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El faro ship crew list

2015 Joaquin Kasırgası Tarihi Adı: Porto Riko (1975-1991)Kuzey Işıkları (1991-2006)El Faro (2006-2015)[1]Sahibi: TOTE MaritimeOperator: Sea Star LinePort registry: San Juan, Porto Riko, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri[1]Rota: Jacksonville, Florida - San Juan, Porto RikoSipariş: 1973Builder: Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.[1]Yard numarası: 670[2]Laid down: 11 Nisan, 1974[2] Başlatılan: 1 Kasım 1974[2]Tamamlandı: 16 Ocak 1975[2]Kimlik: Çağrı işareti: WFKJ IMO numarası: 7395351 MMSI numarası: 368208000 Fate: Sank 1 Ekim'de Joaquin Kasırgası, 2015[3] Genel özellikler [1]Tip: Roll-on/roll-off kargo gemisiTonnage: 31.515 GT21.473 NT14.971 DWTLength: 241 m (791 ft) (uzatmadan sonra)Kiriş: 28,6 m (9 4 ft)Taslak: 12.8 m (42 ft)İtiş : Tek şaft, çift reduksiyon bileşik buhar türbini (11.190 kW)Hız : 22 knots (41 km /h; 25 mph)Crew: On its final voyage of 33 personnel (28 Americans and 5 Poles), the SS El Faro was a United States-flagged, combination roll-on/roll-off and lift-on/lift-off cargo ship crewed by US merchant sailors. Built in 1975 by Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. as Puerto Rico, the ship was renamed the Northern Lights in 1991 and finally El Faro in 2006. On October 1, 2015, he disappeared into the sea with all his hands after entering the center of Hurricane Joaquin. [4] El Faro left Jacksonville, Florida for Puerto Rico on September 29, 2015 at 8:10 p.m. EST. Two days later, after Joaquin had become a Category 3 hurricane, the ship most likely encountered swelling as winds above 20 to 40ft (6-12m) and 80 kn (150km/h; 92 mph) sailed close to the eye of that storm. At around 7:30 a.m. on .m the ship was receiving water and recording a temperature of 15 degrees. However, the latest report from the captain showed that the crew had the flood under control. Soon after, El Faro cut off all communication with the coast. [5] [4] On October 2, the 40-year-old ship was announced as missing, and an extensive search operation was launched by the United States Coast Guard with the help of the Air Force, Air Force and Navy. They were rescued from the wreckage and a damaged lifeboat and detected (but could not recover) an unidentified body. The El Faro was declared sunk on October 5th. The search was called off at sunset on October 7, during which time 183,000 sq nmi (630,000 sq mi; 242,000 sq mi) were met by planes and ships. The Navy sent the USNS Apache to search the El Faro on October 19, 2015. [6] Apache detected debris on October 31 consistent with the [El Faro] cargo ship ... in an upright position and in one piece. [7] The next day, November 1st, the Navy announced that it had returned images that determined that the sunks were El Faro. [8] [4] Construction and his previous career were built by El Faro Sun And the Drydock Corporation in Chester, Pennsylvania, in 1975 under the name Puerto Rico. [1] Puerto Rico, operated by the Navieras de Puerto Rico Steamship Company, transported cargo to the U.S. East Coast for 15 years. It was bought in 1991 by Saltchuk Resources, the parent company of TOTE Shipping, and renamed Northern Lights. Two years later, he grew 27 m. at alabama shipyard, inc., and under Saltchuk he often sailed between Tacoma, Washington and Anchorage, Alaska. [9] In February 2003, just before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the ship was leased by the U.S. Military Naval Lift Command as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom; The ship sent Marines and supplies from San Diego, California, to Kuwait. [9] [10] On March 19, while in the Persian Gulf, the ship came under fire from missiles. The explosions shook the ship but caused damage or injury. By October 2005, towards the end of the northern lights' lease, the ship had called 25 flights and 49 ports. A total of 12,200 military equipment weighing 81,000 short tons (73,000 t) was carried by the ship. Robert Magee, then president of TOTE, and crew of the Northern Lights were praised by United States Air Force generalNorton A. Schwartz: You and your professional team displayed the best U.S. flag industry. [10] After completing military service in 2006, the ship was transferred by TOTE to its by-company Sea Star Lines and renamed el Faro. The ship returned to its original course and served as a lifeline between the United States mainland and Puerto Rico. [9] When it sank on October 1, 2015, the El Faro Trade Ship would return to Tacoma to relieve another