



Pinto station wagon

Ford subcompact car (1971–1980) Ford PintoFord PintoOverviewManufacturerFordAlso calledMercury BobcatProductionSeptember 1970–1980 (Pinto) 1974–1980 (Bobcat) AssemblyUnited States: Edison, New Jersey (Edison Assembly) Milpitas, California (San Jose Assembly) Canada: Southwold, Ontario (St. Thomas Assembly)DesignerRobert Eidschun (1968)[1]Body and chassisClassSubcompact carBody style2-door sedan delivery2-door station wagon 3-door hatchbackLayoutFR layoutRelatedMercury BobcatFord Mustang IIPowertrainEngine1.6 L Kent I42.0 L EAO I42.3 L OHC I42.8 L Cologne V6Transmission4-speed manual3-speed C3/Selectshift/Cruise-O-Matic automatic[2]DimensionsWheelbase94.0 in (2,390 mm)[4]Length163 in (4,100 mm)[2]Width69.4 in (1,760 mm)Height50 in (1,300 mm)Curb weight2,015–2,270 lb (914–1,030 kg) (1971)ChronologyPredecessorFord Cortina (captive import)SuccessorFord Escort / Mercury Lynx The Ford Pinto is a subcompact car that was manufactured and marketed by Ford Motor Company in North America ، 1980 إلى عام 1971 إلى عام 1970. The smallest American Ford car since 1907, Pinto was the first subcompact car produced by Ford in North America. Pinto is marketed in three body styles through its production: a fast-door sedan with a trunk, a three-door hatchback, and a two-door station wagon. Mercury has introduced rebadged copies of Pinto as Mercury Bobcat from 1975 to 1980 (1974-1980 in Canada[5]. More than 3 million pintos were produced over 10 years of production, resulting in aggregates of their local competitors, Chevy Vega and AMC Gremlin. Pinto and Mercury Bobcat were produced at the Edison Society in Edison, New Jersey, the St. Thomas Society in Southwold, Ontario, and the government to scrutiny after several deadly fires involving tank ruptures occurred in rear-end collisions. A subsequent analysis of the public safety of the pinto suggested that it was similar to other 1970s subcompact cars. Safety issues surrounding Pinto and the subsequent response by Ford have been widely mentioned as business ethics as well as a case study of damage repair. The background of the first generation American subcompacts, from left to right: AMC Gremlin, Ford Pinto, Chevrolet Vega American automaker has first repelled imports such as the Volkswagen Beetle with compact cars including Ford Falcon, Ford Maverick, Chevrolet Corver and Plymouth Valiant, although these cars featured six-cylinder engines and consisted of a larger class car. As the popularity of smaller Japanese imports of Toyota and Datsun increased throughout the 1960s, Ford North America responded by introducing Cortina from Ford Europe as Import captive. American automakers soon introduced their own subcompacts, [7] led by AMC Gremlin, which arrived six months before Pinto, and Chevrolet Vega, made the day before Pinto. It was named for the Dowry,[8] and Pinto was introduced on September 11, 1970. The platform was completely new, but used the powertrain of european escort specs. Ford President Henry Ford II himself bought a 1971 Runabout (hatchback) to be used as one of his personal cars. [9] The development of the Ford Pinto product design proposal, 1970 initial planning of the Pinto began in the summer of 1967, was recommended by the Ford Product Planning Committee in December 1968, and was approved by the Ford Board of Directors in January 1969. [10] President Ford wanted me iacocca model 1971 that weighs less than 2,000 pounds, and it will cost less than \$2,000. The development of Pinto products, from load to delivery, was completed in 25 months, when the average auto industry was 43 months, the shortest production planning schedule in automotive history at the time. 10. Some development processes, usually conducted in parallel, have taken place. The machine tools overlapped with the development of the product, which froze the basic design. Decisions threatening the timetable have been discouraged; [11] [12] [13] The position of The Ford Administration was discouraged to develop the pinto as soon as possible. [14] Iaioka ordered a rush project to build the car, and Pinto became known internally as Lee's car. [15] Robert Edshawn erected the chassis in Pinto. [1] Offered with four built-in engine and pinto mechanical design bucket seats was traditionally, with unibody construction, longitudinal composite engine in front rear wheel driving through either manual or automatic transmission and rear end neighborhood axle. The suspension was by asymmetricarms length with front coil springs; The live rear axle is hung on the leaves of the springs. The rack and steering pinion optionally had power assistance, as did the brakes. [16] The date of production on September 11, 1970, ford pinto was presented under the slogan a little carefree car. [17] [18] After structural design on alternative body styles encountered obstacles, [19] Ford offered the Pinto only as a two-door sedan, with entry level models priced at \$1,850, undermining Gm's Chevrolet Vega and targeting imported models directly – which included new competitors such as the Mazda 1200 in 1971, the Subaru DDL in 1972, and the Honda Civic in 1973. [20] Pinto had sold more than 100,000 units in January 1971, [21] and 352, 402 for a full 1971 production run; The year 1974 saw the most bentos production in one year, with 544, 209 units. [22] Calendar year 1971 1972. 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 352,402 480,405 484,488 4,4 512 544,209 223,763 290,132 225,097 188,899 199,018 185,054 Total production 3,173,491 1971-1972 Ford Pinto sedan with enclosed trunk 1973 Pinto Runabout, displayed rear slot for sale Ford Pinto on September 11, 1970 in a single body style, a fastback sedan with a closed trunk. The hatchback became available on February 20, 1971, for the first time at the Chicago Motor Show. [19] In 1971, the pinto and head came with paper pieces pinto that one could fold to make a three-dimensional model. [2] Marketed as Runabout, the hatchback went on sale five days later, priced at \$2,062. [19] The slot itself featured exposed chrome hinges for liftgate and five decorative chrome strips, aerodynamic struts to help open the opening, a rear window almost as large as a sedan, and a folding seat down – a feature that simultaneously became an option on the sedan. The hatchback model matched the sedan in all other dimensions and provided 38.1 cubic feet (1.08 m3) of cargo space with folded seat. [19] By 1972, Ford redesigned the slot itself, enlarge the glass part of the slot itself, eventually completing it in 1977-1980 with an optional rear slot that was entirely glass. [23] On October 30, 1970, less than two months after an introduction, 26,000 Pentos were recalled to address a potential problem with the accelerator sticking on once operated in more than halfway. [24] [25] [26] On March 29, 1971, Ford recalled every 220,000 PTOS manufactured before March 19, 1971, to deal with a problem with fuel fumes in the engine air filter possibly ignited by a counterproductive through the carburetor. [27] [28] [29] on February 24, 1972, [19] Pinto station coach first with a total length of 172.7 in (4,390 m) and 60.5 cubic feet (1.71 m3) of freight volume. [19] The first 2-door Ford station wagon since the 1965 Falcon, the Pinto wagon is equipped with open quarter-face windows. Along with the front disc brake, the 2.0L engine was standard equipment. The Pinto Square wagon featured fake wooden side panels similar to Squire Country-full size. [30] [31] Also in February 1972, the Spar Décor collection was made available for Pinto for one model year only. The Sprint Decor collection included a white exterior with blue and red paint striped pins, a black grille, color-plated wheels with bright trim rings and pins covers, white frescoframes and double sports mirrors with a colored key. Interiors included red, white seats, full carpet and luxury steering wheel. The Sprint Décor collection was presented simultaneously to Maverick and Mttang [32] For the year 1973 model, offering more appearance options was. There was a new range of Sport Accent displayed in white exterior paint with a choice of paint for an orange accent or two-color avocado, a matching vinyl roof, and a luxurious interior coating with wood trim. There was also a new luxury décor collection with a bright outer dress up Black bumper scrub strips and luxurious interior with wood trim tone. The new forged aluminum wheels were introduced. [33] 1974-1978 in 1974, to meet federal adjustment, 5 MI bumpers were added to both the front and background. Unlike most 1970s cars, adding larger bumpers to the pinto does not require significant changes to the chassis. While the Kent engine was dropped unable to, the optional OHC engine was expanded to 2.3L; In various forms this engine powered a variety of Ford cars for 23 years. In 1974, Mercury began selling a version of pinto called Bobcat as a model for Canada only. Sold 544,209 units; 1974 became the most popular model year for Pinto. [22] Tyres with steel belts, an anti-theft alarm system and a metallic glare coating were optional. [34] In 1975, in a move to a good rival with Acom Grimlin, Ford presents the 2.8 FL F6.; While much less of the Gremlin, the Pinto V6 gave an advantage not available in the Chevrolet Vega. Mercury Bobcat sales were expanded to lincoln-mercury dealers in the United