broadcast at 9:00 am EST, on October 28, Khrushchev stated that the Soviet government, in addition to pre-issued instructions to cease further work on the construction sites for the weapons, issued a new order to dismantle the weapons, which you describe as offensive and their pasting and return to the Soviet Union. [130] [131] [122] At 10:00 a.m., October 28, Kennedy first learned of Khrushchev's solution to the crisis, with the United States removing the 15 Jupiters in Turkey and the Russians removing the missiles from Cuba. Khrushchev made the suggestion in a public statement for the world to hear. Despite almost firm opposition from his senior advisers, Kennedy quickly accepted the Soviet offer. It's a pretty good game for him, Kennedy said, according to a tape recording he made secretly at the cabinet meeting. Kennedy deployed jupiters in March of the year, causing a stream of angry outbursts from Khrushchev. Most people will think it's a lot of trade and we have to take advantage of it, Kennedy said. Vice President Lyndon Johnson was the first to support the missile exchange, but others continued to oppose the proposal. In the end, Kennedy ended the debate. We can't very well invade Cuba with all our labor and blood, Kennedy said, when we could have pulled them out by making a deal on the same missiles to Turkey. If that's part of the record, then you're

not fighting a very good war. [133] Kennedy immediately responded to Khrushchev's letter by issuing a statement calling it an important and constructive contribution to peace. [132] He continues this with an official letter: I consider my letter to you of 27 October and your response today as firm commitments by our two governments that need to be made quickly.... The US will make a statement within the Security Council as follows: declare that the United States of America will respect the unscathedness of the Cuban borders, its sovereignty, that it will commit not to interfere in domestic affairs, not to intrude not to allow our territory to be used as a bridge for the invasion of Cuba, and will limit those who plan to carry out aggression against Cuba, nor from the territory of other countries neighboring Cuba. [132] [134]:103 Kennedy's planned statement will also contain suggestions he received from his adviser, Schlesinger Jr., in a Memorandum for the President describing the Post-Mortem of Cuba. [135] Kennedy's phone conversation with Eisenhower shortly after Khrushchev arrived revealed that the president planned to use the Cuban missile crisis to escalate tensions with the Khrushchev [136] and, in the long run, Cuba. The president says the crisis will lead to direct military conflicts in Berlin by the end of next month. He also argued in his conversation with Eisenhower that the Soviet leader had offered to withdraw from Cuba in exchange for the withdrawal of the missiles from Turkey and that while the Kennedy administration had agreed not to invade Cuba, [136], they were in the process of determining Khrushchev's proposal to withdraw from Turkey. [136] When former US President Harry Truman called President Kennedy on the day of Khrushchev's proposal, the president informed him that his administration had rejected the Soviet leader's offer to withdraw missiles from Turkey and planned to use the Soviet hurdle in Cuba to escalate tensions in Berlin. [137] Removal of missiles in Cuba November 11, 1962 – NARA – 193868 The United States continued the blockade; In the following days, aerial reconnaissance proved that the Russians had made progress in bringing down the missile systems. The 42 missiles and their reinforcements were loaded onto eight Soviet ships. On November 2, 1962, Kennedy addressed the United States via radio and television broadcasts about the process of smashing USSR missiles stationed in the Caribbean. [138] The ships left Cuba on November 5 to November 9. The U.S. carried out a final visual inspection when each of the ships went through the blockade. Further diplomatic efforts are needed to remove Soviet I-28 bombers and they were loaded onto three Soviet ships on December 5 and 6. In parallel with the Soviet commitment to il-28, the US government announced the end of the blockade at 18:45 EST on November 20, 1962. [61] At the time the Kennedy administration decided that the Cuban missile crisis was resolved, nuclear tactical missiles remained in Cuba because they were not part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding, and the Americans were unaware of them. Soviet advisers changed their minds, fearing possible future militant Cubans, and on November 22, 1962, Soviet Union Vice President Anastas Mikoyan told Castro that the nuclear warhead missiles had also been removed. [18] In its negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobin, unofficially, Robert Kennedy suggested that Jupiter