ship. [9] Also: Hurricane Joaquin Final voyage life ring rescued on October 3, 2015, September 29, 2015, 8:10 a.m. .m., El Faro San Juan, left in Jacksonville, Florida, carrying a cargo of 391 shipping containers, about 294 trailers and cars, and a team of 33-28 Americans and 5 Poles. [3] The ship's master, Captain Michael Davidson, plotted a course that, according to TOTE Maritime, took a fairly safe distance from the hurricane. [11] During takeoff, Hurricane Joaquin was still a tropical storm, but meteorologists at the National Hurricane Center predicted it would become a hurricane in southwestern orbit toward the Bahamas on the morning of October 1. [12] The ship's ma map route took place within 175 nmi (320 km; 200 miles) of the storm and is likely to be seas exceeding 10ft. [13] TOTE could have vetoed the captain's sailing plan to the prescribed hurricane area, but chose not to and preferred to keep the ship going. The company said there was no incentive for Davidson to continue the ship's program. the program also appeared to be a safe one. [14] At least one of the deck officers, first officer Danielle Randolph, raised concerns before sailing and wrote in an email to friends and family: There is a tornado here and we are going straight there. [15] The ship passed its annual Coast Guard audit in March and another investigation in June[16] and successfully completed the American Maritime Bureau (ABS) class and legal research in February 2015. [17] The NTSB found that security exercises were conducted weekly and met the ship's stability criteria when it left Jacksonville. [18] The former crew of the El Faro expressed their surprise and shock that they had set off in a major storm on the ship's course. They said the ship had a rust bucket that shouldn't be in the water. They also suffer from El Faro drainage problems and said leakage is common in the kadirga (kitchen) compartment. They said the ship was covered in rust and its decks were filled with holes by August. [11] At 11:45 a.m. on October 1 at UTC (7:45.m), a hurricane Joaquin Satellite image continued to track the southwest, painting el faro's approximate final location from September 30 to the morning of October 1. [13] 10 hours after leaving, El Faro was steaming at full speed and veering off course on the map. According to Klaus Luhta of the International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, Davidson continued to head straight for the storm. [19] Joaquin became a hurricane at 8:00 a.m. on September 30.m then quickly intensified. [13] By 11 p.m., the storm had reached Category 3 with maximum sustained winds of 100 kn (185 km/h; 115 mph). [21] On October 1.m at around 7:30 a.m., less than 30 hours after the ship left Jacksonville, the United States Coast Guard received a satellite notification that its ship had lost propulsion. [22] The Coast Guard also took a single ping from the ship's Emergency Radio Beacon. [23] Attempts by the Coast Guard to contact El Faro were unsuccessful. [24] Marine Traffic's last reported location of El Faro is 24°16'29"N 74°56'43"W / 24.2747°N 74.94522°W / 24.2747; -74.94522 (El Faro's location at .m 4:01 a.m. on October 1) 19 kn (35 km/h; 22 mph) south-southeast at .m.01 a.m. [25] According to a different marine positioning database cited by Reuters, El Faro's final relay position was 23°31'N 74°01'W / 23.52°N 74.02°W / 23.52°W / -74.02 (Location of El Faro on October 1 at .m. 7:56 a.m.) at 7:56 a.m..m..[13] about 35 nmi (65 km; 40 mi) northeast of Crooked Island. [26] This ship is placed The eye wall of Hurricane Joaquin, located near 23°12'N 73°42'W / 23.2°N 73.7°W / 23.2°W; -73.7 (location of Hurricane Joaquin at 10:00 a.m. on October .m.m., 80 kn (150 km/h; 92 mph) and 20 to 30 ft (6 to 9 m) waves likely battered the ship. [13] Voyage Data Recorder audio On December 13, 2016, the NTSB released a 500-page transcript of the ship's conversations on the bridge in the last 26 hours, recorded by the ship's Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) and six microphones. The transcript describes a rapidly deteriorating situation. At 5:43 a.m., the captain receives a phone call about suspected flooding in cargo warehouse 3 and sends his senior friend to investigate. The crew then begins to take precautions to assess and control flooding. [28]:415-416 At 06:13, the ship loses its steam propulsion plant. [28]:439 At 06:54, the captain receives a call describing the situation on board: He is now miserable. We've got all the wind on the starboard side. Now there is some flooding that