States; they were sold as a hatchback and station. [35] As a minor design update of 1976, Pinto received a cage egg grille and recycled chrome head edges from Canada only 1974 Mercury Bobcat. For just one typical year, two new options were offered. One of the new sports stallion appearance package with black out trim and two-tone tone paint was presented in red, yellow, silver and white body colors. This option package was Runabout Square which featured wood grain vinyl bodysides like a square cart. The interior received an optional luxury décor set that featured a new low back vinyl or plaid cloth buckets flashing in front of the slanted urethane, parking lamps and grille. Tail lamps have been revised except for carriages. Runabouts offered optional each rear glass slot for the first time. Pinto carts package was given a new option. Dubbed the Pinto Cruising Wagon, the handing back handsedan version of the Pinto was styled to resemble a small turn van, complete with a round side panel bubble windows and a choice of optional vinyl graphics. [37] Ford introduced a new sporty appearance packagesimilar to those on the Chevrolet Vega and AMC Gremlin but it was meticulously cosmetic upgrades that added something to the small ford sold in the 100 states, since the company made the feast. Nearly two feet shorter than Pinto, the German holiday designed was the first front-wheel drive car sold by Ford in the USA. [38] 1974 Ford Pinto Rona 1977-1978 Ford Pinto Rona 1977-1978 Ford Pinto Rona 1977-1978 Ford Pinto Rona 1977-1978 Ford Pinto Rona for the 1979 model year, Pinto has seen its latest great design update. Shedding the original Maverick-like design, Pinto took on a modern Vermont look with rectangular headlights, vertical parking lamps in the board and longer slanted back grilles. With the exception of carriages, tail lamps have been revised. The interior has been updated with a new rectangular instrument set and modified dash pad for vehicles without optional sports equipment. A variety of sporty appearance packages have been reviewed, some with new graphics. [39] 1980 was finished of the Pinto production run to give way to its replacement of the front wheel pushed Ford Escort. In 1980, the V6 engine stopped, leaving 2.3L as a single engine. [40] Powertrain except in 1980, Pinto was available with a choice of two engines. In the first five years of production, only four-cylinder built-in engines were introduced. This engine has been updated and modified several times, allowing it to remain in production in 1997. Among other Ford cars, the turbo version of this later powered Thunderbird Turbo Coupe, Mustang SVO, and European-made Mercure XR4Ti. [42] [Page need] initial pinto deliveries were used in the early years 1600 cc English (98 cu in) and German 2000 cc (120 cu in) tuned engines for performance (see below). The 2000 cc carburetor was used by Vermeilin, where it was only one larger than that used in Maverick. With low weight (not much above 2000 lbs (910 kg)) the SOHC engine accelerated from 0 to 60mph in 10.8 seconds. With the advent of emission control requirements, Ford moved from European source to locally sourced engines, using new or modified designs. New safety legislation has affected fenders and other parts, increasing vehicle weight and reducing performance. SAE standards revised in 1972 reduced the 1.6-liter (98 kin) engine to 54 hp (40 kW) – and a 2.0liter (120 kv) engine to 86 hp (64 kW). [43] Engine name years available horsepower displacement<sup>†</sup> torque<sup>†</sup> inline-four engine Ford Kent I4 1971-1973 98 in (1.6 L) 75 hp (56 kW; 76 PS) (1971) 54 hp (40 kW; 55 PS) (1972-1973) 96 lb-ft (130 N·m) (1971) Ford EAO I4 1971-1974 122 cu in (2.0 L) 100 hp (75 kW; 101 PS) (1971)86 hp (64 kW; 87 PS) (1972-1974) Ford LL23 I4 1974-1980 140 cu in (2.3 liters) 90 hp (67 kW; 91 PS) (1977)88 hp (66 kW; 89 PS) (1977)88 hp (66 kW; 89 PS) (1978-1980) 11 lb-ft (150 N Alexandrian meters) (164 N·m) (1976)120 lbfull ft (160 Nfull) (1977)118 lbfull ft (160 N full-time) (1978-1979) 119 lbfull ft (161 N m) (1975) 103 hp (72 kW; 94 PS) (1977) 90 hp (67 kW; 91 PS) (1977) 90 hp (67 kW; 91 PS) (1978) 102 hp (76 kW; 103 PS) (1979) 139 lbmouth amp; 1979 ft (188 N·) M) (1975) 149 lb Ft (202 Nq) (1976)140 lb ft (190 N·m) (1977)143 lb ft (194) Nfull m) (1978)138 lb ft (187 N·m) (1979) † manpower and 1971 are torque classifications are net production after the 1971 model year. Mercury Bobcat (1974-1980) Lincoln-Mercury dealers market the rebadged alternative of Pinto, as Mercury Bobcat, starting in 1974 model in Canada produced in all same body styles. It has been designed with a unique grille egg cage and chrome head light. Featured double modified rear-tail display lamps for sedan and Runabout models. [44] In 1975, Bobcat was added to the American market and initially sold at upgraded levels of pieces such as the Runabout Hatchback and The Village Wagon. Less truncated versions were introduced in later model years. Bobcat has never been introduced as a two-door sedan with a closed trunk for the American market. All Bobcats have been restyled with a vaulted hood and a longer vertical strip-style grille to look like top mercury models. Throughout all years the model Bobcats have been given different appearance options similar to Pinto. [45] In 1979, bobcat received a large hemline with a slanted front façade with rectangular headlamps and a larger vertical bar grille. With the exception of carriages, tail lamps have been revised. The block tool received a new rectangular design base with a modified dashboard. [46] Popcat production ended in 1980 to make way for its replacement, Mercury Lynx. In total, 224,026 bobcats were produced from 1975-1978 Mercury Bobcat Runabout 1979-1980 Mercury Bobcat Run Receptionabout and criticisms upon the release of Bento received with both positive and negative reviews. The road and track error in the suspension and brakes of the standard drum, describing the latter as a serious shortage, but praised the proven Kent 1.6 L engine, adapted from the European Ford. I found Super Stock magazine fit and finished to be superior and impressed with the overall car. [16] The car and driver Pinto, when equipped with a larger 2.0L engine and front disc brakes, were found to be a smart and powerful passenger car with good visibility and feel of a sports car. [48] The 1974 Pinto review with an automatic transmission by the car and the driver was not appropriate with significant reductions in mileage and acceleration. [49] The controversy over Pinto was later led to a negative legacy associated with the car and Ford dealing with the car and the car a Japan. [50] Time Pinto magazine included lists of 50 of the worst cars of all time. [51] At the time, popular mechanics and NBC News car have been included in the most important reminder lists. [52] [53] Fuel system fires, recalls, and safety litigation design of the Pinto fuel system led to serious accidents, and later resulted in subpoenas, lawsuits, criminal prosecution, and public controversy. The events surrounding the controversy have been described as a historical novel. [55] Former UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LAW PROFESSOR GARY T. SCHWARTZ DESCRIBES THE ASSOCIATED LEGAL CASE AS LEGENDARY BECAUSE OF MANY IMPORTANT FACTUAL MISCONCEPTIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING. [56] Ford Pinto has cited and discussed many business ethics[57][58] as well as damage repair[59][60] case studies. The placement of the fuel tank in the car was the result of the practice of the conservation industry at the time as well as the uncertain regulatory environment during the periods of early development and sales of the vehicle. Ford was accused of knowing the car was then placing an unsafe tank under ongoing design changes based on an internal analysis of costs and benefits. 20. Two high-profile legal cases are Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company and Indiana V. Ford Motor Company, resulting from fatal accidents involving Pintos. [61] The scientific work published in the decades following Pinto's general understanding and controversy over vehicle safety performance and fire risk. These actions also reviewed misunderstandings regarding the actual number of fire-related deaths related to fuel system design, land and unsupported claims confirmed in The Madness of Pinto and elsewhere, [62] facts of related legal issues, Grimshaw vs. Ford Motor Company and Indiana state vs. Ford Motor Company, safety standards in place at the time of design, and the nature of the NHTSA investigations and subsequent vehicles. [63] The design of the fuel system was complicated by the design of the Pinto fuel system due to the uncertain regulatory environment during the development period. The first federal standard for the safety of the automobile fuel system was complicated by the design of the Pinto fuel system due to the uncertain regulatory environment during the development period. Federal Auto Safety Standards, initially considered only the front effects. In January 1969, 18 months after the Pinto development cycle, NHTSA proposed standard was based on a 20 mph mobile rear collision test. Ford has publicly announced that it supports this standard. In August 1970, in the month in which Pinto went into production, the