missiles in Turkey be removed for a short time after the end of the crisis. [139]:222 The last American missiles were dismantled on April 24, 1963, and took off from Turkey soon after. [10] The practical effect of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact is that the US will remove its missiles from Italy and Turkey and the Russians have no intention of resorting to nuclear war if they were the U.S. shootout. [141] [142] Since the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from THE BASES OF THE UNITED STATES in Italy and Turkey was not made public at the time, Khrushchev appears to have lost the conflict and become weakened. The perception is that Kennedy won the superpower race and that Khrushchev was humiliated. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev took every step to avoid a full conflict, despite pressure from the respective governments. Khrushchev held power for another two years. [134]:102-105 Nuclear forces during the October 1962 crisis totaled approximately 26,400 for the United States and 3,300 for the Soviet Union. At the peak of the crisis, the US had 3,500 nuclear weapons ready for command with a combined yield of approximately 6,300 megatons. The Russians have significantly less strategic firepower at their disposal (about 300-320 bombs and warheads) without being armed with submarines that threaten the U.S. mainland and have most of their bomber-based intercontinental delivery systems that would be difficult to penetrate north American air defense systems. The United States has approximately 4,375 nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, most of which are tactical weapons such as nuclear artillery, about 450 of which are for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft. Soviet troops had more than 550 similar weapons in Europe. [143] [144] US SAC ICBM: 182 (highest signal): 121 Atlas D/E/F, 53 Titan 1, 8 Min.1A Bombers: 1595; 880 B-47, 639 B-52, 76 B-58 (1479 bombers and 1,003 refueling tankers available at peak warning) Atlantic Command 112 UGM-27 Polaris in seven SSBNs (16 each); five submarines with Polaris A1 and two with Pacific 4-8 Regulus Cruise 16 Mays Cruise 3 aircraft carriers with about 40 bombs on each ground aircraft with about 50 Bombs European Command IRBM: 105; 60 Thor (United Kingdom), 45 Jupiter (30 Italy, 15 Turkey) 48-90 Mace Cruise 2 missiles 2 American sixth aircraft carrier with about 40 bombs each ground aircraft with about 50 bombs Soviet Union Strategic (for use against North America): ICBM: 42; four SS-6/IR-7A in Plesetsk with two in reserve; in Baikonur, 36 SS-7/IR-16 with 26 in silos and ten on open bomber pads; 160 (readiness unknown); 100 Tu-95 Bear, 60 3M Bison B (mostly aimed at Europe, and others targeting U.S. bases in East Asia); MRBM: 528 SS-4/IR-12, 492 in non-dock launch sites and 36 at difficult launch sites (about six to eight R-12s are in operation in Cuba, capable of hitting the U.S. at any moment while the crisis is resolved) IRBM: 28 SS-5 /R-14 Unknown number of Tu-16 Badger, Tu-22 Blinder, and MiG-21 aircraft loaded with nuclear strike missions After an atomic-armed ballistic missile with range of range. The US secretly agreed to withdraw the missiles from Italy and Turkey. Soviet leaders The great idea of how close to the world it came to thermonuclear warfare, Khrushchev to offer a large-scale easing of tensions with the US. [145] In a letter to President Kennedy of 30 October 1962, Khrushchev outlined a number of bold initiatives to overcome the possibility of a further nuclear crisis, including proposing a non-aggressive treaty between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NAU) and the Warsaw Pact, or even the dissolution of these war blocks, a treaty to end all nuclear tests and even the elimination of all nuclear weapons, the resolution of Germany's east-west hot button problem, which formally accepts the existence of West Germany and East Germany, and the American recognition of the government of mainland China. The letter invited counter-proposals and further study of these and other issues through peace talks. Khrushchev invited Norman Cousins, editor of a major American period and an anti-nuclear weapons activist, to serve as a liaison to President Kennedy, and cousins met Khrushchev for four hours in December 1962. Kennedy responded to Khrushchev's suggestions, but Kennedy told Cousins that he felt limited in exploring these issues because of pressure from hardliners in the U.S. national security apparatus. The United States and the USSR agreed soon after to a treaty banning atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, known as the Partial Ban on Nuclear Tests Treaty. [14] After the crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union established the Moscow-Washington hotline, which is a direct link between Moscow and