has stayed open with a scuttle or open or whatever so keep three- a significant amount. Everyone's safe now, we can't abandon ship. We're in a tough place right now. Okay, I'll call the office and tell them it's incomprehensible. Ok? There's no need to sound the general alarm yet- we can't abandon ship. Engineers are trying to get the factory back. That's why we're working on it, okay? [28]:467 At 07:06, the captain makes a phone call. It says: I have a marine emergency and I want to talk to a QI. We had a hull violation - a scuttle [warehouse] was opened during the storm. We've lowered water from three people. We have a heavy list. We've lost the main propulsion. Engineers can't handle this. Can I speak to a QI, please? [28]:475 We uhh have safe water supply from the ship. ah, blew open with a scuttle ... It's been closed ever since. However, there is a considerable amount of water in the three warehouses. We have a very, very healthy list of ports. Engineers can't get lubrile pressure at the factory, so we don't have a main engine, and I'll give you the lulem and longi what I'm going to do. I wanted to give you a warning before I pressed that button. [28]:476 Crew secure. We're trying to save the ship right now. We're 30 miles east of San Salvador. We're taking every precaution to get the list out. By that I mean, let's throw out the pump that's doing our best, but right now we're not going to gain ground. [28]:477 It's kind of hard to say because all the wind right now ... That's why you have a good wind heel goin, so this way, too. But we're not getting any better. [28]:478 [We] are going to stay by ship ... Nobody everyone was made aware ... Our safest chance is to stay on board during this time. The weather is wild here and we are going to stay with the ship ... outside the swelling northeast, a solid ten to twelve meter (over) spray, high winds, very poor visibility ... [28]:478 At 7:10, the captain tells someone on the phone what a 10-15 degree list is, but a lot with wind heels. [28]:480 The person notes that he will make a help call to the USCG, and then directs the second friend to activate the SSAS button/GMDSS alarm, and directs everyone to wake up. [28]:481-482 At 07:15, the head mate returns to the bridge: I think the water level is rising, Captain. Captain: (ok). Do you know where it came from? Chief Mate: (horse) first chief said something hit the main fire. Torn. Hard. Captain: Is there no way to secure this? Chief Mate: We still don't know if there's any pressure on the fire network. I don't know where the sea is – between the sea sucking and the hull or what it means but everything I say is a guess. [28]:483 At 07:17, the chief engineer tells his chief friend and captain that the wise alarm continues to sound within two alphas from the voice-whipped phone. [28]:485 The captain asks the chef if he can pump all cargo amounts at the same time and discusses the worsening list. [28]:486 The lead mate tells the captain that the cars were floated in #3 cargo warehouses and that the fire mother was below the surface of the water, so she could not see the damage or if the water was still coming. [28]:487-488 At 07:19, after further an argument with the captain, the captain calls the chief engineer again and asks: ... Inseed the fire mother down the engine room. ... Insulation valve on machine room side [] suction [] for fire pump ... Trust him, isolate him to your side so there's free communication from the sea. [28]:489-490 At 07:24, while the captain was on the phone with a crew member, there is still backup floating and stability. Says. [28]:493 At 07:27, the captain orders his second friend to sound the general alarm and wake up the crew. [28]:493 At 07:29, the captain orders him to abandon ship, and about a minute later he is heard on the bridge shouting, Bend over, get down. [28]:499-500 At 07:31, captain, take your raft to your chief friend on UHF radio! Throw all your raft in the water! Everybody off! Get off the ship! Stay together! [28]:501 From 07:32, the captain is heard trying to help the panicked helmsman. [28]:502 The captain constantly tells the helmsman not to panic: Go here,[28]:504, you're fine,[28]:505 and I'm not leavin, let's go! [28]:507 Helmsman shouts, I need a ladder! A line! [28]:506 and, I need someone to help me! [28]:507 At 07:39, the VDR recording ends with the captain and the matz on the bridge. [28]:509 Search operations Conditions During the search for El Faro on October 1, as seen in a Coast Guard HC-130 on October 2, Hurricane Hunters WC-130J