NHTSA changed the proposal to a stricter 20 mph fixed barrier standard which the car He was scheduled to meet in 18 months. The automotive industry considered the fixed barrier standard which the car He was scheduled to meet in 18 months. National Displacement Authority announced a long-term goal of establishing a fixed 30-mile-per-hour barrier standard. [64] Due to the confusion that NHTSA would not select the most strict 30 mil barrier standard, Ford chose to voluntarily meet the 20-bay movement barrier standard for all cars by 1973. [66] Ford and other automakers objected to the stricter fuel system safety standard and filed objections. [68] Pinto's fuel tank design was placed between the steel-rear axle and the rear bumper, a common practice in American subvehicles at the time. [69] Fuel exposure to fuel leakage and fire in rear collision was exacerbated by low rear crushing space, lack of structural reinforcement in the rear, and mainly rear bumper decorations (although similar to other manufacturers). [70] Crash tests, conducted in 1970 with modified Ford Mavericks, as part of the response to proposed NHTSA regulations, showed weakness in the relatively low crash speeds. Design changes were made, but post-launch tests showed similar results. [71] These tests were conducted to develop fault testing standards rather than specifically investigating the safety of the fuel system. Although Ford engineers were not happy with the car's performance, there are no time reports of particular concern. [72] Ford has also tested several different vehicle modifications that can improve rear collision performance. [73] However, the engineer's professional caution and aversion to unproven solutions, as well as the view that the crash test results were inconclusive, led to the use and development of the traditional fuel tank design. [74] The use of a tank site above the axis was considered safer by some, but not all, in Ford. This placement was not a viable option for Hatchback and station wagon body styles. [76] Beginning in 1973, field reports were received from ford Pintos, which was consumed by fire after low-speed rear collisions by the Ford Recall Coordinator's Office. [77] Based on the standard procedures used to evaluate field data twice and found no actionable problem. [78] Cost and Benefit analysis, Pinto's 1973 memorandum, developed ford's Division of Environmental Engineering and Safety cost-benefit analysis entitled Deaths Associated with Crash and Fire-Related Fuel Leakage to be submitted to NHTSA to support Ford's objection to the proposed stronger fuel system. [79] The document became known as the Grouch/Sondi Report, which was named after its authors, [80] and the Pinto Memorandum. [81] The cost-benefit analysis was Used in evaluating safety design decisions accepted by industry and NHTSA. [82] The analysis compared the cost of repairing community costs of fire-related injuries and deaths in vehicle overturning cases for all vehicles sold in the United States by all manufacturers. The values attributed to serious burns and loss of life were based on values calculated by the National Displacement Authority in 1972. [83] In the memo, Ford estimated the cost of fuel modifications system to reduce fire risk in extension events to be \$11 per vehicle across 12.5 million cars and light trucks (all manufacturers), a total of \$137 million.

The design changes were estimated to save 180 burn deaths and 180 serious injuries per year, benefiting the community by \$49.5 million. In August 1977, after a copy of the memo was presented by Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company plaintiffs before the trial, [84][85] the investigative article Mark Doe Pinto Madness, published in Mother Jones Magazine, confirmed the emotional aspects of the Grush/Saundy report and implied Ford was trading a harsh life of profits. [86] The article also claimed that between 500 and 900 people had been killed in fires due to pinto's unique design features. [87] The general understanding of costbenefit analysis contributed to the myths of the Ford Pinto case. Time magazine said the memo was one of the most famous paper tracks in the document considers ford damage liability costs rather than the generalized cost of the community and applies it to the annual sales. of all passenger cars, not just Ford cars. The general misunderstanding of the document, as presented by Mother Jones, gave executive importance that it had never had. [88] [89] THE NHTSA INVESTIGATION IN APRIL 1974, THE CENTER FOR MOTOR SAFETY PETITIONED THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (NHTSA) TO CALL FORD PINTOS TO ADDRESS FUEL SYSTEM DEFECTS AFTER REPORTS FROM LAWYERS OF THREE DEATHS AND FOUR SERIOUS INJURIES IN THE REAR END COLLISIONS AT MODERATE SPEEDS. [90] The Panel found that there was insufficient evidence to warrant an investigation into the defects. [90] In August 1977, he published an article by Doi Pinto Mad, where he made a series of accusations against Ford did not implement the design changes because Ford's cost and utility analysis document showed that paying millions in damages in lawsuits was less expensive than design changes. [93] The day after the article released consumer defender Ralph Nader and the Center for Motor Safety resubmitted their petition to Schwartz's Rutgers Law Review article said the NHTSA Bento investigation was in response to consumer complaints, and referred to the article Jones' mother included in a section of the coupon that readers could mail to NHTSA. [96] Lee and Ehrman note that Mother Jones described Pinto as a firetrap and accusations that THE NHTSA was twisting to the pressure of the industry as well as the public interest created by the exciting new stories forced the NHTSA would be under the microscope for a while. [97] On August 11, 1977, the day after nader and Mather Jones' press conference, the National Commission for National Election Sarcasm began investigating. [98] On May 8, 1978, NHTSA informed Ford of their intention that the Pinto fuel system was damaged. [99] NHTSA concluded: 1971-1976 ford pintos experienced moderate speed, rear collisions that led to fuel tank damage, fuel leakage, and accidents that led to deaths and non-fatal burns injuries ... The fuel tank design and structural characteristics of mercury Bobcat 1975-1976, which make it identical to contemporary Pinto vehicles, make them vulnerable to similar consequences in rear collisions. [100] The NHTSA scheduled a public hearing in June 1978, and the NHTSA negotiated with Ford on the recall. [102] Lee and Ehrman pointed out that the NHTSA used the worst test to justify calling pinto, rather than a regular 1977 collision test background. A large bullet vehicle was used instead of a standard mobile barrier. Put weights in the car's nose to help her slide under the pinto and maximize the gas tank connection. The vehicle's headlights were turned on to provide a potential ignition source. The fuel tank was completely filled with gasoline rather than partially filled test since most of the small cars at the time would not have passed. Just because your friends get away with stealing doesn't mean you should get away with it too. [103] The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) eventually directed Ford to remember Pinto. Initially, the National Accident and Accident Authority did not feel there was enough evidence to demand that Alanda be summoned because of the shootings. The 10th National Authority investigation found that 27 deaths had occurred between 1970 and mid-1977 in rear impact incidents leading to a fire. The Authority did not indicate whether these effects could survive fires or if the effects were even greater than the state of the most recent fuel systems (of 1977) that could have survived. [105] In their analysis of social factors affecting NHTSA's work, Lee and Erman noted that 27 were the same number of deaths attributed to Pinto. The problem that contributed to the collisions after the damaged cars stopped. [106] They also note that NHTSA had two main incentives to prove a defect in the design of the Pinto fuel system. The administration has come under pressure from safety advocates (The Center for Car Safety) as well as the public's response. It is also forced to operate because of the ways in which the courts and the executive branch limit the ability of the National Authority for Sarcasm to deal with systemic vehicle safety issues. [107] I recall though Ford could be moving forward with a formal subpoena hearing, for fear of further damage to the company's public reputation the company approved a voluntary recall program. [108] On June 9, 1978, days before the NHTSA issued for Ford an official recall, Ford recalled the 1.5 million Ford Pintos and Mercury Bobcats, the largest recall in automotive history at the time. [109] Ford disagreed with the NHTSA's discovery of the defect, saying the recall was to end the public concern caused by criticism of fuel systems in these vehicles. [110] The Ford car placed a polyethylene shield between the tank and its possible causes of the hole, lengthening the filling tube, and improving the tank filler seal in the event of a collision. [111] Legal cases approximately 117 lawsuits are filed against Ford in connection with background end events in