Washington. The aim is to find a way for the leaders of both Cold War countries to be able to communicate directly to solve such a crisis. The compromise embarrassed Khrushchev and the Soviet Union because the withdrawal of American missiles from Italy and Turkey was a secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Khrushchev went to Kennedy while he thought the crisis was getting out of hand, but the Soviets backed away from the circumstances that they had begun. Khrushchev's fall from power two years later was partly because of the Soviet Politburo's turmoil in the two Khrushchev concessions to the United States and this inability to accelerate the crisis in the first place. According to the The highest Soviet leadership took the Cuban starting position as a blow to its prestige, bordering on humiliation. [148] Cuban leaders in Cuba saw the result as a betrayal by the Russians, as decisions to resolve the crisis were made exclusively by Kennedy and Khrushchev. Castro is particularly upset that some issues of interest to Cuba, such as the status of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, have not been addressed. This caused the Cuban-Soviet relationship to deteriorate for years to come. [149]:278 U.S. Leadership The World Status of U.S. Forces DEFCON 3 was returned to BP 4 on November 20, 1962, his position is in the minority. [54] He was pressed for an immediate invasion of Cuba as soon as the crisis began and still favored the Cuban war, even after the Russians had withdrawn their missiles. Twenty-five years later, LeMay still believes that Cuba could have pulled not only the missiles out of Cuba, but also the Communists from Cuba at the time. [86] At least four contingency strikes were launched from Florida against Cuban airports and alleged missile sites in 1963 and 1964, although all were diverted to the Pinecastle Range complex after the planes passed through Andros Island. [152] Critics, including Seymour Mehlman, and Seymour Hersh [153] suggested that the Missile Crisis encouraged the United States to use military means, such as the case in the later Vietnam War. The u-2 pilot's human sacrifices have been returned to the United States and buried with full military honors in South Carolina. He was the first recipient of the newly created Air Force Cross, which was awarded posthumously. Although Anderson was the only death toll during the crisis, 11 crew members of three Reconnaissance Boeing RB-47 Stratofets of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing were also killed in crashes between September 27 and November 11, 1962. [155] Later, the revelations Schlesinger, a historian and adviser to Kennedy, told National Public Radio in an interview on October 16, 2002, that Castro did not want the missiles, but Khrushchev pressed Castro to accept them. Castro was not entirely happy with the idea, but the Cuban National Directorate of revolution adopted them to protect Cuba from the United States and help the Soviet Union. [149]:272 Schlesinger believed that when the missiles were withdrawn, Castro was more angry with Khrushchev than Kennedy because Khrushchev had not contacted Castro before deciding to remove them. [Note 2] Although Castro is infuriated by Khrushchev, he plans to strike with the rest of the missiles if she invaded the island. [149]:311 In early 1992, it was confirmed that Soviet forces in Cuba had already received tactical nuclear warheads for their artillery missiles and IL-28 bombers when the crisis broke down. [156] Castro stated that he would recommend using them if the United States attacked despite the destruction of Cuba. [156] Perhaps the most dangerous moment in the crisis was recognized only after the Cuban Missile Crisis conference in Havana in October 2002. To many of the veterans of the crisis present, they all learned that on October 27, 1962, the USS Beale tracked down and refused to give up deep accusations (the dimensions of hand grenades) on the B-59, Soviet Project 641 (of the EU designation Foxtro). It is not known to the US that he was armed with a 15 kiloton nuclear torpedo. [15] The air of the Soviet submarine was surrounded by American warships and in desperate need of assistance. An argument broke out between three officers aboard the B-59, including the submarine's captain Valentin Savitsky, political officer Ivan Semonovich Maslov and brigade commander Captain 2nd Rank (rank of the US Navy Commander) Vasily Archipov. The exhausted Savitsky got angry and ordered the nuclear torpedo on board to be ready to fight. The accounts differ as to whether Archipov persuaded Savitsky not to make the attack, or Savitsky himself eventually concluded that the only reasonable choice left open to him was to come to the surface. [158]:303, 317 During the conference, McNamara declared that nuclear war was much closer than people