Super Hercules aircraft tried to find El Faro without success in the U.S. Air Force Reserve 53 Air Reconnaissance Squadron 53 air reconnaissance squadron. [29] On October 2, Florida's Coast Guard HC-130H Hercules aircraft, CGAS Clearwater, launched a special search for the ship. [24] An MH-60T Jayhawk helicopter from USCGC Northland and CGAS Clearwater, Florida, joined the search later that day. [30] U.S. Coast Guard MH-65C Dolphin Helicopters from CGAS Miami, Florida, and CGAS Borinquen, Puerto Rico, and HC-144A Ocean Sentry Fixed Wing Patrol Aircraft from Miami were also present. On October 3, planes flew in severe hurricane conditions, characterized by winds of 100 kn (185 km/h; 115 mph) at an altitude of 1,000ft (300m), waves up to 40ft (12m) and visibility less than 1 nmi (1.9km; 1.2m). Despite the dangerous conditions, a helicopter crew found a ring of life from the ship today. [31] Conditions improved markedly on October 4 as Joaquin moved northeast from the Bahamas; winds averaged 15 kn (28 km/h; 17 mph) and visibility was limitless. [32] Taking advantage of the fresh air, the helicopter stayed in flight for 11 hours and refueled twice. [26] A second HC-130, USCGC Charles Sexton and USCGC Stable were deployed that day. [32] Northland and Resolute continued their work overnight with engineers who used night vision goggles to participate in the search. [26] [33] The U.S. Navy provided P-8A Poseidon fixed-wing aircraft from the NAS. Jacksonville, Florida to help on October 5; Three Crowley Shipping tugboats also attended. [33] [34] Search operations have been conducted at an almost continuous pace until this date. [26] On October 5, an unidentified body was found but not found in a life suit thought to be from El Faro. According to the rescue diver, the body was unrecognizable, his head was three times normal[35] and he was left to be recovered later in the day. However, a failure of the positioning device SLDMB ultimately resulted in body loss. [36] [37] Several other unopened suits were found. [38] A deflated lifeboat and a heavily damaged lifeboat in El Faro, each capable of carrying 43 people and stockpiling food and water for

several days, were also not found. [26] [37] The ship was announced missing at sea today, believed to have sank with 4,600m of water and turned into search-and-rescue efforts. [3] [39] United States Air Force and Air National Guard provided three HC-130P/J aircraft on October 6. [34] [40] A total of 183,000 sq nmi (630,000 sq mi; 242,000 sq mi) of water were seized during the ship search. [34] Two debris fields were discovered: one was located 260 sq nmi (890 sq 2) near the last position of El Faro, and the other was located 60 nmi (110 km) northeast of the first debris field, which is 61 sq nmi (210 sq) long. At sunset on October 7, the Coast Guard announced the cessation of search operations. [34] [41] After October 7, a navy rescue team requested a debris search at the request of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). [41] Florida Senator Bill Nelson wrote to the NTSB, urging them to examine TOTE's policies on severe weather. [38] Nelson also stated that the ship's lifeboats were outdated and inadequate for the conditions faced by the crew. [38] On October 9, TOTE set up a fund for the crew's families through the Seamen Church Institute in New York and New Jersey. [42] On October 14, a \$100 million lawsuit was filed against TOTE by a family member of one of the missing crew members. [43] On October 28, another lawsuit was filed on behalf of the property of a man who died in the sinking. Without force in the complaint, M/V EL FARO was just a fungus in the sea as the hurricane approached. statement was taken. [44] On April 19, 2016, TOTE Shipping sold 18 out of 33 families for more than \$7 million. [45] [46] MV Isla Bella was chosen to replace el faro's former operations. [47] Search the wreckage for a navy screen capture showing the ass of the El Faro. On October 19, the USNS Apache left Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story in Virginia Beach, Virginia, to do an underwater search for El Faro. The ship is equipped with a check pinger finder, side examination sonar and a remote controlled vehicle. [6] On October 31, the search team detected a vessel at a depth of about 4,600 m. Hydrostatic pressure at this depth is about £6,688 per square inch (46,110 kPa). The NTSB reported that this object is consistent with a [790 ft (240 m)] cargo ship ... in an upright position and in one piece. [7] On November 16, the National