Pinto. [112] The two most important cases were Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company and Indiana State vs. Ford Motor Company. [113] Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company, which was decided in February 1978, is one of two important Pinto cases. [62] The 1972 Pinto driven by Lily Gray stopped in a lane in the middle of a California highway. The car was hit from behind by a car that initially drove at 50 mph and affected an estimated 30 and 50 miles per hour, causing a fire in the fuel tank. [114] Gray died at the time of the collision. Richard Grimshaw, a 13-year-old passenger, suffered serious burns. [115] The plaintiff's bar collaborated with Mother Jones and the Center for Car Safety to disseminate compelling information about Ford before the trial. [84] [117] The jury awarded \$127.8 million in total damages. \$125 million in punitive damages to the family of the deceased driver. Lily Gray. The jury award was said to be the largest ever in product liability and personal injury cases in the United States. [118] The jury prize was the largest against an automaker at the time. [119] The judge reduced the jury's punitive damages to \$3.5 million, which he later said was still larger than any other compensatory sentence in the state by a factor of five. [120] Ford later decided to settle the related cases out of court. [121] The reaction to Grimshaw's case was mixed. According to the Los Angeles Times in 2010, the award for auto that will be cruelly punished for ignoring known flaws. [122] The case was seen as an example of a disconnect between the use of ERM analysis and the tendency of jurors to abuse these analyses. [123] The case is also cited as an example of illogical damages for punitive damages. [124] While Schwartz supports the conclusion of liability, the punitive compensation decision is difficult to justify. [125] Indiana v. Ford Motor Company. On August 10, 1978, three teenage girls from the Orlich family were killed in Osiola, Indiana, when Pinto was in Bento in 1973 involved in a back-to-back collision. The driver had stopped on the road to retrieve the gas cover, which had been accidentally left on the road. While Pinto stopped hit by a Chevrolet truck. [127] Ford Urlichs sent a recall notice to Pinto in 1979. A grand jury indicted Ford on three counts of reckless lyced murder in Indiana against Ford, a landmark in the Product Liability Act, which was the first time a company had been charged with murder. [128] If convicted, Ford faced a maximum fine of \$30,000 under indiana's Reckless Homicide Act of 1978. [129] Ford's legal defense was considerably more ambitious than the effort in the Grimshaw case. [130] The effort led James V. Neil with an angel of 80 and a budget of about \$1 million; The Elcart County District Attorney had a budget of about \$20,000, volunteer law professors and law students. [131] A former president of NHTSA, in his testimony on behalf of Ford, said Pinto's design was no more or less safe than any other car in its class. [132] In 1980 Ford was found not guilty. [129] In 1980, a civil suit was settled for \$7,500 per plaintiff. [133] According to Automotive News in 2003, the charge was a low point in Ford's reputation. [134] Some saw the suit as a milestone in taking a company to do a job for their actions, while others saw the case as trivial. [135] In 2002, Malcolm Wheeler, a lawyer working for Ford's defense team, noted that the case was a bad application of criminal law. [137] The case also raised how Ford handled issues of future product liability legally and in the press. [138] Retrospective safety analysis of UCLA law professor Gary T. Schwartz, in an article reviewing Rutgers Law (see section 7.3 NHTSA investigation above), examined the mortality rates of Pinto and many other small cars from the time period. He noted that fires, and butt fires in particular, were a very small part of overall car deaths. At that time only 1% of car accidents will lead to fire and only 4% of fatal accidents involving fire, and only 15% of fatal fire accidents are the result of rear end collisions. [139] When considering the total From Pinto. Schwartz notes that subcompact cars as a class have a generally higher risk of death. Pintos represented 1.9% of all cars on the road in 1975-1976. During this period the car accounted for 1.9% of all fatal accidents accompanied by some fires. Which means that the car was average for its class. [140] When all types of deaths were considered. Pinto was almost even with AMC Gremlin. Chevrolet Vega and Datsun 510. It was much better than the Datsun 1200/210, Toyota Corolla and the Volkswagen Beetle. [139] The vehicle's safety record in terms of fire was average for charters, and all vehicles respectively. This was considered respectable for a subcompact car. Only when considering a narrow subset of rear collision, the fire deaths of the car were somewhat worse than the average subcompact car. Recognizing that this is an important legal point, Schwartz refuses to portray the car as a fire trap. [141] See also 60 Minutes: The Unintentional Acceleration of AVE Mizar – a NBC Dateline Pinto Dateline jumper: GENERAL MOTORS vs. NBC Bangra – several car based on Pinto^A. Joseph's Notes, Damien (October 30, 2009). Ugliest cars of the last 50 years. Bloomberg BusinessWeek. Archived from the original on February 20, 2010. Accessed March 6, 2016. Pinto doesn't look so bad - that is, so remember how exciting ford was from the 1960s. ^ A.B.C. INDEX GUIDE: FORD 1971 PINTO HANDBOOK. Oldcarbrochures.com. Accessed december 3, 2011. ^ Carvolio 1970 Pinto. ^ Ford Pinto. Automobile-catalog.com. ^ Mays, James C. Ford and Canada: 100 years together (Montreal: Publishing House, 2003). p.116. ^ Smith, Charles (March 25, 2006). Noble ambition/developer revs up for the former Ford factory in Richmond for real living spaces working. The San Francisco Chronicle ^ Rifwerk, Robert (June 17, 2003). Ford 100: The defective Pinto almost took Ford's reputation with it. Automatic week. Accessed October 26, 2017. ^ Why Ford keeps using horse names for cars. Jennings Ford Direct. Accessed October 26, 2017. ^ Lewis 2003, p. 262-231. ^ Dunley 2005: Preliminary planning on the Pinto, second subtext second, began in 1967 ... In January 1969, in a victory for laccoca, the Ford Board approved the recommendation of the Product Planning Committee (December 1968) to produce Pinto. ^ Gioia 1992: The Pinto was brought from beginning to production at the record time of approximately 25 months (compared to the industry's average of 43 months), a time frame to suggest the need for doing things appropriately. In addition to the time pressure, engineering and development teams were To stick to production limits of 2000 for the car is slim: it was not to exceed either \$2000 in cost or 2000 pounds in weight. Any decisions that threaten these objectives or the timing of the entry of the vehicle have been discouraged. Under normal design and design an carried out in parallel. As a result, the tools were already in full swing (hence the basic design freeze) ... ^ Helms, Marilyn M. Hutchins, Betty A. (1992). Poor quality products: Is their products: Is production planning table was given in history. The tools continued at the same time with the development of the product so, when experiments revealed a serious defect with the gas tank, pinto toolmachines were built for almost exactly 200 million dollars. The guidance came from the top, President Lee Iacocca, who confirmed that Pinto had no weight of more than £2,000 and did not cost a cent more than \$2,000, and that safety was not a priority, because safety did not sell. ^ Wojdyla 2011: The genesis of Ford Pinto came sometime in 1968, when Ford then president Lee laccoca decided that his company would not sit idly as new Japanese competitors dominated the small car segment. The Council pushed the Pinto program green light, and by August 1968 the program was under way. It will have aggressive goals: no more than \$2000 and a delivery deadline of just 25 months, a record at the time and still impressive today. ^ Woidvla 2011: But at the time, the management's position was to get the product out of the door as quickly as possible. ^ Reforkin 2003: lawaka express program is ordered to build the Pinto ... Pinto soon became known as Lee's car. He demanded that you not weigh more than 2,000 pounds and sell it for \$2,000 ... (Aiakoka) was in a hurry and wanted the car in the 1971 model showrooms. This means one of the shortest production planning periods in the history of modern cars: only 25 months, when the normal time was 43 months. This also means that pinto tools were developed at the same time with product development. ^ A b Pinto 2000 Coupe. SuperStock Magazine. December 1970. Accessed April 29, 2016. ^ Meet The New Pinto Ford. The car is a little concerned. Spokane Daily Chronicle. Washington. (Announcement). September 18, 1970. P.9, Part 1. ^ A.B.J.D.E. Birth of Pinto Ford. Howstuffworks.com 2007-08-09. ^ Quart in Pinto. Engine Volume 3558. August 26, 1970. P. 26-27. ^ 1971-1980 Ford Pinto. 