thought. Thomas Blanton, director of the National Security Archive, said A man called Vasily Archipov saved the world. Fifty years after the crisis, Graham T. Allison wrote: Fifty years ago, the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. During the friction, US President John F. Kennedy thought that the chance of escalating war was between 1 in 3 and even, and what we learned in the following decades did nothing to put those chances to life. We now know, for example, that in addition to nuclear ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union has 100 tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba, and the local Soviet commander may have dropped these weapons without additional codes or commands from Moscow. U.S. airstrikes and invasions, which were planned for the third week of the confrontation, are likely to trigger a nuclear response against U.S. ships and troops, and perhaps even Miami. The war he fought could result in the deaths of more than 100 million Americans and more than 100 million Russians. BBC journalist Joe Matthews published the story on 13 October 2012 behind the 100 nuclear warheads mentioned by Graham Allison in the excerpt above. Khrushchev fears Castro's pride and widespread resentment of Cuba concessions he made to Kennedy could lead to the failure of the agreement between the USSR and the US. To prevent this, Khrushchev decided to offer to give Cuba more than 100 tactical nuclear weapons that had been sent to Cuba along with long-range missiles but, crucially, escaped the notice of U.S. intelligence agencies. Khrushchev decided that because the Americans had not included the missiles on their list of demands, keeping them in Cuba would be in the interest of the Soviet Union. Anastas Mikoyan was tasked with negotiating with Castro on the missile transfer deal, which was designed to prevent a breakdown in relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union. While in Havana, Mikoyan witnessed the mood and paranoia of Castro, who was convinced that Moscow had reached an agreement with the United States at the expense of Cuba's defense. Mikoyan, on his own initiative, decided that Castro and his army were not under the control of weapons of explosive force equal to 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs under any circumstances. During a tense, four-hour meeting, Mikoyan convinced Castro that, despite Moscow's willingness to help, it would be in violation of unpublished Soviet legislation that did not actually exist, transfer the missiles permanently into Cuban hands and provide them with an independent nuclear deterrent. Castro was forced to give way and, much to the aid of Khrushchev and the rest of the Soviet government, tactical nuclear weapons were slaughtered and returned by sea to the Soviet Union in December 1962. [160] In popular culture, American media, especially television, often used the events of the missile crisis and fictional and documentary forms. [162] Jim Willis included the crisis as one of the 100 media moments that changed America. [163] Sheldon Stern discovered that half a century later, there were still many misconceptions, half-truths, and outright lies that shaped media versions of what happened in the White House during those disastrous two weeks. [164] Historian William Cohen argued in a 1976 article that television programs were usually the main source used by the American public to know and interpret the past. [165] According to the Cold War historian, the Soviet media proved to be a little disorganized as they failed to generate a consistent popular story. Khrushchev lost his power and was awakened by history. Cuba is no longer portrayed as a heroic David against the American goliath. One contradiction that has been tangled in the Soviet media campaign is between the pacifist rhetoric of the peace movement, which highlights the horrors of nuclear war and the belligerence of the need to prepare the Russians for war against American aggression. [166] Media Presentations No. Robert Kennedy's days of crisis, published in 1969, are at a 15-day time period. It became the basis for numerous films and documentaries. [167] The October 1974 missiles for the crisis. [168] The Fog of War, a 2003 American documentary about the life and times of former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, directed by Errol Morris, won this Academy Award for best documentary. [169] Fiction Topaz, an Alfred Hitchcock film based on the novel by Leon Eric, on the eve of the crisis. [170] Matinee, a film starring John Goodman, which was shot during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which an independent director decided to take the opportunity to debut an atomic-themed film. [171] Thirteen Days (film), Kennedy-based tapes: at the White

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