Transportation Safety Board announced that it had completed its search for the sunk ship but could not find the travel data recorder. [48] On January 3, 2016, the NTSB opened the public accident regarding the investigation into the sinking of the El Faro and released underwater images and videos of the ship. [49] On April 18, 2016, the NTSB launched a second search for the ship's travel data recorder (VDR) using the RV Atlantis, a navy ship operated by sailors from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. NTSB on April 26 The VDR was found about 41 miles (66 km) northeast of the Acklins and Crooked Islands in the Bahamas. The NTSB was cannot get the recorder back at the time because it was too close to the pole and other obstacles. On August 5, 2016, the USNS Apache returned to the site and five days later found the VDR back. Ten months after its sinking, VDR was handed over to the NTSB in Mayport, Florida, to continue its investigation. [50] The presentation of the findings was completed on September 24, 2017 and published in the document library on October 1, 2017. [51] The 199-page Naval Board Report details the facts, analyses and conclusions, and provides security, administrative and implementation recommendations. [52] Coast Guard investigators ass reassed nearly all of the blame to Michael Davidson, captain of the El Faro. Davidson underestimated the storm's strength and the ship's vulnerability in harsh weather and did not take adequate precautions to escape the storm, despite his crew expressing concern about its increased strength and change of direction. Investigators said that if Davidson had survived the storm, his actions would have been a reason for the Coast Guard to revoke the captain's license. Capt. Jason Neubauer, who led the investigation, said Davidson was ultimately responsible for the ship, crew and safe navigation. Coast Guard investigators also criticized TOTE Maritime, the owner of the el Faro, noting that the company had made several violations related to crew rest times and opening hours, that there were no private security guards to inspect the El Faro, and that it used outdated, open-air lifeboats (similar to those used on older ships such as the RMS Titanic). [53] The NTSB NTSB model, the NTSB model of El Faro's resting place on the sea floor, met in Washington, D.C., on December 12, 2017, to discuss factors contributing to the sinking ground and to vote on proposals to address security issues uncovered during the investigation. [54] The board meeting was broadcast live. [54] In the board's 400-page report:[55] [56] [57] he criticized the captain's decision to move towards the approaching storm despite numerous calls from the crew to change course, and criticized the Coast Guard's grandfathering practices on ships, exempting them from using closed lifeboats. : The old lifeboats were not properly stored, they were not launched, and most likely in the latest report of the failure of the owner that they would not have offered useful shelter, the NTSB determines that El Faro and subsequent loss of life are the possible cause Action to prevent Hurricane Joaquin, his failure to use the most up-to-date weather information, and the crew decided toer his late. The captain on board the El Faro ship that contributed to the sinking ship was ineffective bridge resource management, including the officers' lack of adequate consideration of their recommendations. The sinking was also a lack of tote surveillance and security management system. Factors that contribute more ... an undetectable open waterproof scuttle and damaged seawater pipe had flooded a cargo warehouse; loss of propulsion due to low lubricat pressure to the main engine caused by a continuous list; and cargo keeps downflooding next with unsadned ventilation hatches. Also contributing ... there was a lack of an approved damage control plan ... There was a lack of proper survival craft for the conditions that contributed to the loss of life. [59] See also Transport portal Tropical cyclones portal Bermuda Triangle events list 21. ABS Registration. U.S. Maritime Bureau. Accessed October 4, 2015. ^ a b c d El Faro (7395351). Sea net. Accessed on: November 17, 2015. ^ a b c Lizette Alvarez; Richard Pérez-Peña & Francis Robles (October 5, 2015). The 33-crew U.S.-based cargo ship Sank in the Storm. The New York Times. Accessed October 10, 2015. ^ a b c Slade, Rachel. Towards the Raging Sea: Thirty-Three Sailors, a Megafly and the Sinking of El Faro. 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