2007-08-09. ^ Standard Guide b Ford, Edition 4, 2007, John Gunnell. Krauss Publications ^ 1980 Ford Pinto Handbook. ^ Jones 1978: Shortly after the Pinto show, 26,000 were called because the accelerators were sticking. ^ Ford recalls 26,000 pinto cars. Chicago Tribune. October 31, 1970. Accessed March 6, 2016. Ford Motor Company announced today that it remembers 26,000 early production models of the 1971 Pinto equipped with a 1600 cc engine due to a accelerator problem ... The company found that when the throttle is opened more than half way. it is possible that it may not always return to the closed position when the pressure on the gas pedal is removed ^ Associated Press 1971: For many motorists, it's the second time around ... Last October Ford recalled about 26,000 pintos due to complaints about the accelerator's sticking pedals when the throttle was opened over halfway. ^ Jones 1978: 220,000 PTOS were propelled for modifications to prevent possible engine compartment fires. ^ Mataja, James (March 30, 1971). Ford recalls 204,000 pintos to prevent possible ignition of fuel fumes in engine air cleaner, announced yesterday. A Ford spokesman declined to give the recall cost, but all Pintos produced through March 19, including 204,000 in the program... Ford said its investigation into the complaints revealed that the possibility of a fire existed because fumes in the air cleaner could be ignited by adverse reactions through the carburetor. ^ Associated Press 1971: About 165,000 American owners of new Ford Pinto are affected by the auto announcement that nearly all small cars are being recalled for a engine malfunction. ^ ^ Powell Zal (Ed). 1972 Ford (United States) Pinto Station Wagon. automobile-catalog.com. Accessed October 26, 2017. ^ 1972 Ford Pinto Sprint. Accessed January 3, 2018. ^ 1973 Ford Pinto Handbook. Paintref.com. ^ a b Lewis 2003, p. 289-303. ^ Lewis 2003, p. 304-309. ^ Lewis 2003, p. 310-315. ^ Lam, Michael (August 1974). PM Owners Report: Ford Pinto. Popular mechanics. Popular Mechanics Magazine. ^ Ford Pinto. ^ b Gunel, John A.; Linzky, James T. (1995). Standard catalog for Ford cars, 1903-1990. Krauss Publications. Redmak 0-87341-140-4. ^ The Auto Editors of Consumer Guide (2007-08-09). HowStuffWorks the birth of Pinto. Ford. Things work. ^ 1974 Mercury Bobcat Canada Handbook. ^ Louis 2003, p. 290. ^ Louis 2003, p. 315. ^ Fleury, J. Kelly, Jr. (2013). American Cars, 1973-1980: Each model, year after year. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & amp; Co. Your response is 978-0-7864-4352-9. ^ Chevrolet Vega vs. Ford Pinto. Car magazine and driver. November 1971. Accessed April 12, 2016. A Ford Pinto Rona: The secret to the success of a small car can't be found in the list of options. Car magazine and driver. June 1974. A Lineart, Dan (January 27, 2004). Worst cars of all time. Forbes. Accessed March 6, 2016. A Ford Official said she did not want to talk about Pinto. Leaving this in the cemetery apparently, Ford has not forgotten the lawsuits and PR disasters formulated by the Pinto Hatchback and Sedan. Pinto's famous safety flaw, of course, is that it was prone to blow-up if the background ended. When people talk about how bad american small cars create an opportunity for the Japanese to come in and clean the house in the 1970s and '80s, they're referring to such cars (see Chevrolet Vega, second slide). ^ AP, Dan (September 7, 2007). 1971 Ford Pinto – the worst 50 cars of all time. Time. ^ Top 10 Product Remember. Time. July 2, 2009. Accessed March 5, 2016. ^ Hoffman, John Burley (February 12, 2010). 5 most infamous recall of all time. Popular mechanics. Accessed March 5, 2016. ^ Spear, Gillian (June 18, 2013). Take it back: Remember the famous, from Tylenol to Toyota. NBC News. Accessed March 5, 2016. ^ Lee and Ermann 1999: Pinto's story became a historical narrative (Nichols 1997:324), a final story used to support the building of unethical corporate behavior as a pervasive social problem. This narrative was first publicly stated by investigative journalist Mark Doe (1977) in a stinging Pulitzer Prize-winning expose, Pinto Madness, published in two public observations. The first is that many important factual misconceptions surround the public's understanding of the issue. Due to the cumulative power of these misconceptions, the issue can be correctly referred to as mythical. A Bazerman, Max H.; Tenbrunsel, Ann E. (April 2011). Moral breakdowns. Harvard Business Magazine. 89 (4): 58-65, 137. PMID 21510519. Accessed February 28, 2015. ^ Brech, Douglas (October 25, 1994). Case Ford Pinto ^ Woodyard, Chris (March 28, 2011). Status: Lee Iacocca Pinto: Fiery Failure. USA Today. ^ Catman, Jimmy (March 24, 2011). You don't like government regulation? How do you want another pinto? Cartalk.com. ^ Lee and Ermann 1999: Conventional Wisdom holds that Ford Motor Company decided to rush Pinto into production in 1970 to compete with integrated foreign imports, despite internal pre-production tests that showed gas Ruptures in low-speed rear-end collision would result in fatal fires. This decision is allegedly derived from a notorious sevenpage cost-benefit analysis (Grouch/Sanby Report [1973), which estimated human lives at \$200,000. Settling burns victims' claims would have cost \$49.5 million, well below the \$137 million needed to make minor corrections. According to this calculation, the company made an impressively informed, sarcastic and coordinated decision that payments (Kelman and Hamilton 1989:311) to the families of burn victims were more cost-effective than improving the safety of the fuel tank. This description provides the unmistakable basis on which the media and academics built a narrative of decision-making in the Benzo reservoir. ^ A B DANLEY 2005 ^ SCHWARTZ 1991 ^ ROSSOW 2015: 'FIXED-BARRIER' MEANS THAT THE CAR WAS MOVING (BACKWARDS) TO A FIXED BARRIER ... The 20 mph fixed barrier standard was met with uniform opposition from the auto industry because it was a much more rigorous test than the mobile barrier standard. ^ Lee & amp; Ermann 1999: pg 36, 43 ^ Lee and Ermann 1999: In the design phase (1967-1970), there is no company or government standard on the safety of the rear fuel tank to guide engineers, but their industry-wide tradition to build lower levels of durability in small cars. This situation changed in stage marketing (after 1970). Shortly after the 1971 general pentos model was released, Ford adopted an interior 20 mph moving standard barrier for the 1973 model year the only manufacturer to do so (Geoya 1996; Strobel 1994). The existing legal/regulatory environment reinforced the engineers' belief that this standard was very reasonable because it was the same as that recommended at the time by the Federal Public Services Administration; (a) the Canadian equivalent of the United States Republic of The United States; the Society of Automotive Engineers; and a private consulting firm hired by NHTSA ... The NHTSA itself in 1969 (Strobel 1980:205). This standard would restrict future discussions by certifying that Pinto is safe for the Ford Sub-Union, which is charged with assessing potential lyable safety problems. A Schwartz 1991: In August 1970, 1971 model year Panos began coming from the collection line. Only a few days later, the National Commission for The Tae-Tain had never submitted its previous proposal to a more demanding set of proposed regulations. Three months later, Ford officials decided that for the purposes of the 1973 Model, Ford would adopt, as its own internal goal, regulations that NHTSA had proposed in 1969. In order to respond to a more recent NHTSA proposed, Ford would adopt, as its own internal goal, regulations that NHTSA had proposed in 1969. In order to respond to a more recent NHTSA proposed, Ford would adopt, as its own internal goal, regulations that NHTSA had proposed in 1969. crash test process, and identified a number of design modifications that imp:rove performance pinto. In October 1971, Ford officials decided against merging any of these In the current Pintos; In 1973, the Authority issued its fuel tank standard, but ruled that this standard would apply only to 1977 models. Ford adopted a 20 mph moving barrier standard for all 1973 cars. ^ Strobel 1979: Ford then met other automakers in an aggressive pressure campaign that was successful in delaying and lowering the standards federal suggested on how strong fuel systems must be to resist a potential rip burst. ^ Gioia 1992: The tank was in place between the rear bumper and the axle background (standard practice industry for the time). ^ Schwartz 1991:Page 1015 and Footnote 9, Appeals Court opinion referred to the Pinto bumper as flimsy of any American car. Grimshaw, 119 Cal app.3d at 774, 174 Cal Rptr. at 360. Mark Robinson Jr., co-counsel for the plaintiffs, asserts that this reference is correct. Telephone interview with Mark Robinson Jr. (September 12, 1990) [later referred to as Robinson's interview]. However, Byron Bloch, a prosecution witness, stated in cross-examination in the subsequent criminal case that the bumper in Pinto was almost the same as that in Grimlin, Vega and Dodge Colt. See L. STROBEL, footnote 5 above, in 157 (I would say they were all bad.) ^ Danley 2005: A few months later Ford began crashing the Mavericks modified test in part to prepare a response to the proposed NHTSA regulations. The results showed poor fuel safety at relatively low speeds, and some adjustments were made. In August of 1970, the first year of the Pinto model, 1971, went into production. Post-production tests revealed similar results. However, there were no federal performance standards at the time, and the proposed regulations addressed only forward collisions. ^ Lee Erman 1999: Engineers were in the design phase after trying to find out to how to run crash tests (Vinnie 1997; see also Lacey 1986:613). For example, the Internal Pinto Test Report of November 1970 listed as its target to develop a test procedure for use to provide baseline data on vehicle fuel system safety (NHTSA C7-38-AI.5, final test report #T-0738). In this test, a Pinto sedan showed an excessive leak to the fuel tank when it was towed from behind to a fixed barrier at 21.5 miles per hour, roughly equivalent to a 35-mile-per-hour vehicle collision. Nothing in this, or any Ford test report, indicates that participants felt cause for concern or organization work. Although some Ford engineers were not participants felt cause for concern or organization work. Strobel 1980), or they maintained their fears to (Camps 1997). Some felt that cars were rarely subject to the extreme forces generated in the test of a fixed barrier in real-world collisions (Feaheny 1997; Devin 1996). NHTSA apparently agreed and Replacing the proposed fixedbarrier test with a less stringent mobile barrier test in its final standard (Us Department of Transportation 1988) ^ Gioia 1992: Ford actually crash tested 11 vehicles; 8 of these vehicles suffered catastrophic ruptures of gaseous sitoches. The only 3 cars that survived intact were each somehow modified to protect the tank. ^ Me & amp; Erman 1999: The caution encouraged professional engineers to see more design adjustments to improve test performance as unproven in in-ins events (Devin 1996) Feaheny 1997; Schwartz 1991; Strickland 1996; Strobel 1980). Engineers, who usually value avoiding uncertainty (Allison 1971:72), chose to stick to an existing design rather than face the doubts associated with a novel of which (Devin 1996; Strobel 1980). For example, a series of tests showed that Pintos, equipped with flexible foam-like gas tanks, would not seep in 30 mph crashes. But some engineers fear that such a tank might melt and disagreed with others who felt it was safer than the existing metal design (Devin 1996, see also Strobel 1980). Other engineers believed that rubber improved performance in tests, but anticipated problems under real-world conditions (Strobel 1980). ^ Schwartz 1991: As for the additional design proposals made by the plaintiffs, many of them for example, the bladder inside the tank, and the tank inside the tank - concerned with a fairly innovative technology that was never used in the production of actual cars. At the trial, there was a certificate that the bladder could have been possible in the early 1970s, but also a rebuttal testimony that the bladder at this time was beyond the limits of feasibility. ^ Lee and Erman 1999: Ford Whistle Harley Copp argument that Pinto could have been safer the gas tank had placed above the axis instead, often cites in Pinto's novels as an example of safety being sacrificed for profit, or at least trunk area, in the design phase (Colin, Maakestad and Cavender 1987; Doi 1977; Strobel 1994). However, it was not until 1977 (Strobel 1980) that Cobb reached this conclusion. Other engineers were much less certain, although the top axle design performed better in one set of fault tests. The engineer who oversees pinto's design, Harold MacDonald (whose father died in a fuel tank fire when his Ford Model A car exploded after a frontal collision with a tree), felt that placing the axis above was less safe under real-world conditions because the tank was closer to the passenger compartment and more prone to puncture by elements in the trunk (Strobel1980). ^ Gioia 1992: I began to build my own files of incoming security problems. One of these new files concerned reports Pintos lights up (in the words of a field representative) in backend incidents. There was actually Few reports, perhaps because the component failure was not initially assumed. These cars were simply consumed by fire after apparently very low speed accidents. ^ Me and Erman 1999: When Jaya became a recall coordinator, he inherited about 100 active recall campaigns, half of them related safety. As with most jobs, the enormous workload requires it to use standard operating procedures to organize and manage information for decision-making (Dr. Kreisberg 1976:1102). The united states of America has a responsibility to ensure that the united states of America has a responsibility to ensure that the united states is the only country in the world that has the right to self-government. These processes required that problems be rememberable and needed either a higher frequency of problems or a causal link that could be directly traced to a design defect. When reports began pouring into Gioia that Pintos was a problem to be recalled. His working group voted unanimously not to recall Pinto because the weak data did not meet the SOP (Gioia 1996) criteria. The Working Group was not aware of any cost-benefit analyses or pinto crash test results. Reports of pinto fires continued to flow, and Eventually Gioia became aware, and worried about, the results of the crash test. Again he wondered if Pinto had little problem, so he started a second meeting to convince his co-workers that crash tests had shown a potential design flaws - after all, Pinto meets the company's internal standards, and there is no contradictory external standard. The tank leak workset conceived a problem not as a defect, but as a basic and non-functionable design feature: the small size of the car, the use of light metals, the construction in rear collisions (Gioia 1996). ^ Grouch, E.S.; Saundy, C.S. Crash-related deaths caused by fuel leaks and fires (PDF) (report). Ford Environmental and Safety Engineering. Accessed March 2, 2016. ^ Danley 2005 ^ Rossow 2015 ^ Geoya 1992: National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA, federal agency) has agreed to use cost and benefit analysis as an appropriate way to set car safety design standards. ^ Danley 2005: In calculating interest, the analysis used the figure of \$200,000 per life. This figure was developed by NHTSA in 1972. ^ A.B. Frank, Ted. The economics of extension: systems of responsibility for arbitrary and reduced products. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. ^ Lee and Ermann 1999: Based on information given to it by lawyers preparing cases against Ford, the Center for Motor Safety petitioned NHTSA in the mid-1970s to investigate pinto's rear design. According to the materials On the Center (www.autosafety.org). Pinto Madness is still available on Mother Jones's website along with a video showing Pinto caught fire after the background was over. In an interview with Gary T. Schwartz of Rutgers Law Review, Cobb confirmed that he was also a major source of information on the story of Mother Jones's article angrily choked companies that applied a malicious analysis of costs and benefits in order to make corporate profits. ^ Schwartz 1991: According to Mother Jones, as of 1977, somewhere between 500 and 900 people have been killed in fires attributed to the unique Pinto design features ^ Schwartz 1991: To summarize, Ford's document has been set as an operational importance that it did not possess, and has been convicted as unethical at the expense of document descriptions that are in large part unjustified. Of course, the condemnation of the Ford report is linked to the public's condemnation of Pinto himself. The common belief is that Pinto, at the expense of the fuel tank design, was a fire canteen. Mother Jones's article drew the emotional power of her exposure of pinto as a fire trap, a death trap, and a deadly car. 47 Combining that article, the verdict in the Pinto Ford case, and the NHTSA initial decision, Pinto recalls clearly conveying this feeling of Pinto as fire to the public. ^ Lee & amp; Ermann 1999: Dowie (1977) explains accurately in part of his article Mother Jones that Ford employees wrote this document as part of the ongoing lobbying efforts to influence NHTSA (24, 28). But his readers relied exclusively on his other claim, namely that it was the internal memorandum (20,24) on which Ford relied on its decision to market Pinto's dangerous and settle the few inevitable lawsuits (31). ^ A.B. Graham, John D. (1991). Hooper, Peter W.; Litan, Robert E. (eds.). Does liability: the impact of responsibility rules on innovation and safety. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution: 132. ^ Weise, Josef W. W. Business ethics: stakeholder management and issues approach. Publishing house Perret Koehler. Your response is 978-1-62656-141-0. ^ Lee and Erman 1999: pg 41 ^ Dowie 1977: Ford knows Pinto is a firetrap, yet it has paid millions to settle out-of-court damages claims, and it is willing to spend millions more lobbying against safety standards ... Ford waited eight years because an internal cost-benefit analysis, which puts the value of the dollar on human life, said it would not be profitable to make changes sooner. ^ Daredes weigh 1982: On August 10, 1977, Ralph Harmon and Mark Doi held a press conference Inform the public that unnecessary deaths and injuries were suffered as a result of the faulty design by the 1977 Pinto model. ^ Center for Motor Safety 2009 ^ Schwartz 1991:Pg 1019, Schwartz relating to Pintos 1971-1976. The government's policy of supporting the government' in the country is to make the government more competitive and ^ Lee Erman 1999:by 1977, the social context had changed. Dowie (1977:18) has been described as a firetrap pinto article and accused the agency of twisting to pressure the auto industry. The public interest generated by the article imposed a second investigation from Pinto and ensured that the National Commission for Displacement was under the duration of its term. ^ Daredes weigh 1982: On August 11, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (HTS) began an investigation of the allegations. ^ Jones 1978: But NHTSA, Department of Transport Agency, informed Ford on May 8 about results of the new investigation, which concluded that pre-1977 model year Ford Pintos was vulnerable to fuel tank damage, Fuel leaks and accidents caused by the fire that resulted in deaths and non-fatal burns when affected at moderate speeds, and that the fire threshold in those vehicles reached closing speeds of 30-35 mph. ^ Investigation Report: Alleged fuel tank and neck damage in rear collisions of passenger cars cars passenger cars, 1971-1976 Ford Pinto, 1975-1976 Mercury Bobcat (PDF) (report). Bureau of Imperfection Symour Investigation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. May 1978. Accessed March 5, 2016. Based on the information developed or obtained during this investigation, the following conlcusions were reached: 1971-1976 ford pintos experienced moderate speed, rear collisions that led to fuel tank damage, fuel leakage, and fire accidents that resulted in deaths and non-fatal burns. ^ Jones 1978: A NHTSA spokesman said that his agency and Ford began the negotiation process after May 8 that led to Ford's announcement in Detroit yesterday. ^ Lee and Erman 1999: NHTSA engineer Lee Strickland was assigned to determine whether Pinto (and Chevrolet Vega) tank problems warrant mandatory recall. The Strickland Pinto and Vega Working Group was held at a higher level than other vehicles (Strickland 1996). I gave up the usual moving barrier. Instead, the car deliberately chose a large and particularly rigid bullet to hit the pinto rear end. It weighed down the bullet car to provide a ready source for ignition. Gas tanks were completely filled in Cars with gasoline instead of non-flammable stoddard liquid are commonly used. Strickland justified these acts as identifying the worst conditions in the real world (Davidson 1983; 1983). NhTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). For THE NHTSA, the tests seemed to be an unconditional success: two pintos in 1972 burst into flames on impact. In the summer of 1978, THE NHTSA declared the Pinto gas tank a safety flaw, leading to the largest recall campaign in automotive history at the time (NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). Ford voluntarily agreed to call 1971-1976 Pintos. Other small cars sold during the 1970s were not mentioned, although most were comparable, or in the case of AMC Gremlin might be less secure (Schwartz 1991; 1991). NHTSA C7-38; Swegert and Farrell 198081:180). Its manufacturers successfully defended acceptable risks (see Wallace 1978). When we asked why NHTSA was forced to call Pinto for failing to test 35 mph, although most small cars couldn't withstand such a test, Strickland (1996) symmetry that, just because your friends get away with stealing stores, doesn't mean you should get away with it too. ^ Me, Matthew T (1998). Ford Pinto case and the development of automotive safety systems, 1893-1978. Business and economic history. 27 (2): 390-401. ^ Schwartz 1991: Relying on a variety of external sources (including Ford), NHTSA indicated that it was aware of thirty-eight cases in which the rear end effect on pintos led to a fuel tank or fire leak; These cases, in turn, resulted in twenty-seven non-fatal burn deaths and twenty-four injuries.66 The NHTSA Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS), which began operating in 1975. FARS data showed that from January 1975 to mid-1977, seventeen people died in accidents in which pinto rear collisions led to fires. 67 In comparing the NHTSA figure of 1975-77.68 one should keep in mind that the number of pintos on the road was increasing each year in a cumulative manner. The NHTSA figure of twenty-seven dead thus appears almost in the stadium by suggesting a number of people who died in the Pinto rear fires. However, the National Timber and Timber an a result of high-speed collisions that would stimulate leakage even in state-of-the-art fuel systems; ^ Lee and Erman 1999: Beginning in the late 1970s, claims With Pinto Madness easily gained public acceptance, but contradictory credible claims did not (for example, Davidson 1983; Epstein 1980). For example, the governor's estimate of Dowie for 500 deaths (1977:18) was accepted, while the NHTSA report that only 27 fire-related deaths from Pinto (NHTSA C7-38; ignored 1985) was documented. A transport problem that also caused 27 Pinto's death (and 180 on other Ford Products Clark 1988) never became a social problem. Similarly, the public accepted claims for safety errors made by Harley Cobb, a Ford engineer who was apparently abroad when crucial decisions were made early (Camp 1997; Strobel 1980), but ignoring other safety conscious Pinto engineers who believeed windshield retention was a more important safety problem (Camps 1997), and the lack of safety glass caused more deaths (Feaheny 1997). ^ Lee and Erman 1999: By the time of the Pinto investigation, NHTSA had essentially abandoned its original mission of imposing industry-wide safety improvements, First, NHTSA was pressured by specific organizations in its network (such as the Center for Car Safety) and members of the public (see NHTSA C7-38) to take action on the Pinto gas tank. The network (such as the courts, the Nixon administration, and the auto industry) is steadily reducing the NHTSA's ability to address systemic car safety issues. ^ Danley 2005: Ford could have refused to mention and chose instead to defend Pinto's design at official recall sessions at the NHTSA. While this tactic could easily delay any forced recall for months, if not more than a year, the cost of hearings announced for Ford's reputation could have been significant, even if Ford had ultimately succeeded. Ford voluntarily agreed to recall Pinto in June 1978. A Lee Erman 1999: The Pinto was the subject of the large calls in car history at home. ^ Jones 1978: In a statement prepared, Ford Vice President [Hert] Mach said: Ford NHTS is informed that it does not agree with the agency's OUT decision of May 8 to risk unreasonable safety being involved in the design of these cars ... Mesh said Ford decided to submit the amendments in order to end the public concern caused by criticism of fuel systems in these vehicles. ^ 1975 Ford Pinto, NHTSA, ^ Rifwerk 2003; Ford customers raise 117 lawsuits, according to Peter Woden in The Unknown Of Jaluka, ^ Dunley 2005; Two Mission Cases Were Central Legal, One was a civil trial that began in August 1977 in Orange County, California, Grimshaw y, Ford Motor Company. The other relates to a reckless murder in Indiana. A Schwartz 1991: Pinto Then hit by a car, which was originally traveling at about fifty miles per hour at the point of impact.9... [Footnote 9] For reasons that are completely beyond the control of the Court, the Court must be treated with caution in its opinion as a source of actual facts. Because the defendant was appealing the jury's verdict in favour of the plaintiffs, the court was obliged to look at all the evidence in a manner more appropriate to the plaintiffs and to ignore the evidence in the record that might be favourable to the defendant. See number 773, 820, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359, 388. In fact, Ford's primary position at the trial was that the court opinion at no time mentioned that the approaching car (A Ford Galaxy) had not slowed down at all, hitting the Grey car at speeds exceeding 50 miles per hour. There was an enormous amount of evidence in the trial that supported both the factual allegations of the parties regarding the speed of the galaxy's closure. If the jury had accepted Ford's speed assessment, there wouldn't be much of a question of the validity of the malfunctions: for the plaintiffs' position throughout the trial, it was that even the advanced fuel system could not maintain integrity in a 50-mile-per-hour collision. ^ Danley 2005: pg 208 ^ Schwartz 1991:pg 1016 ^ Me and Ermann 1999: Based on information given to her by lawyers preparing cases against Ford, the Center for Motor Safety petition NHTSA in the mid-1970s to investigate pinto's rear design. According to the materials presented on the Centre's website Doi's article is based on that information provided by the Centre (www.autosafety.org). Pinto Madness is still available on Mother Jones's website along with a video showing Pinto caught fire after the background was over. In an interview with Schwartz, Cobb confirmed that he was also a major source of information about the story of Jones's mother, Schwartz, the legend of the Ford Pinto case, 1027, n.53 ^ Schwartz 1991: After trading for eight hours the Gray family was awarded unlawful death damages of \$560,000; Grimshaw received more than \$2.5 million in damages and \$125 million in punitive damages as well. The court judge reduced the decision to compensate for punitive damages to \$3.5 million as a condition for denying the Court a new trial. Two years later, the Court of Appeal confirmed these findings in all respects; the State Supreme Court then refused to hold a hearing. ^ Christian, Nichol M;2;1;; Henderson, Angelo B. Nomani, Abra S (October 9, 1997). Chrysler is to be paid jurors in the Mini Van accident trial. The Wall Street Journal p. 1. Accessed March 4, 2016. ^ McLellan, Dennis (April 19, 2008). A retired judge or. C took over key issues. Los Angeles Times. Accessed March 4, 2016. ^ Danley 2005: pg 209 ^ Williams, Carol J. (March 14, 2010). Toyota is just the latest automaker to face auto safety Los Angeles Times. Accessed March 4, 2016. ^ Viscosi, W. Cape (February 2000). Corporate Risk Analysis: Reckless Action? (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 52 (3): 569. Doi: 10.2307/1229473. hdl:1803/6556. JSTOR 1229473. The basic problem is that jurors do not take a comprehensive approach to risk analysis, regardless of its nature. Jurors tend to compare the very small safety cost of often per unit with those of the injured victim. Instead of examining the entire market and the associated benefits and costs, jurors will be offended by a comprehensive approach to risk analysis or will not fully understand, and will focus their assessment more narrowly on the specific victim and the costs of preventing the injury. The fact that these costs would also have been incurred to the thousands of consumers who were unharmed would not be on the horizon, as Judge Easterbrook confirmed. Thus, there is a tendency to show bias too late rather than considering the expected costs and benefits at the time of the safety decision. ^ Viscosi, W. Cape (February 2000). Corporate Risk Analysis: Reckless Action? (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 52 (3): 569. Doi: 10.2307/1229473. Adl:1803/6556. JSTOR 1229473. ^ Schwartz, Gary T. (1982-1983). Deterrence and punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: suspension. Southern California Law Review: 134. Thus, the opinion of the Court of Appeal suggests that the Court was similarly willing to confirm the trial judge's decision to pay \$125 million. From a deterrence point of view, it confuses understanding to allow for widespread uncertainty as to the level of punishment expected. A Schwartz 1991: Therefore, there was no apparent error in subjecting Ford to liability for damages caused by this last category of fires. However, the punitive compensation decision in the Ford Pinto case is much more difficult than to justify. To a large extent they fall on the premise that Ford has acted reprehensible when balanced safety versus cost in pinto design. However, the process by which manufacturers make these differential design discount does not just seem to be recognized. Accordingly, the decision of the Bento jury that disciplinary damages were appropriate - a decision confirmed by the trial judge and the Court of Appeal raises serious questions about the importance of Indiana against Ford Motor Company from a legal point of view. This was the first time that criminal charges had been purchased against an American company for poor product design. According to lawyer Malcolm Wheeler (1981, p. 250), no [ewspapers] referred to her The most important economic situation of the century ... The idea that a company could question its criminal acts was a new legal concept at the time. Wheeler was not alone in his assessment of the case as influential. Because of the application as unprecedented (Welty, 1982) and a historical case (Clinard, 1990; Frank And Lynch, 1992; Hills, 1987; Maxtad, 1987), 15. McStad (1987, p. 7) stated that the case had set an important precedent; in some cases involving human health and safety, companies and their executives could be required not only to be subject to scrutiny and penalties imposed by traditional federal regulatory agencies, but also to state criminal courts. Pinto's rule lets us make off the hook. Christian Science Monitor. Accessed March 3, 2016. An Indiana jury in a landmark 10-week trial found Ford not guilty in the back by a speeding truck on August 10, 1978. A Schwartz 1991: In August 1978- half a year after the verdict in the 1973 Bento Damage case was involved in a fatal crash in Ulrich, Indiana. Indiana public officials decided to prosecute Ford for reckless homicide. Because the Reckless Killing Act was enacted only in 1977, Ford could not be prosecuted for the reckless design of Pinto; Rather, the prosecution needed to show recklessness after -1977's failure by Fordddiao. Due largely to the narrowness of the resulting issue, the prosecution was unable to secure the acceptance of Ford's internal documents that he had hoped to build his case. Ford's defense efforts in this criminal case were considerably more ambitious than the company's earlier effort to defend itself against Grimshaw's claim of damage. In March 1980, a jury in Indiana found Ford not guilty. The jury seemed contradictory about Pinto, but concluded that Ford avoided recklessness in carrying out the subpoena program. A Levton, Joyce (February 4, 1980). W.A. Local charges Pinto with murder, and James Neal's Watergate comes to the defense. People. 13 (5). Accessed March 3, 2016. ^ Gladwell 2015: Former President of the N.H.T.S.A. testified on Beford's behalf, noting that in his opinion Pinto's design was no more or less than any other car in its class, such as the Chevrolet Vega or A.M.C. ^ Baker, Gibson and Bruce 2002 ^ Shervekin 2003: A low point for Ford came in 1979 when Indiana authorities charged the automaker with reckless murder in a criminal trial. ^ Baker, Gibson and Bruce 2002: Two key perspectives emerged after pinto's trial on how the outcome of the case would affect future uses of criminal law against for product liability issues. One view was mentioned by the then President of the National Prosecutors Association, Robert Johnson, Sr. quoted as saying we will see more prosecutions like this ... A psychological barrier has been broken, and large companies become responsible for their actions. Thus, the prevailing sentiment among some legal commentators was that the Pinto case represented a fundamental shift in how criminal courts perceived companies. ... Another perspective is that the case was quite trivial. Commenting on the civil litigation, Harry Philo, then president-elect of the American Trial Lawyers Association, said: In my opinion, the Pinto case was a totally irrelevant lawsuit (Stewart, 1980, p. 4). However, he also stated that the provision would not deter civil proceedings (Melchko, 1980, Action Act). ^ Epstein 1980: The important point here is that neither the drama of the situation nor its outcome should be allowed to obscure the basic legal and a institutional issues. In the register, such criminal prosecution should never have been presented. ^ Baker, Jipson and Bruce 2002: The fact that there has been no other criminal liability products since that case tells you one significant impact of the case was ... [That] said that criminal law is a very bad tool to use in product litigation. It's not just suitable ^ Baker, Jipson and Bruce 2002: Paul Weaver worked for Ford Motor Company from 1978 to 1980 in the company positions on policy issues. Ford criticized how to deal with the bento controversy. According to Weaver (1988, p. 94), r the design of the Pento fuel system was essentially the same as other cars of their size and generation and pintos had about the same rate of fire deaths caused by rear collision as other small cars. His assertion is that Pinto was not unusual compared to similar models. Weaver admits that he simply should have told the truth about the car and [he] didn't fight to defend ourselves. Thus, by refusing to launch a major propaganda campaign, Ford gave the impression that he was guilty. ... These observations add an interesting dimension to the Pinto case in that one of the obvious lessons has been to address the issues raised about defective products. This concern explains that after the Pinto case, companies became more prepared and adept at dealing with images resulting from poor design. In other words, the Pinto case has made companies more willing to fight public relations battles over design and production flaws. ^ A.B. Schwartz 1991 Footnote 1029 ^ Schwartz 1991 pg 1031 ^ Schwartz 1991 pg 1033 Recall Affecting 165,000 US Pinto owners. Read the eagle. Associated Press. March 30, 1971. Accessed March 7, 2016. Baker, Paul J. Gibson, Arthur J.; Bruce, Alan S. (March 2002). Indiana V. Ford Motor Company revisited. American Journal of Criminal Justice. 26 (2): 181–202. Doi: 10.1007/bf02887826. S2CID 144364586. Ford Pinto fuel tank. Center for Car Safety. November 13, 2009. Accessed March 5, 2016. The government's support for the government's work in the field of women's affairs has been very limited. Bento Shine: Legal responsibility, moral blame, and risk. Quarterly Business Ethics. 15 (2): 205–236. Doi: 10.5840/beg200515211. 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services geography syllabus pdf , 28 day keto diet meal plan , kozipabovozubi.pdf ,